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Our  Military  History 


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Our  Military  History 

Its  Fads  and  Fallacies 


By 

Leonard  Wood 

Major  General,  U.  S.  Army 


Chicago 
The  Reilly  8C  Britton  Co, 


VI K*3 
^1% 


Copyright,  1916 

By 

The  Reilly  &  Britton  Co. 


^ 


Our  Military  History 


FOREWORD 

Panic  patriotism  appears  from  time 
to  time  when  the  clouds  of  possible 
trouble  loom  up  heavier  than  usual. 
There  is  much  discussion,  some  fever- 
ish activity,  but  little  accomplishment. 

Adequate  national  preparedness  on 
sound  lines  will  be  secured  only  when 
there  is  a  general  appreciation  of  its 
vital  importance  for  defense  and  of  the 
further  fact  that  it  can  not  be  impro- 
vised or  done  in  a  hurry.  It  includes 
both  moral  and  material  organization. 

Military  preparedness,  which  in- 
cludes preparation  on  land  and  sea, 
should  go  hand  and  hand  with  a 
nation's  policy.  Our  policy  is  not  one 
of  aggression,  but  one  which  looks  only 


336840 


Foreword 

to  a  secure  defense.  Consequently,  the 
arrangements  for  our  military  estab- 
lishment should  be  limited  to  the  needs 
of  a  secure  and  certain  national  defense 
against  any  force  which  may  be 
brought  against  us. 

A  brief  review  of  our  past  military 
policy,  its  shortcomings  and  cost,  may 
aid  in  establishing  an  appreciation  of 
our  needs. 


CONTENTS 

I     The  Cost  of  Unprepared- 

ness    9 

II     The  Struggle  for  Peace.     31 

III     Past  National  Policy.  ...     55 

IV     Lessons  of  the  Revolution     87 

V     Seventy  Years  of  Ineffi- 
ciency         122 

VI     The  Price  of  Unprepared- 

ness  in  the  Sixties ....    149 

VII     The   Value  of   Prepared- 
ness       168 

VIII     What  We  Should  Do...   193 

IX     Constructive  Work  of  the 

Army    227 

Appendix   228 

The  Australian  System  228 
The  Swiss  System 236 


Our  Military  History 


chapter  i 
The  Cost  of  Unpreparedness 

"Our    culture    must,   therefore,   not 
omit  the  arming  of  the  man." 

— Emerson. 

Wars  and  rumors  of  wars  world- 
wide in  extent  have  aroused  to  an 
unusual  degree  the  interest  of  the 
American  people  in  their  own  military 
problems,  especially  the  question  of 
national  defense,  including,  as  it  must, 
the  organization  of  national  resources. 

There  is  a  failure  on  the  part  of 
our  people  to  appreciate  the  defects  of 
our  military  organization  in  the  past, 
9 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

and  a  tendency  growing  out  of  this 
state  of  misinformation  as  to  what  has 
been  really  done,  to  continue  to  place 
too  much  dependence  upon  a  military 
policy  found  gravely  defective,  even 
to  the  extent  of  endangering  success 
and  in  most  instances  making  it  unnec- 
essarily costly. 

There  is  still  a  general  lack  of 
appreciation  of  the  fact  that  military 
operations,  in  order  to  be  effective, 
must  be  conducted  by  highly  trained, 
well  organized  and  equipped  forces,  and 
that  such  training,  organization  and 
equipment  require  much  time  and  must 
be  accompanied  by  an  organization  of 
industrial  resources,  all  in  complete 
readiness  in  advance  of  the  day  of 
trouble. 

There  is  a  general  tendency  to  con- 
sider   that    our   geographical    position 
10 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

renders  us  secure  from  invasion  and 
that  our  numbers,  resources  and  wealth 
would  be  a  secure  defense  if  we  should 
be  attacked.  These  very  dangerous 
misconceptions  are  largely  due  to  a 
failure  on  the  part  of  our  educational 
institutions,  public  and  private,  to  teach 
properly  our  military  history,  and  espe- 
cially to  their  failure  to  present  that 
side  of  it  which  relates  to  the  methods 
employed  in  the  conduct  of  our  mili- 
tary establishment  in  the  past. 

With  few  exceptions,  the  teaching  of 
the  military  history  of  our  country  has 
not  been  such  as  to  give  the  people  a 
correct  idea  of  our  military  achieve- 
ments or  of  the  conditions  under  which 
military  operations  have  been  con- 
ducted. As  a  rule,  students  leave 
school,  and  even  college,  not  only  with 
superficial  knowledge,  but  often  with 
11 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

entirely  incorrect  ideas  concerning  our 
achievements  in  war.  They  know  little 
or  nothing  of  the  system  under  which 
we  have  raised  and  maintained  our 
armies,  still  less  of  the  unnecessary  cost 
in  life  and  treasure  which  has  charac- 
terized the  conduct  of  our  wars,  or  the 
reasons  therefor.  Only  too  often  the 
real  facts  of  our  failures  are  overlooked 
and  the  account  of  our  successes  exag- 
gerated. The  schools  teach  the  dates 
of  battles  and  the  names  of  the  com- 
manding generals,  but  nothing  of  the 
organization  which  determined  the  effi- 
ciency of  military  operations  in  our 
various  wars. 

The  natural  result  has  been  an 
unwarranted  degree  of  confidence,  a 
confidence  which  has  grown  into  a 
belief  that  we  always  have  been  easily 
successful  in  war;  that,  in  the  language 
12 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

of  the  Fourth  of  July  orator,  we  can 
defeat  a  world  in  arms.  The  effect  of 
this  lack  of  sound  information  is  not 
limited  by  any  means  to  those  in  pri- 
vate life,  but  too  often  characterizes 
the  remarks  of  those  in  places  of  trust 
and  responsibility  who  should  know 
better.  The  result  of  this  general 
failure  to  teach  correctly  our  military 
history,  and  of  the  resulting  mis- 
information concerning  it,  is  seen  in 
the  general  lack  of  interest  in  our 
military  situation,  ignorance  of  the 
most  elementary  facts  concerning  our 
military  establishment,  its  organization, 
strength,  equipment  and  needs. 

There  is  a  lack  of  information  also 
as  to  the  nation's  resources  in  men  and 
material,  both  mechanical  and  chemi- 
cal. Americans  are  unaware  that  this 
country  is  depending  upon  sea  control 
13 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

for  many  of  these,  and  are  uninformed 
as  to  the  time  required  to  make  arms 
and  ammunition.  Intelligent  public 
interest  in  adequate  preparedness  has 
been  so  long  dormant,  and  ignorance 
of  the  need  of  it  is  so  general,  that  our 
people  do  not  appreciate  how  many 
links  in  our  industrial  and  chemical 
chain  are  wanting,  how  many  breaks 
are  tied  together  with  string,  how 
helpless  the  nation  would  be  in  certain 
lines  of  endeavor  without  these  missing 
necessities. 

They  are  cheerfully  confident  that 
an  untrained  American  is  as  effective 
in  war  as  a  highly  trained  and  equally 
well  educated  foreigner  of  equal  phys- 
ical strength  and  intelligence.  There 
is  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  fact 
that  willingness  does  not  mean  fitness 
or  ability.  This  condition  of  mind  is 
14 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

undoubtedly  ascribable  to  the  fact  that 
we  have  been  actively  engaged  in  mat- 
ters in  no  way  relating  to  our  military 
establishment,  an  immense  work  has 
been  accomplished  in  developing  our 
resources.  We  are  entitled  to  credit 
for  what  we  have  done,  and  we  can 
justly  take  much  pride  in  it.  We  now 
need  pitiless  publicity  as  to  the  defects 
in  our  military  system,  organization 
and  resources,  which  have  characterized 
them  and  endangered  our  safety  in  all 
our  past  wars. 

The  general  lack  of  information  and 
interest  in  military  matters  is  the  result 
of  various  causes;  but  first  and  fore- 
most is  the  want  of  sound  teaching  of  v 
our  national  history,  especially  its  mili- 
tary side,  and  an  unwarranted  sense 
of  security  because  of  our  assumed 
inaccessibility.  It  is  also  due  in  a 
15 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

measure  to  our  rapid  expansion,  accom- 
panied by  the  development  of  our  vast 
resources.  We  have  unconsciously 
come  to  look  upon  the  size,  wealth  and 
population  of  our  country  as  sufficient 
protection,  forgetting  that  without  the 
organization  of  our  resources  and  the 
training  of  our  men  these  will  be  of 
little  value  against  lesser  forces  well 
organized  and  prepared,  and  ignoring 
also  the  further  fact  that  valuable  ter- 
ritory, great  wealth,  and  commercial 
aggressiveness,  accompanied  by  weak 
arrangements  for  defense,  are  always 
an  incentive  to  attack. 

For  many  years  after  the  Civil  War 
we  had  a  large,  well-trained,  though 
unorganized,  reserve  of  officers  and 
men  who  had  seen  service.  This  fact 
gave  us  for  many  years  a  sense  of 
security  which  was  well  justified. 
16 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

Gradually  this  reserve  of  well-trained 
men  has  passed  away. 

The  Spanish  War  gave  little  train- 
ing, as  did  the  Philippine  insurrection. 
Campaigns  of  this  kind  are  of  limited 
value  as  a  preparation  for  war  with 
an  organized,  prepared  power.  Our 
reserves  to-day  are  reserves  in  name 
only  and  consist  of  those  trained  but 
unlisted  and  unlocated  men  who  have 
served  in  our  army  and  have  gone  back 
into  the  mass  of  the  people,  forgotten 
and  unheeded,  valuable  material  lost. 
Their  number  is  only  a  fraction  in 
comparison  with  the  well-trained  alien 
reservists  living  in  this  country  but 
owing  military  obligation  to  their  home 
countries.  The  balance  of  our  reserve 
consists  of  the  wholly  untrained  and 
unprepared  men  of  our  population,  of 
little  military  value  until  trained. 
17 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

The  general  failure  to  impress  upon 
our  people  the  defects,  weakness  and 
unreliability  of  our  militia  and  volun- 
teer systems  in  the  past,  has  resulted 
in  an  unwarranted  degree  of  depen- 
dency upon  them  as  reliable  instru- 
ments of  defense,  a  dependence  which 
is  not  warranted  by  careful  study  of 
the  real  facts  of  our  military  history; 
a  dependence  which,  if  continued,  will 
cost  us  dearly  in  case  of  war  with  an 
organized  military  power  of  the  first 
class. 

The  spirit  of  the  officers  and  men 
who  served  under  these  systems,  and 
are  now  serving  under  one  of  them,  is 
good,  but  neither  of  the  systems  will 
stand  the  test  of  war  with  an  organized 
and  trained  force.  They  will  crumple 
up  at  the  first  heavy  impact  of  such  a 
force.  The  reason  will  not  be  the 
18 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

physical  or  moral  deficiency  of  the 
men,  but  the  fact  that  they  will  be  un- 
trained. If  all  great  nations  were 
trusting  to  military  props  of  the  type 
of  these,  the  condition  as  to  possible 
defense  would  not  be  so  serious,  but 
even  in  this  case  the  waste  of  life  in 
camp  and  field  from  ignorance  of  the 
proper  care  of  men  and  lack  of  train- 
ing for  leading  them  in  action,  should 
condemn  these  systems  on  the  ground 
of  plain  humanity.1 

The  danger  of  depending  on  these 
systems  or  upon  either  one  of  them 
should  be  made  clear  to  our  people  in 
order  that  their  support  may  be  had  in 
establishing  a  sound  policy,  one  which 

1  Every  American  should  read  Emory  Up- 
ton's Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  and 
follow  it  up  with  Huidekoper's  work,  which 
brings  the  statement  of  our  military  policy,  or 
lack  of  it,  up  to  date. 

19 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

will  give  the  largest  measure  of  insur- 
ance against  war,  one  which  will,  if  war 
be  forced  upon  us,  enable  us  to  conduct 
it  with  the  minimum  loss  of  life.  We 
have  no  right  to  employ  the  services  of 
loyal  and  willing  men  under  a  system 
which  insures  the  maximum  loss  of  life 
and  the  minimum  of  success,  a  system 
which  has  been  condemned  by  military 
experts  the  world  over,  including  our 
own.  A  continuance  of  these  systems, 
or  either  one  of  them,  invites  attack 
and  greatly  increases  the  probability 
of  defeat.  The  real  facts  of  our  mili- 
tary history  make  these  conclusions  so 
absolutely  clear  that  he  who  runs  may 
read. 

"  In  time  of  peace  prepare  for  war!  " 
This  was  the  advice  of  George  Wash- 
ington.    It  was  drawn  from  the  expe- 
rience  of  all   time.      The   advice   was 
20 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

sound  and  conservative  when  given.  It 
is  of  even  more  importance  to-day,  for 
the  reason  that  organization,  prepara- 
tion, rapidity  of  transportation,  have 
all  tremendously  increased  the  rapidity 
of  the  onset  of  modern  war. 

There  is  nothing  particularly  new  in 
the  condition  of  the  world  to-day,  so 
far  as  our  own  situation  is  concerned, 
as  the  following  extracts  from  the 
messages  of  the  early  presidents  indi- 
cate. As  one  reads  them  he  cannot 
fail  to  be  impressed  with  the  fact  that 
with  the  change  of  a  word  here  and 
there  they  are  as  applicable  to  condi- 
tions to-day  as  when  written. 

On  December  3,  1799,  President 
John  Adams,  in  his  third  annual 
address,  spoke  as  follows: 

"  At  a  period  like  the  present,  when 
momentous  changes  are  occurring  and 
21 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

every  hour  is  preparing  new  and  great 
events  in  the  political  world,  when  a 
spirit  of  war  is  prevalent  in  almost 
every  nation  with  whose  affairs  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  have 
any  connection,  unsafe  and  precarious 
would  be  our  situation  were  we  to 
neglect  the  means  of  maintaining  our 
just  rights.  The  result  of  the  mission 
to  France  is  uncertain;  but  however  it 
may  terminate,  a  steady  perseverance 
in  a  system  of  national  defense  com- 
mensurate with  our  resources  and  the 
situation  of  our  country  is  an  obvious 
dictate  of  wisdom;  for,  remotely  as  we 
are  placed  from  the  belligerent  nations, 
and  desirous  as  we  are,  by  doing  jus- 
tice to  all,  to  avoid  offense  to  any, 
nothing  short  of  the  power  of  repelling 
aggressions  will  secure  to  our  coun- 
try a  rational  prospect  of  escaping 
22 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

the     calamities    of    war    or    national 
degradation." 

A  few  years  later,  December  3, 
1805,  in  his  fifth  annual  message, 
President   Thomas   Jefferson   said: 

"  In  reviewing  these  injuries  from 
some  of  the  belligerent  powers,  the 
moderation,  the  firmness  and  the  wis- 
dom of  the  Legislature  will  all  be 
called  into  action.  We  ought  still  to 
hope  that  time  and  a  more  correct  esti- 
mate of  interest,  as  well  as  of  char- 
acter, will  produce  the  justice  we  are 
bound  to  expect.  But  should  any 
nation  deceive  itself  by  false  calcula- 
tions, and  disappoint  that  expectation, 
we  must  join  in  the  unprofitable  con- 
test of  trying  which  party  can  do  the 
other  the  most  harm.  Some  of  these 
injuries  may  perhaps  admit  a  peace- 
able remedy.  Where  that  is  competent 
23 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

it  is  always  the  most  desirable.  But 
some  of  them  are  of  a  nature  to  be 
met  by  force  only,  and  all  of  them 
may  lead  to  it.  I  can  not,  therefore, 
but  recommend  such  preparations  as 
circumstances  call  for." 

Two  years  later,  on  October  27, 
1807,  in  his  seventh  annual  message, 
Jefferson  made  the  following  state- 
ments : 

"  Circumstances,  fellow  citizens, 
which  seriously  threatened  the  peace  of 
our  country  have  made  it  a  duty  to 
convene  you  at  an  earlier  period  than 
usual.  The  love  of  peace  so  much 
cherished  in  the  bosoms  of  our  citizens, 
which  has  so  long  guided  the  proceed- 
ings of  their  public  councils  and 
induced  forbearance  under  so  many 
wrongs,  may  not  insure  our  continu- 
ance in  the  quiet  pursuits  of  industry. 
24 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

The  many  injuries  and  depredations 
committed  on  our  commerce  and  navi- 
gation upon  the  high  seas  for  years 
past,  the  successive  innovations  on 
those  principles  and  usage  of  nations 
as  the  rule  of  their  rights  and  peace, 
and  all  the  circumstances  which  induced 
the  extraordinary  mission  to  London 
are  already  known  to  you. 

"  Under  the  acts  of  March  11  and 
April  23,  respecting  arms,  the  difficulty 
of  procuring  them  from  abroad  during 
the  present  situation  and  dispositions  of 
Europe,  induced  us  to  direct  our  whole 
efforts  to  the  means  of  internal  supply. 
The  public  factories  have  therefore 
been  enlarged,  additional  machineries 
erected,  and,  in  proportion  as  artificers 
can  be  found  or  formed,  their  effect, 
already  more  than  doubled,  may  be 
increased  so  as  to  keep  pace  with  the 
25 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

yearly  increase  of  the  militia.  The 
annual  sums  appropriated  by  the  latter 
act  have  been  directed  to  the  encour- 
agement of  private  factories  of  arms, 
and  contracts  have  been  entered  into 
with  individual  undertakers  to  nearly 
the  amount  of  the  first  year's  appro- 
priation." 

On  February  18,  1815,  President 
James  Madison,  in  a  special  message, 
said: 

"  Experience  has  taught  us  that 
neither  the  pacific  dispositions  of  the 
American  people  nor  the  pacific  char- 
acter of  their  political  institutions  can 
altogether  exempt  them  from  that 
strife  which  appears  beyond  the  ordi- 
nary lot  of  nations  to  be  incident  to 
the  actual  period  of  the  world,  and  the 
same  faithful  monitor  demonstrates 
that  a  certain  degree  of  preparation 
26 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

for  war  is  not  only  indispensable  to 
avert  disasters  in  the  onset,  but  affords 
also  the  best  security  for  the  contin- 
uance of  peace." 

And  on  December  5,  1815,  in  his 
seventh  annual  message,  Madison  wrote 
as  follows: 

"  Notwithstanding  the  security  for 
future  repose  which  the  United  States 
ought  to  find  in  their  love  of  peace  and 
their  constant  respect  for  the  rights  of 
other  nations,  the  character  of  the  times 
particularly  inculcates  the  lesson  that, 
whether  to  prevent  or  repel  danger,  we 
ought  not  to  be  unprepared  for  it.  This 
consideration  will  sufficiently  recom- 
mend to  Congress  a  liberal  provision 
for  the  immediate  extension  and  grad- 
ual completion  of  the  works  of  defense, 
both  fixed  and  floating,  on  our  mari- 
time frontier,  and  an  adequate  provi- 
27 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

sion  for  guarding  our  inland  frontier 
against  dangers  to  which  certain  por- 
tions of  it  may  continue  to  be  exposed." 

The  foregoing  are  quoted  at  some 
length  for  the  purpose  of  pointing  out 
that  there  is  nothing  new  in  the  advice 
which  is  being  given  us  for  prepara- 
tion. The  general  conditions  under 
which  nations  live  always  render  ade- 
quate preparation  necessary,  and  our 
country  is  no  exception  to  the  rule. 
We  stand  to-day  after  a  period  of  a 
hundred  years  as  we  shall  probably 
stand  a  hundred  years  hence,  in  a 
position  that  renders  adequate  meas- 
ures of  defense  absolutely  necessary,  if 
we  consider  our  institutions  and  our 
rights  worth  defending,  and  are  to 
defend  them  successfully  against  pow- 
erful  adversaries. 

Our  presidents  throughout  the  entire 
28 


COST  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

period  of  our  national  life  have  con- 
stantly warned  our  people  with  refer- 
ence to  preparedness,  not  only  as  a 
measure  necessary  for  the  successful 
conduct  of  war,  but  more  often  as  a 
means  of  preventing  war. 

International  relations  are  in  a  little 
less  precarious  condition  in  these  days, 
speaking  of  the  world  at  large,  because 
the  telegraph,  the  wireless,  and  rapid 
transmission  of  dispatches  to  all  por- 
tions of  the  world,  make  full  and 
prompt  explanation  of  misunderstand- 
ings possible.  On  the  other  hand, 
rapid  transport  and  complete  organiza- 
tion make  preparation  even  more 
necessary,  as  less  time  is  given  to  pre- 
pare after  war  is  decided  upon. 

Earnest  efforts  have  been  made  for 
arbitration  and  the  maintenance  of 
world  peace,  but,  as  present  conditions 
29 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

indicate,  success  is  still  remote,  and 
every  nation,  while  striving  for  peace, 
must  make  adequate  preparation  to 
defend  its  life. 


30 


chapter  ii 
The  Struggle  for  Peace 

"But  in  demonstrating  by  our  con- 
duct that  we  do  not  fear  war  in  the 
necessary  protection  of  our  rights 
and  honor,  we  should  give  no  room  to 
infer  that  we  abandon  the  desire  of 
peace.  An  efficient  preparation  for 
war  can  alone  secure  peace." — John 
Adams,  Second  Annual  Message, 

There  is  nothing  new  in  the  move- 
ment for  peace.  It  is  centuries  old. 
Men  have  dreamed  of  it  since  they 
had  things  of  value  to  hold.  Women 
have  prayed  for  it  through  the  ages. 
Good  people  have  looked  forward  to 
the  day  of  peace  and  tranquility  since 
the  beginning  of  written  history,  and 
doubtless  long  before.  Just  as  they 
31 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

have  desired  to  avoid  great  misfor- 
tunes, plagues,  earthquakes,  fire,  or 
famine,  so  they  have  struggled  to 
escape  war,  except  in  those  instances 
where  war  was  the  lesser  of  two  evils. 
Yet  war  is  with  us  to-day,  was  with 
us  yesterday,  and  so  through  all  the 
years  since  history  records  man's  action 
or  tradition  tells  of  his  deeds. 

To-day,  initiated  as  a  rule  with  more 
formality,  conducted  with  greater 
regard  for  the  lives  of  the  noncom- 
batants,  and  characterized  by  a  larger 
measure  of  observance  of  the  dictates 
of  humanity  in  the  treatment  of  pris- 
oners and  the  helpless,  war  is  still  with 
us.  Peace  leagues  struggle  to  prevent 
it;  great  alliances  attempt  to  abate 
it  through  preponderant  forces  — 
through  war  itself,  if  need  be. 

Arbitration  serves  to  lessen  it  a 
32 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

little  through  disposing  of  many  minor 
questions  which,  if  allowed  to  grow, 
might  bring  about  disputes  resulting 
in  war.  As  one  of  the  means  of  pos- 
sible avoidance  of  a  resort  to  force, 
we  welcome  arbitration  with  open  arms 
and  strive  to  give  it  the  largest  meas- 
ure of  success,  although  realizing  that 
in  many  cases  it  will  not  avail  to  pre- 
vent that  final  resort  to  force  which 
can  only  be  avoided  when  all  great 
powers  think  alike.  That  time  will 
come  only  when  absolutely  unselfish 
justice  marks  international  relations; 
when  trade  is  equitably  shared  among 
competing  peoples;  when  the  rich  help 
freely  the  poor;  when  competition, 
greed,  selfishness,  race  interests  and 
prejudices  and  religious  intolerance 
pass  away;  when  men  and  nations  have 
no  fixed  convictions  which  differ  from 
33 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

those  of  others;  when  they  neither 
dream  dreams  nor  see  visions.  Until 
then,  strive  as  we  may,  the  cry  will  be 
"Peace!  Peace!"  and  yet  there  will 
be  no  permanent  peace.  Nevertheless, 
we  must  strive  unceasingly  to  reduce 
war  to  the  minimum,  and  to  build  up 
arbitration,  but  in  so  doing  we  must 
not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  our 
efforts  will  not  always  be  successful. 
An  infinite  wisdom  has  established 
the  conditions  under  which  we  live  and 
put  in  being  the  great  law  which  runs 
through  the  universe:  the  law  of  the 
survival  of  the  most  fit.  We  may 
struggle  against  it,  but  it  rules  in  its 
general  application.  The  most  fit  in 
a  military  way,  which  includes  good 
bodies,  based  on  good  food,  careful 
sanitation,  well  thought-out  training, 
clear  intelligence  resting  on  good 
34 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

schools  and  early  training,  good  arma- 
ment, equipment  and  organization,  all 
springing  from  intelligence  and  edu- 
cation applied  to  self -protection  and 
expansion  of  interests  and  trade,  will 
win  in  war  just  as  they  win  in 
commerce. 

They  may  not  be  the  most  fit  in 
abstract  morality  as  relates  to  busi- 
ness relations  between  individuals  or 
nations,  or  with  regard  to  generosity 
or  sense  of  justice.  The  characteristics 
of  selfishness,  self-interest  and  the 
spirit  of  acquisitiveness  are  often 
accompanied  by  a  development  of  the 
means  to  get  what  is  coveted  and  to 
hold  it  securely.  Human  nature  in 
the  mass  is  still  human  nature;  under 
a  little  more  restraint,  perhaps,  but 
still  the  old  complex  proposition  of 
the  ages,  characterized  and  controlled 
35 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

only  too  often  by  expediency  and  self- 
interest. 

Nations  are  but  collections  of  indi- 
viduals; we  need  courts  for  the 
individual  man,  and  courts  are  of  no 
avail  without  the  police.  In  the  vast 
group  of  individuals  constituting  a 
community,  city  or  nation,  the  resort 
to  force  by  small  groups  representing 
perhaps  a  thousandth,  or  less,  of  the 
population,  is  a  nuisance  and  is  not 
permitted  by  the  great  aggregation  of 
the  individuals  among  whom  they  live, 
as  it  interferes  with  the  interest  and 
activities,  often  safety,  of  too  many 
other  people.  The  individuals  in  the 
community  of  nations  are  few  in  num- 
ber, and  it  is  much  less  easy  to  bring 
preponderant  force  to  the  control  or 
restraint  of  the  more  powerful. 

Yet  as  men  struggle  within  the 
36 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

community  and  too  often  resort  to 
force  unless  restrained,  so  do  nations 
struggle  and  resort  to  force  in  the 
world  community,  only  here  counter 
force  in  the  form  of  international 
police  has  never  been  resorted  to.  Can 
it  be  effectively  done  while  there  still 
exist  strong  groups  characterized  by 
century-old  prejudices  of  race  and 
interest?  This  is  one  of  the  great 
questions  of  the  hour.  While  consider- 
ing it  we  should  not  neglect  prepara- 
tion for  defense  or  fail  to  recognize 
conditions  as  they  are. 

The  maintenance  of  peace  and  the 
prevention  of  war  have  been  attempted 
through  alliances  to  compel  or  regulate 
the  action  of  other  groups  or  other 
combinations  of  nations,  by  efforts  so 
to  group  nations  as  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  power  between  people  whose 
37 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

only  too  often  by  expediency  and  self- 
interest. 

Nations  are  but  collections  of  indi- 
viduals; we  need  courts  for  the 
individual  man,  and  courts  are  of  no 
avail  without  the  police.  In  the  vast 
group  of  individuals  constituting  a 
community,  city  or  nation,  the  resort 
to  force  by  small  groups  representing 
perhaps  a  thousandth,  or  less,  of  the 
population,  is  a  nuisance  and  is  not 
permitted  by  the  great  aggregation  of 
the  individuals  among  whom  they  live, 
as  it  interferes  with  the  interest  and 
activities,  often  safety,  of  too  many 
other  people.  The  individuals  in  the 
community  of  nations  are  few  in  num- 
ber, and  it  is  much  less  easy  to  bring 
preponderant  force  to  the  control  or 
restraint  of  the  more  powerful. 

Yet  as  men  struggle  within  the 
36 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

community  and  too  often  resort  to 
force  unless  restrained,  so  do  nations 
struggle  and  resort  to  force  in  the 
world  community,  only  here  counter 
force  in  the  form  of  international 
police  has  never  been  resorted  to.  Can 
it  be  effectively  done  while  there  still 
exist  strong  groups  characterized  by 
century-old  prejudices  of  race  and 
interest?  This  is  one  of  the  great 
questions  of  the  hour.  While  consider- 
ing it  we  should  not  neglect  prepara- 
tion for  defense  or  fail  to  recognize 
conditions  as  they  are. 

The  maintenance  of  peace  and  the 
prevention  of  war  have  been  attempted 
through  alliances  to  compel  or  regulate 
the  action  of  other  groups  or  other 
combinations  of  nations,  by  efforts  so 
to  group  nations  as  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  power  between  people  whose 
37 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

territorial  expansion  and  increase  of 
population  and  interests  might  other- 
wise jeopardize  peace.  These  efforts 
have  usually  resulted  in  war  sooner 
or  later,  although  in  many  instances 
serving  to  maintain  peace  for  long 
periods.  The  policy  of  no  combination 
satisfies  the  greed,  ambition  or  policy 
of  all  its  members,  and  eventually  the 
dominating  interest  of  one  or  more 
members  of  such  a  combination,  or  the 
injection  of  new  interests  or  condi- 
tions, serves  after  a  time  to  bring 
about  the  loosening  of  the  bonds  of  the 
alliance  and  the  formation  of  new 
combinations,  too  often  with  a  resort 
to  force  as  the  final  argument. 

Thus  far  we  see  little  prospect  of 

change.     We   may  hold   down   for   a 

time  the  explosive  pressure  or  give  it  a 

safe  vent,  but  from  time  to  time  human 

38 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

effort  will  fail  and  the  explosion  will 
occur.  In  other  words,  the  controlling 
nations  are  too  few  in  number  and 
their  vital  interests  are  so  coincident 
or  interwoven  with  those  of  the  con- 
trolled nations  that  constant  changes 
and  rearrangements  result  in  this 
grouping,  and  these  changes  inevitably 
bring  about  an  appeal  to  force.  It  is 
difficult  to  see  how  this  condition  can 
be  changed  so  long  as  national  lines 
exist  and  racial  groups  continue,  or 
certain  trade  areas  remain  under  the 
control  of  these  groups. 

Justice  and  righteousness  are  not 
enough  to  insure  protection,  nor  is  an 
upright  and  blameless  personal  or 
national  life  a  guarantee  against  the 
unscrupulous.  A  Pilate  was  found  to 
crucify  Christ;  and  a  strong,  aggres- 
sive nation,  believing  in  its  own  worth 
39 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

| 
and  right  to  expand,  has  always  been 

prone  to  crush  and  coerce  a  weaker 

one,  regardless  of  the  abstract  justice 

of  the  weaker  nation's  cause. 

Why  all  these  things  are,  is  a  ques- 
tion which  this  world  cannot  answer  in 
precise  terms,  and  with  such  answer  we 
are  not  at  this  moment  concerned. 

We  can  with  justice  say  that  public 
and  national  morality  is  largely  the 
reflection  of  the  education  of  our 
youth.  Given  sound  moral  training  in 
the  home,  a  healthy  body  and  a  devel- 
oped sense  of  justice  and  fair  play, 
and  you  have  the  youth  who  will  most 
probably  make  the  sound,  just  and 
normal  man  in  public  life,  the  best 
citizen,  and,  collectively,  when  assem- 
bled in  legislative  bodies  or  engaged  in 
executive  or  administrative  work,  the 
man  who  will  act  on  the  most  just, 
40 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

reasonable  and  tolerant  lines.  But 
even  among  men  of  this  class  there 
will  be  strong  differences  of  opinion 
and  it  is  little  short  of  folly  to  assume 
the  contrary.  We  may  diminish  the 
frequency  of  strife  and  make  more 
humane  the  struggle,  but  for  the 
present  nothing  more. 

Blood,  race,  tradition,  trade  and  a 
host  of  other  influences,  capped  by 
ambition  to  go  on,  to  lead,  to  expand, 
will  always  produce  strife.  We  cannot 
escape  this  conclusion  if  we  take  as 
our  guide  the  evidence  of  things  done 
and  being  done,  rather  than  follow  the 
dictates  of  fancy  or  desire.  The  strug- 
gle for  peace  is  centuries  old,  and 
efforts  to  end  war  and  establish  undis- 
turbed peace  have  filled  the  minds  of 
men  and  taxed  the  resources  of  nations. 
The  great  combinations  of  power  to 
41 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

prevent  war  were,  after  all,  but  combi- 
nations of  forces  to  restrain  the  exer- 
cise of  force,  and  have  more  often 
than  not  ended  in  a  great  struggle  for 
readjustment  of  the  balance  of  power. 
The  theories  and  policies  of  addled 
minds  and  shallow  intelligences,  prod- 
ucts of  the  applause  of  the  lecture 
platform,  or  of  minds  upset  by  the 
flattery  incident  to  sudden  wealth,  have 
had  their  share  of  attention,  and  even 
of  sympathy.  After  all,  they  indicate 
only  a  failure  to  understand  that  war 
generally  has  its  roots  running  deep 
below  the  surface  that  is  swept  by  the 
gaze  of  such  observers.  The  authors 
of  these  theories  never  have  studied 
seriously  the  causes  of  war.  They 
assign  as  causes  the  little  incidents 
which  serve  to  touch  off  the  mass  of 
explosive  which  other  forces  have  been 
42 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

accumulating  and  piling  up  for  a  gen- 
eration or  perhaps  a  century. 

War,  whether  it  be  for  evil  or  good, 
is  among  men,  and  our  clear  duty  is 
to  recognize  this  fact,  instead  of  deny- 
ing the  evidence  of  our  senses  simply 
because  it  is  disagreeable  and  brutal, 
something  that  we  would  get  rid  of. 
Our  duty  is  to  protect  ourselves  as  best 
we  can  against  war  and  build  our  pro- 
tection on  so  secure  a  foundation  and 
maintain  its  efficiency  so  systematically 
that  our  own  institutions,  ideals  and 
interests  may  be  secure  and  that  we 
may  be  able  to  hand  down  to  our 
children  all  the  benefits  we  have 
received  from  our  fathers.  God  has 
given  us  eyes  to  see,  ears  to  hear,  and 
intelligence  and  memory  to  glean  and 
carry  from  the  lessons  of  the  past  some- 
thing of  wisdom  to  guide  us  in  meeting 
43 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

the  issues  of  the  present.  If  we  fail  to 
make  the  best  use  of  those  faculties 
which  have  been  given  us,  we  must 
pay  the  penalty. 

We  must  continue  to  strive  for  world 
peace,  for  the  betterment  of  human 
conditions;  we  must  do  what  we  can  to 
promote  arbitration,  love  of  justice; 
but  we  have  no  right  to  forget  that 
none  of  these  will  serve  to  protect  us 
against  an  unjust  aggressor.  Let  us 
do  all  these  good  things,  but  at  the 
same  time  take  those  measures  of  wise 
precaution  which  the  experience  of 
time  and  of  all  people  teaches,  that  we 
may  be  prepared  to  defend  with  force 
those  things  which  justice,  honesty  and 
fair  dealing  are  inadequate  of  them- 
selves to  defend?  As  Cromwell  said: 
"  Trust  in  God  —  but  keep  your 
powder  dry."  In  other  words,  do 
44 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

right,  but  do  not  trust  to  that  alone. 
The  highwayman  is  not  especially  con- 
cerned with  the  morals  of  the  man 
whose  purse  he  covets,  nor  is  the  great 
nation  struggling  for  trade  and  expan- 
sion disposed  to  give  especial  consider- 
ation to  the  morals  of  the  people 
standing  in  her  way.  Every  nation 
does,  however,  give  serious  and  prompt 
heed  to  the  strength  and  ability  of 
another  to  hold  and  protect  what  she 
has. 

After  going  over  the  evidence  of 
past  results  and  present  conditions,  we 
must  realize  that  arbitration  to-day 
cannot  as  a  rule  be  depended  upon  for 
protection  or  even  as  a  means  of  delay- 
ing a  resort  to  force,  except  in  such 
cases  as  are  not  of  vital  importance  to 
either  of  the  disputants.  Questions  of 
citizenship,  cases  arising  under  the 
45 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

Monroe  Doctrine  —  in  which  we  are 
particularly  interested  —  are  among 
those  which  cannot  well  be  turned 
over  to  arbitration.  Our  interests  in 
them  are  vital. 

Preparedness  to  resist  injustice  or 
attack  with  force  tends  to  amplify  the 
possibilities  of  successful  arbitration, 
as  the  cost  and  danger  of  the  strug- 
gle and  the  uncertainty  of  the  out- 
come are  evident.  Preparedness  lends 
weight  to  just  claims  and  makes  the 
would-be  aggressor  hesitate.  It  is  the 
well-guarded  house  in  which  the  robber 
sees  the  danger  and  realizes  the  cost. 
It  does  not  mean  that  the  people  of 
the  house  are  less  just  because  they 
have  had  the  good  sense  to  recognize 
conditions  and  take  the  wise  measure 
of  protection. 

All  arbitration  has  a  much  better 
46 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

chance  of  success  when  each  party 
realizes  that  the  other  has  the  ability 
to  make  strong  opposition  to  unjust 
claims.  A  country  unable  to  defend 
her  rights  on  land  and  sea  is  not  the 
country  to  determine  whether  arbitra- 
tion or  force  is  to  be  resorted  to.  It 
is  the  strong,  well-prepared  nation 
which  will  determine  whether  a  dispute 
is  to  be  settled  by  arms  or  arbitration, 
not  the  weak  and  unprepared  one. 

Washington's  words  still  hold  good: 
"  To  be  prepared  for  war  is  one  of  the; 
most  effectual  means  of  preserving1 
peace."  The  assertion  so  often  made 
that  preparedness  increases  the  proba- 
bility of  war,  is  unsound  from  every 
standpoint,  unless  those  who  make  the 
assertion  assume  that  we  should  not 
engage  in  war  in  any  case  but  rather 
submit  passively  to  whatever  demands 
47 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

are  made  upon  us.  The  resort  to 
aggressive  force  will  always  be  gov- 
erned to  a  certain  extent  by  the  ques- 
tion of  cost  —  cost  in  men  and  treasure. 
If  no  serious  resistance  is  possible  on 
the  part  of  one  party  to  a  dispute,  the 
temptation  of  the  stronger  and  better 
prepared  to  use  force  is  great;  if  the 
reverse  is  the  case,  consideration  and 
a  disposition  to  arbitrate  may  be 
counted  on. 

Every  dictate  of  common  sense,  the 
teaching  of  history  and  the  lessons  of 
the  moment,  suggest  strongly  and 
unmistakably  the  urgent  necessity  of 
the  organization  of  the  might  of  the 
nation,  in  order  that  we  may  be  ready 
to  meet  force  with  force,  if  other 
means  fail.  Reliance  on  peace  treaties 
is  not  a  safe  policy.  Experience  shows 
they  often  mean  little  in  the  face  of 
48 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

a  great  crisis  threatening  the  life  and 
interests  of  a  nation. 

Preparedness  does  not  mean  militar- 
ism or  an  aggressive  military  spirit;  it 
means  simply  the  application  to  the 
military  questions  of  the  day  of  some- 
thing of  the  experience  and  lessons  of 
the  past  as  well  as  those  of  the  present. 
A  man  armed  against  thieves  is  not 
prone  to  become  a  thief  unless  he  is 
one  at  heart.  A  nation  can  be  strong 
without  being  immoral  or  a  bully. 
Militarism,  as  indicated  by  the  exist- 
ence of  a  military  class  demanding  and 
receiving  special  consideration  and  pre- 
cedence and  exercising  an  undue  influ- 
ence in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  nation 
or  upon  its  international  relations,  is 
to  be  avoided  beyond  peradventure. 
But  effective  preparedness  can  be  had 
without  a  trace  of  this  condition,  as 
49 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

prepare  to  resist  aggression  we  are 
likely  to  become  aggressors. 

We  have  no  right  to  jeopardize  all 
we  have  and  hold  most  dear  by  failing 
to  organize  and  prepare  our  strength 
because  of  the  fear  that  if  strong, 
organized  and  ready,  our  nation  may 
become  an  international  highwayman. 
Rubbish  and  cant  of  the  faint-hearted! 
Lacking  the  spirit  which  places  prin- 
ciples and  honor  above  fear  and 
wounds ! 

Peace  treaties  —  international  law 
—  they  should  be  observed,  but  they 
are  not  always.  Where  are  those  who 
trusted  them  and  forgot  that  force  is 
still  to  be  reckoned  with?  The  great 
Peace  Palace  stands  empty  in  the  land 
of  a  prosperous,  industrious  people  at 
present  under  arms  to  protect  their  own 
neutrality.  None  of  the  causes  of  the 
52 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  PEACE 

greatest  war  of  the  ages  has  been  or  is 
being  heard  within  its  walls.  Inter- 
national law  has  been  too  often  only 
the  will  of  the  strongest  and  may  be 
again.  It  is  at  the  best  but  a  feeble 
staff  to  lean  on,  when  issues  involving 
the  life  of  a  nation,  or  nations,  are 
involved. 

As  Washington  said:  "The  best 
way  to  make  a  good  peace  is  to  have 
a  good  army,"  —  using  the  word 
"  army  "  in  the  sense  of  military  force, 
which  includes  the  navy;  and  he  might 
have  said  that  the  best  way  to  preserve 
peace  is  to  be  prepared  against  war. 
We  should  favor  preparedness  not 
only  on  the  grounds  of  safety,  but  on 
the  grounds  of  humanity,  for  it  is  a 
brutal  waste  of  life  to  send  an  undisci- 
plined and  untrained  people  into  war, 
and  war  will  come,  from  time  to  time, 
53 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

do  what  we  may  to  try  to  avoid  it. 
No  nation  does  more  to  tempt  others 
to  war  than  one  which,  possessing  much 
of  the  trade  and  more  than  her  propor- 
tion of  the  wealth  of  the  world,  fails  to 
make  adequate  preparations  to  guard 
what  she  has. 


54 


chapter  iii 
Past  National  Policy 

"A  government  is  the  murderer  of 
its  citizens  which  sends  them  to  the 
field  uninformed  and  untaught,  where 
they  are  to  meet  men  of  the  same  age 
and  strength  mechanized  by  education 
and  disciplined  for  battle." — General 
Richard  Henry  Lee. 

We  are  a  warlike,  but  not  a  mili- 
tary people;  that  is  to  say,  we  are 
quick  to  resent  injury  and  ready  to 
meet  force  with  force,  but  we  are  not 
organized  to  employ  force  effectively. 
We  are  commercially  aggressive;  we 
are  exceedingly  rich.  We  never  have 
submitted  and  are  still  indisposed  to 
submit  ourselves  to  discipline  or  prepa- 
ration. We  spend  human  life  like 
55 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

water  and  pay  with  blood  and  treasure 
for  the  lack  of  ordinary  intelligent 
preparation.  We  are  not  so  much 
unready  to  resort  to  war  for  the  right 
if  need  be  as  we  are  unprepared  to 
wage  it.  We  hate  militarism,  object 
to  large  standing  armies,  and  prop- 
erly, and  we  can  continue  so  to  do  and 
still  make  full  preparation  on  lines  not 
at  variance  with  our  ideals  or  the  prin- 
ciples laid  down  by  the  founders. 

T[n  our  country  peace  societies  are 
not  a  new  idea.  The  New  York  Peace 
Society  was  founded  in  1815,  and  as 
long  ago  as  1827  there  were  many 
peace  societies  in  the  United  States. 
The  effort  has  passed  through  many 
stages;  the  pacifists  of  to-day  must  not 
flatter  themselves  that  they  have  dis- 
covered that  war  is  brutal.  Cicero 
emphasized  it  in  his  day.  Seneca  char- 
56 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

acterized  war  as  "plain  insanity."  If 
it  could  be  stopped  by  pointing  out 
that  it  is  brutal  and  gives  pain,  it 
would  have  been  stopped  long  ago. 

We  must  realize  that  there  are  two 
types  of  peace.  There  is  the  peace 
of  Rome  under  Augustus,  which  was 
a  real  peace,  and  Rome  and  Roman 
citizens  were  respected  by  their  neigh- 
bors; and  there  is  the  other  type,  the 
peace  of  Honorius,  in  whose  time 
pacifists  prated  as  they  do  at  pres- 
sent.  Nonresistance  was  the  theory. 
Emperor  Honorius  raised  poultry  and 
the  barbarians  overran  the  empire.  In 
the  first  instance  there  was  peace  with 
honor  and  dignity;  in  the  second 
instance  the  empire  was  overrun,  a 
civilization  almost  destroyed  through 
failure  to  listen  to  the  teachings  of 
history  and  make  reasonable,  rational 
57 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

preparation.  It  was  the  sort  of  peace 
which  has  existed  in  China.  It  was 
the  kind  of  peace  which  marks  the 
decadence  of  a  nation.  It  goes  hand 
in  hand  with  the  policy  advocated 
by  the  peace-at-any-price  people  of 
to-day. 

Our  early  presidents  were  most  of 
them  truly  great  men,  lovers  of  peace; 
some  of  them  had  participated  in  war, 
and  all  of  them  had  lived  through 
periods  of  war.  They  were  just  and 
upright  in  character.  What  was  their 
advice  to  our  people?  Washington 
says,  in  his  first  annual  address: 

"  To  be  prepared  for  war  is  one  of 
the  most  effectual  means  of  preserving 
peace.  A  free  people  ought  not  only 
to  be  armed,  but  disciplined;  to  which 
end  a  uniform  and  well  digested  plan 
is  requisite;  and  their  safety  and  inter- 
58 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

est  require  that  they  should  promote 
such  manufactures  as  tend  to  render 
them  independent  of  others  for  essen- 
tial, particularly  military,  supplies." 

In  his  third  annual  message,  speak- 
ing of  the  militia,  which  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  organic  law  included  men 
from  eighteen  to  forty-five,  Washing- 
ton said: 

"  The  safety  of  the  United  States, 
under  divine  protection,  ought  to  rest 
on  the  basis  of  systematic  and  solid 
arrangements,  exposed  as  little  as  pos- 
sible to  the  hazards  of  fortuitous  cir- 
cumstances." 

In  his  fifth  annual  message  he  made 
this  statement: 

"  I  cannot  recommend  to  your  notice 

measures    for    the    fulfillment    of    our 

duties  to  the  rest  of  the  world  without 

again  pressing  upon  you  the  necessity 

59 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

of  placing  ourselves  in  a  condition  of 
complete  defense  and  of  extracting 
from  them  the  fulfillment  of  their 
duties  towards  us.  The  United  States 
ought  not  to  indulge  a  persuasion  that, 
contrary  to  the  order  of  human  events, 
they  will  forever  keep  at  a  distance 
those  painful  appeals  to  arms  with 
which  the  history  of  every  other  nation 
abounds.  There  is  a  rank  due  to  the 
United  States  among  nations  which 
will  be  withheld,  if  not  absolutely  lost, 
by  the  reputation  of  weakness.  If  we 
desire  to  avoid  insult  we  must  be  able 
to  repel  it ;  if  we  desire  to  secure  peace, 
one  of  the  most  powerful  instruments 
of  our  rising  prosperity,  it  must  be 
known  that  we  are  at  all  times  ready 
for  war." 

In  Washington's  eighth  annual  ad- 
dress, speaking  of  the  country's  inabil- 
60 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

ity  to  protect  its  commerce,  he  said: 
"  Will  it  not  then  be  advisable  to 
begin  without  delay  to  provide  and  lay 
up  materials  for  the  building  and 
equipping  of  ships  of  war  and  to  pro- 
ceed in  the  work  by  degrees  in  pro- 
portion as  our  resources  shall  render  it 
practicable  without  inconvenience,  so 
that  a  future  war  in  Europe  may  not 
find  our  commerce  in  the  same  unpro- 
tected state  in  which  it  was  found  dur- 
ing the  present?" 

John  Adams,  in  a  special  message, 
stated:  "  With  a  view  and  as  a  meas- 
ure which  even  in  time  of  universal 
peace  ought  not  to  be  neglected,  I 
recommend  to  your  consideration  a 
revision  of  the  laws  for  organizing, 
arming  and  disciplining  the  militia,  to 
render  that  natural  and  safe  defense 
of  the  country  efficacious." 
61 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

In  his  second  annual  message,  which 
dealt  with  our  relations  with  France, 
President  Adams  declared:  "But  in 
demonstrating  by  our  conduct  that  we 
do  not  fear  war  in  the  necessary  pro- 
tection of  our  rights  and  honor,  we 
should  give  no  room  to  infer  that  we 
abandon  the  desire  of  peace.  An  effi- 
cient preparation  for  war  can  alone 
secure  peace.  We  ought,  without  loss 
of  time,  to  lay  the  foundations  for 
that  increase  of  our  navy  to  a  size  suffi- 
cient to  guard  our  coasts  and  protect 
our  trade." 

Thomas  Jefferson,  in  his  fifth  annual 
message,  advocated :  "  The  organiza- 
tion of  300,000  able-bodied  men 
between  the  ages  of  18  and  26,  for 
defense  at  any  time  or  at  any  place 
where  they  may  be  wanted." 

In  a  letter  to  James  Monroe,  from 
62 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

Monticello,  dated  June  19,  1813,  Jef- 
ferson wrote: 

"  It  proves  more  forcibly  the  neces- 
sity of  obliging  every  citizen  to  be  a 
soldier.  This  was  the  case  with  the 
Greeks  and  Romans,  and  must  be  that 
of  every  free  state.  Where  there  is  no 
oppression  there  will  be  no  pauper  hire- 
lings. We  must  train  and  classify  the 
whole  of  our  male  citizens,  and  make 
military  instruction  a  regular  part  of 
collegiate  education.  We  can  never  be 
safe  till  this  is  done."  / 

This  letter  was  written  fourteen 
months  before  the  fiasco  at  Bladens- 
burg  and  the  burning  of  Washington. 
Again  he  says: 

"  If  war  be  forced  upon  us  in  spite 

of  our  long  and  vain  appeals  to  the 

justice  of  nations,  rapid  and  vigorous 

movement   at  the   outset   will   go   far 

63 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

toward  securing  us  in  its  course  and 
issue,  and  toward  throwing  its  burdens 
on  those  who  render  necessary  the 
resort  from  reason  to  force. 

"  Considering  the  conditions  of  the 
times  in  which  we  live,  our  attention 
should  unremittingly  be  fixed  on  the 
safety  of  our  country.  For  a  people 
who  are  free  and  who  mean  to  remain 
so,  a  well-organized  and  armed  militia 
is   their  best   security." 

One  might  continue  almost  indefi- 
nitely to  quote  from  the  messages  and 
state  papers  of  our  presidents,  con- 
cerning this  great  matter  of  defense, 
organization  and  readiness. 

General  Henry  Knox,  when  Secre- 
tary of  War,  sent  to  President  Wash- 
ington, on  January  18,  1790,  a  plan 
which  provided  for  the  enrolling,  classi- 
fying and  training  of  all  able-bodied 
64 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

men  from  eighteen  to  sixty  years  of 
age.  General  Knox  refers  to  the  fact 
that  this  plan  had  been  previously  pre- 
sented to  Washington,  had  been  modi- 
fied somewhat,  and  as  now  finally 
presented  had  Washington's  approval. 
Among  other  things  he  states  in  his 
letter  of  transmission: 

"  It  had  been  my  anxious  desire  to 
devise  a  national  system  of  defense 
adequate  to  the  probable  exigencies  of 
the  United  States,  whether  arising 
from  internal  or  external  causes;  and 
at  the  same  time  to  erect  a  standard 
of  republican  magnanimity,  inde- 
pendent of,  and  superior  to,  the 
powerful   influence   of   wealth." 

Both  Washington  and  Knox  had 
had  unfortunate  experiences  with  the 
untrained  militia  during  the  Revolu- 
tion, and  the  plan  they  now  proposed 
65 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

was  not  one  which  contemplated  the 
use  of  militia  as  it  was  used  during 
the  Revolution,  but  it  was,  in  effect, 
the  forerunner  of  the  idea  voiced  by 
Jefferson  in  1813,  namely,  the  organ- 
izing, classifying  and  training  of  the 
male  population.  General  Knox  pre- 
cedes his  plan  by  a  long  introduction, 
much  of  which  was  apparently  written 
by  Washington.  Among  other  state- 
ments therein  made,  worthy  of  note 
are  the  following: 

"  But  it  is  at  the  same  time  acknowl- 
edged that,  unless  a  republic  prepares 
itself  by  proper  arrangements  to  meet 
those  exigencies  to  which  all  states  are 
in  a  degree  liable,  its  peace  and  exist- 
ence are  more  precarious  than  the 
forms  of  government  in  which  the  will 
of  one  directs  the  conduct  of  the  whole, 
for  the  defense  of  the  nation. 
66 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

"It  is  the  intention  of  the  present 
attempt  to  suggest  the  most  efficient 
system  of  defense  which  may  be  com- 
patible with  the  interests  of  a  free 
people  —  a  system  which  will  not  only 
produce  the  expected  effect,  but  which, 
in  its  operations,  shall  also  produce 
those  habits  and  manners  which  will 
impart  strength  and  durability  to  the 
whole  government. 

"  All  discussions  on  the  subject  of 
a  powerful  militia  will  result  in  one  or 
other  of  the  following  principles: 

"First:  Either  efficient  institutions 
must  be  established  for  the  military 
education  of  the  youth,  and  that  the 
knowledge  acquired  therein  shall  be 
diffused  throughout  the  community  by 
the  means  of  rotation;  or, 

"Secondly:  That  the  militia  must 
be  formed  of  substitutes,  after  the 
67 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

manner  of  the  militia  of  Great  Britain. 

"  If  the  United  States  possess  the 
vigor  of  mind  to  establish  the  first 
institution,  it  may  be  reasonably 
expected  to  produce  the  most  unequiv- 
ocal advantages.  A  glorious  national 
spirit  will  be  introduced,  with  its  exten- 
sive train  of  political  consequences. 
The  youth  will  imbibe  a  love  of  their 
country;  reverence  and  obedience  to  its 
laws;  courage  and  elevation  of  mind; 
openness  and  liberality  of  character, 
accompanied  by  a  just  spirit  of  honor; 
in  addition  to  which  their  bodies  will 
acquire  robustness,  greatly  conducive 
to  their  personal  happiness,  as  well  as 
the  defense  of  their  country,  while 
habit,  with  its  silent  but  efficacious 
operations,  will  cement  the  system. 

"  Every  intelligent  mind  would 
rejoice  in  the  establishment  of  an  insti- 
68 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

tution,  under  whose  auspices  the  youth 
and  vigor  of  the  constitution  would 
be  renewed  with  each  successive  gen- 
eration, and  which  would  appear  to 
secure  the  great  principles  of  freedom 
and  happiness  against  the  injuries  of 
time  and  events." 

General  Knox  then  concludes  his 
letter  with  the  following  summary: 

11  First:  That  it  is  the  indispensable 
duty  of  every  nation  to  establish  all 
necessary  institutions  for  its  own  per- 
fection and  defense. 

"  Secondly:  That  it  is  a  capital 
security  to  a  free  state  for  the  great 
body  of  the  people  to  possess  a  compe- 
tent knowledge  of  the  military  art. 

"Thirdly:     That     this     knowledge 

cannot  be  attained,  in  the  present  state 

of  society,  but  by  establishing  adequate 

institutions  for  the  military  education 

69 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

of  the  youth;  and  that  the  knowledge 
acquired  therein  should  be  diffused 
throughout  the  community  by  the  prin- 
ciples of  rotation. 

"  Fourthly:  That  every  man  of  the 
proper  age  and  ability  of  body,  is 
firmly  bound,  by  the  special  compact, 
to  perform  personally  his  proportion 
of  military  duty  for  the  defense  of  the 
state. 

"Fifthly:  That  all  men  of  the  legal 
military  age  should  be  armed,  enrolled 
and  held  responsible  for  different 
degrees  of  military  service. 

"  And,  sixthly:  That,  agreeably  to 
the  Constitution,  the  United  States  are 
to  provide  for  arming,  organizing  and 
disciplining  the  militia,  and  for  gov- 
erning such  a  part  of  it  as  may  be 
employed  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  reserving  to  the  states,  respec- 
70 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

tively,  the  appointment  of  the  officers 
and  the  authority  of  training  the 
militia  according  to  the  discipline  pre- 
scribed by  Congress." 

This  plan,  briefly  stated,  consisted 
of  the  grouping  of  physically  and 
mentally  fit  men,  between  the  ages  of 
eighteen  and  sixty  years  of  age,  into 
three  corps.  The  young  men  between 
eighteen  and  twenty-one  years  of  age 
formed  the  Advance  Corps,  and  the 
men  between  twenty-one  and  forty-five 
formed  the  Main  Corps.  There  was  a 
third,  or  Reserve  Corps,  which  con- 
sisted of  men  from  forty-five  to  sixty 
years  of  age.  The  plan  further  pro- 
vided that  these  first  and  second 
groups  should  be  organized  into  vari- 
ous military  units;  that  the  young  men 
of  eighteen  and  nineteen  years  of  age 
should  receive  thirty  days'  training  in 
71 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

camp  each  year;  the  men  of  twenty, 
ten  days  of  training  in  camp  each  year ; 
the  men  from  twenty-one  to  forty-five, 
four  days  of  training  each  year. 

This  was  a  federal  force  and  it  was 
to  be  equipped,  armed  and  subsisted  at 
the  expense  of  the  United  States;  its 
members  were  required  to  take  an  oath 
of  allegiance  to  the  state  and  to  the 
United  States.  Herein  was  an  element 
of  weakness.  A  force  of  this  kind,  or 
any  kind  of  national  force,  should  be 
purely  a  federal  force.  Its  officers 
should  be  appointed  by  the  president 
on  the  federal  authority  and  it  should 
be  available  for  service  within  or  with- 
out the  United  States.  The  plan  was 
a  great  advance  over  anything  hitherto 
proposed,  inasmuch  as  it  recognized 
the  necessity  for  general  military  train- 
ing. The  training  of  these  troops  was 
72 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

to  be  prescribed  by  the  United  States. 
The  early  plan  was  a  tremendous 
improvement  over  the  militia  idea 
finally  adopted.  It  would  have 
resulted  in  the  general  military  train- 
ing of  our  people  and  the  dissemina- 
tion of  a  knowledge  of  our  military 
policy.  It  represented  an  appreciation 
of  the  necessity  for  military  training. 
Had  this  system  been  adopted,  the 
War  of  1812  would  probably  never 
have  occurred.  Or,  if  it  had  occurred, 
we  should  have  been  quickly  success- 
ful in  obtaining  our  objective.  Both 
Washington  and  Knox  recognized 
the  economic  efficiency  which  would 
be  gained  by  this  training,  and 
they  also  realized  that  a  tremendous 
improvement  in  citizenship  would 
result.  They  did  not  expect  the  men 
from  forty-five  to  sixty  to  serve  in 
73 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

the  first  line,  but  they  saw  that  they 
would  be  a  valuable  asset  on  the  lines 
of  communication,  depots,  and  other 
important  fields  of  activity  where  the 
highest  degree  of  physical  excellence 
is  not  required.  This  proposed  act,  if 
it  had  been  passed  and  put  into  effect, 
would  have  saved  many  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  lives  and  many  hundreds  of 
millions  of  money. 

If  the  advice  of  our  early  presidents 
was  sound  at  the  time  it  was  given, 
when  the  ocean  was  a  real  barrier 
instead  of,  as  at  the  present  time,  the 
readiest  means  of  approach,  once  sea 
control  is  lost ;  when  troops  were  moved 
over  sea  by  sailing  ships  of  relatively 
small  capacity;  when  none  of  the  great 
nations  contained  large,  highly  organ- 
ized and  equipped  armies  prepared  for 
prompt  movement  in  any  direction; 
74 


A 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

when  the  arms  of  war  were  simple  and 
easy  of  manufacture  and  easy  to 
acquire  familiarity  with;  when  we  had 
little  in  the  way  of  commerce  or  wealth 
to  tempt  aggression;  how  much  more 
sound  is  it  now,  when  all  great  nations 
have  highly  organized  armies,  large 
reserves  of  men  and  material,  adequate 
equipment  of  all  kinds? 

Since  then  steam  has  divided  time 
and  distance  by  ten;  the  arms  of  war 
are  most  intricate  and  require  a  long 
time  to  manufacture,  and  it  takes  a 
still  longer  time  to  teach  men  to  use 
them  effectively;  our  wealth  has 
enormously  increased;  our  commerce 
spreads  over  the  earth  and  we  hold 
great  areas  far  beyond  our  continental 
limits;  our  people  are  unskilled  in  the 
use  of  arms,  and  our  population  as  a 
whole  has  little  appreciation  of  its 
75 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

military  obligation.  There  is  no  ques- 
tion but  that  the  advice  of  our  early 
presidents  is  entitled  to  much  more 
attention  to-day  than  when  given. 

This  country  has  never  engaged 
single-handed  in  a  war  with  a  nation 
of  the  first  class  prepared  for  war. 
We  have  absolutely  no  conception  of 
what  modern  war  means  when  con- 
ducted by  a  nation  organized  and  ready 
in  men  and  material.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  we  may  never  have  this  experience, 
certainly  not  until  we  have  learned 
something  from  the  experience  of 
others,  something  from  the  lessons  of 
the  past  as  well  as  those  of  the  present. 

We  have  no  markedly  superior  mili- 
tary virtues;  as  a  people,  the  blood  of 
all  peoples  runs  in  our  veins.  We 
live  under  a  form  of  government  which 
tends  to  develop  individuality  and  self- 
76 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

confidence,  good  qualities  if  coordi- 
nated and  harmonized  by  discipline. 
But  there  is  nothing  which  indicates 
peculiar  or  superior  military  excellence, 
and  there  is  nothing  in  our  military 
history  upon  which  we  can  found  such 
an  assumption.  We  have  splendid 
material  for  soldiers,  if  trained,  but 
without  training  that  material  is  rela- 
tively of  little  value. 

There  seems  to  be  a  general  impres- 
sion that,  having  blundered  through 
our  past  wars  with  a  hideously 
unnecessary  expenditure  of  life  and 
treasure,  somehow  or  other  we  shall 
continue  to  blunder  on  successfully, 
regardless  of  lack  of  preparation  on 
our  part  or  of  thorough  organization 
and  preparation  on  the  part  of  our 
possible  antagonist.  Such  an  opinion 
is  absolutely  unwarranted.  Thorough 
77 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

preparation  is  absolutely  indispensable. 
General  Harry  Lee  —  popularly 
known  as  "  Light-Horse  Harry"  — 
stated  at  the  end  of  the  Revolution 
that  the  nation  was  the  murderer  of 
its  men  which  sent  them  untrained 
and  undisciplined  to  meet  equally  good 
men,  mechanized  and  disciplined  by 
training.  These  words  were  true  when 
they  were  uttered  and  they  are  true 
to-day,  and  they  apply  with  peculiar 
force  to  our  own  people.  It  is  not 
enough  to  be  willing  —  we  must  be 
prepared.  One  would  not  think  of 
putting  into  a  lifeboat  men  who  could 
neither  row  nor  swim;  and  yet  we 
assume  to  send  them  into  battle  undis- 
ciplined and  untrained,  unfamiliar  with 
the  use  of  arms,  where  they  are  to 
meet  men  trained  to  the  minute.  It  is 
murder  —  nothing  else. 
78 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

If  a  lot  of  men  physically  of  the 
right  type  presented  themselves  for 
the  crews  or  for  the  teams  of  a  uni- 
versity and  said  they  were  willing  to 
go  into  athletics,  but  would  not  train, 
they  would  receive  scant  courtesy  at 
the  hands  of  their  college  mates. 
Experience  in  athletics  has  taught  that 
success  is  absolutely  dependent  upon 
thorough  preparation;  and  the  would- 
be  athlete  who  assumed  that  he  could 
meet,  with  any  hope  of  success,  an 
equally  good  man,  physically  fit  and 
trained  in  all  the  details  of  the  game, 
would  be  looked  upon  as  little  better 
than  a  fool. 

So  it  is  with  professional  soldiers, 
who  have  devoted  their  lives  to  their 
work:  they  see  the  folly  of  the  idle 
declarations  of  the  Fourth  of  July 
orator,  or  the  equally  fatuous  and  mis- 
79 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

leading  statements  of  the  men  who  say 
that  we,  by  virtue  of  peculiar  qualities, 
are  superior  to  equally  good  men, 
trained  and  ready.  Such  vain  boasts 
are  more  than  foolish  —  they  are  dan- 
gerous. They  strike  at  the  very  life 
of  the  nation.  If  we  heed  them  longer 
we  shall  repent  in  sackcloth  and  ashes. 
While  students  of  military  policy 
and  our  professional  soldiers  of  the 
best  type  —  not  the  machine-cut-and- 
dried  type,  but  the  soldiers  with  learn- 
ing and  imagination  —  have  always 
recognized  that  campaigns  are  won  in 
the  preparations  for  them,  our  people 
have  never  appreciated  this  great  truth, 
nor  do  they  realize  that  thorough 
organization  of  the  nation's  resources 
in  men,  material  and  money  is  neces- 
sary to  a  success  which  shall  be  charac- 
terized by  the  minimum  loss  of  blood 
80 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

and  treasure.  Battles  are  won  as  well 
as  lost  in  the  national  legislature,  in 
the  offices  of  the  administration,  in 
departments,  as  well  as  in  the  field. 
Failure  to  provide  means  for  conduct- 
ing the  war,  neglect  properly  to 
organize,  undue  interference  by  non- 
technical persons  in  the  direction  of 
that  highly  specialized  and  technical 
business,  war,  the  direction  of  opera- 
tions to  meet  political  demands  of  the 
hour,  all  contribute,  with  fateful  force, 
to  the  outcome  of  the  armed  struggle. 
Under  our  procedure  in  the  past, 
the  soldier  too  often  has  had  little  to 
say  in  the  great  question  of  prepara- 
tion in  its  varied  forms,  involving 
organization,  supply  and  equipment, 
and  only  too  often  has  found  himself 
like  a  sailor  put  on  board  a  ship  in  a 
gale  of  wind  —  a  ship  built  not  by 
81 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

professional  shipbuilders  —  a  ship  of 
whose  equipment  and  personnel  he  is 
largely  ignorant.  All  he  can  do  is  to 
make  the  best  of  a  bad  situation, 
reorganize  and  re-equip  in  the  face  of 
a  storm.  So  it  has  been  only  too 
often  with  our  soldiers,  called  to  lead 
badly  organized,  uninstructed,  half- 
armed  bodies  of  troops  without  previ- 
ous training.  This  describes,  in  a 
general  way,  the  situation  which  has 
existed  at  the  beginning  of  our  wars 
in  the  past.  These  conditions  should 
not  be  possible  in  future  wars;  but 
they  will  be  unless  we  study  thoroughly 
the  question  in  all  its  aspects,  and  take 
wise  measures  of  precaution  and  make 
such  preparation  as  the  experience  of 
the  past  and  the  best  information  of 
the  present  indicate. 

When  our  people  offer  their  bodies 
82 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

and  their  lives  to  the  nation  for  service 
in  war  in  the  nation's  defense,  they 
have  a  right  to  demand  that  these 
sacrifices  shall  be  made  —  if  made  they 
must  be  —  under  conditions  which  min- 
imize the  probability  of  disaster  from 
lack  of  preparation,  instruction,  arms, 
equipment  or  organization,  both  on 
the  fighting  line  and  behind  it. 

Preparation  will  tend  to  make  the 
struggle  as  brief  as  possible,  and 
reduce  the  cost  in  life  and  treasure  to 
the  lowest  possible  limit.  Our  people 
have  never  entered  into  war  with  any 
of  these  assurances.  They  have  gone 
into  it  blindly,  uninformed  as  to  the 
necessity  of  the  hundred  and  one 
things  which  make  for  preparation 
and  which  are  the  sure  foundations  of 
success.  National  defense  begins  with 
the  people,  and  must  find  its  main  sup- 
83 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

port  among  their  representatives,  for, 
as  John  Adams  said,  "  National  de- 
fense is  one  of  the  cardinal  duties  of  a 
statesman;  the  soldier  can  only  endorse 
when  asked;  the  statesman  must  advo- 
cate, and  the  legislative  body  enact." 
Only  too  often  do  we  find  men  who 
should  know  better,  speaking  of  our 
great  military  resources,  forgetting 
that  unless  developed  and  organized 
they  will  be  of  no  more  value  in  the 
quick  onrush  of  modern  war,  initiated 
by  a  prepared  nation,  than  would  an 
undeveloped  gold  mine  in  Alaska  be 
in  a  crisis  in  Wall  Street.  The  fact 
that  a  nation  has  resources  does  not 
help  if  those  resources  are  undeveloped 
and  unavailable.  If  modern  war  em- 
phasizes any  one  thing  above  another, 
it  is  that  resources  of  all  kinds  must 
be  promptly  available  and  organized. 

84 


PAST  NATIONAL  POLICY 

Mere  numbers,  untrained,  unorgan- 
ized and  unequipped,  mean  little;  no 
wolf  was  ever  frightened  by  the  size 
of  a  flock  of  sheep. 

As  one  considers  the  conduct  of  our 
various  wars  from  the  standpoint  of 
military  efficiency  and  economy  in  life 
and  treasure,  there  is  but  one  con- 
clusion possible,  and  that  is  that  our 
lack  of  system  has  been  not  only 
unduly  expensive  from  every  stand- 
point but  that  it  has  led  to  great  pro- 
longation of  war,  unnecessary  loss  of 
life  and  treasure,  and  consequent  inter- 
ference with  the  development  of  the 
country.  In  some  instances  that  lack 
of  organization  has  resulted  in  failure 
to  attain  the  object  sought. 

In  the  Revolutionary  War,  Wash- 
ington stands  out  conspicuously  as 
the  great  coordinating,  dominant  fig- 
85 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

ure,  and  the  more  one  studies  the 
conduct  of  that  war  the  more  he  is 
impressed  by  the  debt  we  owe  to 
Washington.  His  sound  judgment, 
able  military  leadership,  and,  above 
all,  his  patience  and  persistence,  cou- 
pled with  infinite  tact,  made  it  possible 
for  him  to  retain  the  confidence  of 
Congress  and  the  people  to  an  unusual 
extent  and  to  hold  together  the  poorly 
equipped  and  hastily  assembled  raw 
levies  which  formed  the  bulk  of  the 
Revolutionary  armies. 


86 


chapter  iv 
Lessons  of  the  Revolution 

"Against  stupidity  the  very  gods 
themselves  contend  in  vain." — Schil- 
ler. 

The  causes  leading  to  the  Revolu- 
tion had  produced  such  effect  that,  as 
early  as  1774,  several  of  the  Colonies 
began  preparations  for  war  with  Eng- 
land, and  a  Provisional  Congress  was 
convened  in  Massachusetts,  with  John 
Hancock  as  president.  This  Congress 
appointed  officers  and  adopted  organi- 
zation for  the  militia  and  made  certain 
arrangements  for  the  collections  of  sup- 
plies, equipment  and  provisions.  The 
royal  governor  of  the  colony  attempted 
87 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

to  prevent  the  assembly  of  this  Con- 
gress, but  was  unsuccessful. 

In  the  following  year  a  second  Con- 
gress assembled  and  appointed  a 
Committee  of  Safety,  with  authority 
to  raise  and  support  a  military  force 
to  resist  the  Acts  of  Parliament. 
Under  this  authority  a  considerable 
force  of  militia  was  raised,  part  of  it 
called  Minute  Men,  or  troops  bound 
to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  for 
instant  service.  This  was  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs  when  the  conflicts 
occurred  at  Lexington  and  Concord. 
A  few  days  later,  April  22nd,  steps 
were  taken  formally  to  organize  for 
defense  against  Great  Britain.  The 
Congress  decided  to  raise  an  army  of 
30,000  men,  and  immediately  to  enroll 
13,600  men  within  the  limits  of  Massa- 
chusetts, trusting  that  the  balance 
88 


THE  REVOLUTION 

might  be  supplied  by  New  Hamp- 
shire, Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut. 
Troops  were  raised  by  giving  to  any- 
one who  succeeded  in  enrolling  fifty- 
nine  men,  a  captain's  commission,  and 
a  colonel's  commission  to  any  man  who 
could  secure  ten  such  companies.  In 
other  words,  qualifications  for  com- 
mand rested  solely  on  the  ability  to 
enroll  men. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  foresee  the 
results  which  must  necessarily  follow 
under  a  system  based  upon  such  a 
policy.  The  training  of  the  officers 
and  their  qualifications  for  command 
meant  little.  Of  course  we  must  not 
forget  that  the  situation  was  an 
extremely  difficult  one.  The  troops 
had  to  be  raised,  there  were  relatively 
few  trained  officers  in  the  colony,  and 
many  who  had  had  previous  military 
89 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

experience  remained  constant  in  their 
allegiance  to  Great  Britain.  Still 
there  is  no  doubt  that  a  larger  propor- 
tion of  trained  officers  could  have  been 
secured  had  the  matter  of  organization 
been  more  systematically  undertaken. 
The  men  were  courageous,  and  when 
led  by  officers  of  experience  and  capa- 
city, fighting  in  a  defensive  position, 
and  not  required  to  maneuver  in  the 
face  of  an  enemy,  rendered  brave  and 
good  service,  as  at  Bunker  Hill.  The 
Continental  Army,  when  Washington 
assumed  command,  consisted  of  a  mass 
of  raw  levies,  generally  speaking, 
under  incompetent  officers  —  levies 
composed  of  men  who  had  no  idea  of 
remaining  throughout  the  war  and 
undergoing  thorough  training. 

There  were  many  things  outside  the 
condition  of  the  army  itself  which  led 
90 


THE  REVOLUTION 

to  great  embarrassment.  The  action 
at  Lexington  took  place  three  weeks 
before  the  assembling  of  the  Second 
Continental  Congress,  and  compelled 
that  body  to  assume  immediately  the 
functions  of  civil  government,  but  as 
it  had  no  authority  to  levy  taxes  or 
provide  a  revenue,  it  could  only  issue 
Bills  of  Credit.  The  power  to  create 
and  support  armies  was  crippled  by  a 
financial  system  which  was  based 
wholly  upon  the  faith  of  the  people  in 
ultimate  success.  If  the  Congress 
had  had  the  power  to  levy  taxes  and 
raise  a  revenue,  the  war  would  have 
been  much  shorter  and  its  conduct 
more  vigorous.  Moreover,  the  Con- 
gress was  vested  with  both  executive 
and  legislative  power  and  there  was 
consequently  a  lack  of  the  balance  and 
adjustment  which  exists  where  these 
91 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

functions  are  distinct  and  separate. 
The  country  was  dependent  for  its 
military  legislation  upon  the  decisions 
of  a  group  of  citizens  wholly  without 
instruction  in  military  matters,  and 
influenced  by  general  fear  of  a  stand- 
ing army.  Washington's  correspond- 
ence indicates  very  clearly  the  embar- 
rassments and  the  difficulties  of  the 
situation. 

The  strength  of  the  army  at  the 
time  of  Washington's  assignment  to 
command  was  about  17,000  men,  all 
of  them  under  short  enlistment.  Much 
had  to  be  accomplished.  It  was  abso- 
lutely essential  to  organize  a  force 
which  would  owe  its  allegiance  to  the 
United  Colonies,  and  in  June,  with 
this  end  in  view,  Congress  authorized 
the  raising  of  ten  companies  of  rifle- 
men in  Pennsylvania,  Maryland  and 
92 


THE  REVOLUTION 

Virginia,  with  a  term  of  enlistment  of 
one  year.  This  was  the  nucleus  of 
the  army  which  finally  achieved  Amer- 
ican independence.  During  the  year 
both  infantry  and  artillery  were  added. 
The  enlistments  were  still  for  a  short 
period,  and  did  not  extend  beyond  the 
end  of  the  following  year.  The  terms 
of  enlistment  of  the  troops  thereby 
enrolled  mostly  expired  at  or  near  the 
end  of  1775.  As  it  was  necessary 
promptly  to  raise  troops  to  replace 
them  and  to  add  to  those  already 
enrolled,  Congress  decided  to  raise 
twenty-six  regiments:  sixteen  in  Mas- 
sachusetts, five  in  Connecticut,  two  in 
Rhode  Island,  and  three  in  New 
Hampshire.  Washington  was  author- 
ized to  appoint  the  officers.  This 
resulted  in  a  condition  to  which  Wash- 
ington refers  in  various  letters. 
93 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

On  November  11,  1775,  he  writes  as 
follows : 

"  The  trouble  I  have  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  army  is  really  inconceiv- 
able. Many  of  the  officers  sent  in 
their  names  to  serve  in  expectation  of 
promotion;  others  stood  aloof  to  see 
what  advantage  they  could  make  for 
themselves,  while  a  number,  who  have 
declined,  have  again  sent  in  their  names 
to  serve.  So  great  has  the  confusion 
arising  from  these  and  many  other 
perplexing  circumstances  been  that  I 
found  it  absolutely  impossible  to  fix 
this  very  interesting  business  exactly 
on  the  plan  resolved  on  in  the  con- 
ference, though  I  have  kept  up  to  the 
spirit  of  it  as  near  as  the  nature  and 
necessity  of  the  case  would  permit. 

"  The  difficulty  with  the  soldiers  is 
as  great,  indeed,  more  so,  if  possible, 
94 


THE  REVOLUTION 

than  with  the  officers.  They  will  not 
enlist  until  they  know  their  colonel, 
lieutenant-colonel,  major,  and  captain, 
so  that  it  was  necessary  to  fix  the  offi- 
cers the  first  thing,  which  is,  at  last,  in 
some  manner  done,  and  I  have  given 
out  enlisting  orders." 

And  on  November  28th  he  con- 
tinues : 

"  The  number  enlisted  since  my  last 
is  two  thousand  five  hundred  and  forty 
men.  I  am  sorry  to  be  necessitated  to 
mention  to  you  the  egregious  want  of 
public  spirit  which  reigns  here. 
Instead  of  pressing  to  be  engaged  in 
the  cause  of  their  country,  which  I 
vainly  flattered  myself  would  be  the 
case,  I  find  we  are  likely  to  be  deserted 
in  a  most  critical  time.  Those  that 
have  enlisted  must  have  a  furlough, 
which  I  have  been  obliged  to  grant  to 
95 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

fifty  at  a  time,  from  each  regiment. 
The  Connecticut  troops,  upon  whom  I 
reckoned,  are  as  backward,  indeed,  if 
possible,  more  so  than  the  people  of 
this  colony.  Our  situation  is  truly 
alarming,  and  of  this  General  Howe 
is  well  apprised,  it  being  the  common 
topic  of  conversation  when  the  people 
left  Boston  last  Friday.  No  doubt 
when  he  is  reinforced  he  will  avail  him- 
self of  the  information." 

And  in  a  private  letter  a  little  later, 
he  describes  conditions  in  the  following 
words : 

"  Such  a  dearth  of  public  spirit  and 
such  want  of  virtue,  such  stock- jobbing 
and  fertility  in  all  the  low  arts  to 
obtain  advantages  of  one  kind  or 
another  in  this  great  change  of  mili- 
tary arrangement  I  never  saw  before, 
and  pray  God's  mercy  that  I  may 
96 


THE  REVOLUTION 

never  be  witness  to  again.  What  will 
be  the  end  of  these  maneuvers  is 
beyond  my  scan.  I  tremble  at  the 
prospect.  We  have  been  till  this  time 
enlisting  about  three  thousand  five 
hundred  men.  To  engage  these  I 
have  been  obliged  to  allow  furloughs 
as  far  as  fifty  men  to  a  regiment,  and 
the  officers,  I  am  persuaded,  indulge 
as  many  more.  The  Connecticut 
troops  will  not  be  prevailed  upon  to 
stay  longer  than  their  term,  saving 
those  who  have  enlisted  for  the  next 
campaign,  and  are  mostly  on  furlough; 
and  such  a  mercenary  spirit  pervades, 
the  whole  that  I  should  not  be  at  all 
surprised  at  any  disaster  that  may 
happen.  In  short,  after  the  last  of 
this  month  our  lines  will  be  so  weak- 
ened that  the  Minute  Men  and  militia 
must  be  called  in  for  their  defense, 
97 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

and  these  being  under  no  kind  of  gov- 
ernment themselves,  will  destroy  the 
little  subordination  I  have  been  labor- 
ing to  establish,  and  run  me  into  one 
evil  while  I  am  endeavoring  to  avoid 
another ;  but  the  lesser  must  be  chosen. 

These  letters  point  out  very  plainly 
the  conditions  which  existed.  Another 
important  thing  to  remember  is  that 
these  occurrences  took  place  during  a 
period  when  our  forefathers  were 
struggling  for  independence,  when,  as 
we  were  taught  in  school,  a  spirit  of 
patriotism  and  self-sacrifice  stirred  the 
country.  The  foregoing  extracts  from 
Washington's  letters  show  the  real  sit- 
uation. It  was  extremely  difficult  to 
secure  troops  for  the  armed  forces. 
Men  came  only  for  short  periods  of 
time,  and  insisted  upon  the  election  of 
their  officers.  Discipline  was  poor,  and 
98 


THE  REVOLUTION 

such  as  there  was,  was  difficult  of 
enforcement.  In  fact,  the  situation  was 
more  or  less  one  of  military  chaos,  and 
it  was  only  Washington's  remarkable 
personality  that  made  it  possible  to  hold 
together  these  discordant  elements  in 
the  form  of  a  fighting  force. 

We  soon  went  to  the  bounty,  small 
at  first,  but  gradually  increased.  In 
1778  freedom  was  offered  by  Rhode 
Island  to  negroes  if  they  would  enlist. 
The  difficulty  in  increasing  the  Con- 
tinental forces  augmented  instead  of 
diminished  from  year  to  year.  Wash- 
ington was  twice  empowered  with  dic- 
tatorial powers.  The  colonial  assem- 
blies singly  and  collectively  made 
special  efforts  to  secure  troops  but 
there  seems  to  have  been  lacking  a 
sense  of  individual  responsibility  for 
soldier  service  and  the  result  was  that 
99 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

our  greatest  force  was  in  1776,  when 
we  had  89,000  troops,  47,000  Con- 
tinentals, 42,000  militia.  The  Con- 
tinentals were  really  short  service 
troops.  From  this  year  on  the  strength 
of  the  American  force  steadily  de- 
creased until,  in  1781,  the  force  was 
only  a  trifle  over  29,400  men.  At  no 
time  during  the  war  did  Washington 
have  an  effective  force  of  20,000  men 
in  line,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
nearly  400,000  men  were  enrolled  dur- 
ing the  war. 

One  of  the  principal  causes  of  diffi- 
culty during  the  war  was  that  control 
of  military  matters  rested  with  the 
Continental  Congress,  and  that  body 
was  jealous  of  a  standing  army,  knew 
little  of  military  matters,  and  was 
inclined  to  make  economies  which 
resulted  in  vast  expenditures  through 
100 


THE  REVOLUTION 

extending  the  war  and  rendering 
unavailing  such  expenditures  as  had 
previously  been  made.  Washington 
did  everything  a  man  could  do  in  his 
position,  and  he  accomplished  miracles. 
We  were  fortunate  in  this  war  in 
receiving  at  a  critical  time  the  invalu- 
able assistance  of  France,  and  from  the 
further  fact  that  the  contention  of  the 
Colonies  was  supported  by  a  strong 
party  in  England.  The  difficulties 
which  Washington  encountered  can 
best  be  appreciated  by  soldiers  who 
realize  what  it  means  to  make  new 
armies  practically  every  year.  Large 
forces  of  militia  were  called  in  from 
time  to  time  but  they  were  almost 
useless.  Washington's  opinion  of  men 
raised  in  this  manner  without  training 
and  without  discipline,  was  expressed 
as  follows: 

101 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

"  To  place  any  dependence  upon 
militia  is  assuredly  resting  upon  a 
broken  staff.  Men  just  dragged  from 
the  tender  scenes  of  domestic  life, 
unaccustomed  to  the  din  of  arms, 
totally  unacquainted  with  every  kind 
of  military  skill  (which  is  followed  by 
want  of  confidence  in  themselves  when 
opposed  by  troops  regularly  trained, 
disciplined,  and  appointed,  superior  in 
knowledge  and  superior  in  arms)  are 
timid  and  ready  to  fly  from  their  own 
shadows. 

"  Relaxed  and  unfit  as  our  rules  and 
regulations  of  war  are  for  the  govern- 
ment of  an  army,  the  militia  (these 
properly  so  called,  for  of  these  we  have 
two  sorts,  the  six-months  men  and 
those  sent  in  as  a  temporary  aid)  do 
not  think  themselves  subject  to  them, 
and  therefore  take  liberties  which  the 
102 


THE  REVOLUTION 

soldier  is  punished  for.  This  creates 
jealousy,  jealousy  begets  dissatisfac- 
tion, and  this  by  degrees  ripens  into 
mutiny,  keeping  the  whole  army  in  a 
confused  and  disordered  state,  render- 
ing the  time  of  those  who  wish  to  see 
regularity  and  good  order  prevail  more 
unhappy  than  words  can  describe. 
Besides  this,  such  repeated  changes 
take  place  that  all  arrangement  is  set 
at  naught  and  the  constant  fluctuation 
of  things  deranges  every  plan  as  fast 
as  it  is  adopted. 

"  Those,  sir,  Congress  may  be  as- 
sured, are  but  a  small  part  of  the 
inconveniences  which  might  be  enumer- 
ated and  attributed  to  militia,  but  there 
is  one  that  merits  particular  attention, 
and  that  is  the  expense.  Certain  I  am 
that  it  would  be  cheaper  to  keep  50,000 
or  100,000  in  constant  pay  than  to 
103 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

depend  upon  half  the  number  and 
supply  the  other  half  occasionally  by 
militia.  The  time  the  latter  are  in  pay 
before  and  after  they  are  in  camp, 
assembling  and  marching,  the  waste  of 
ammunition,  the  consumption  of  stores, 
which  in  spite  of  every  resolution  or 
requisition  of  Congress,  they  must  be 
furnished  with  or  sent  home,  added  to 
other  incidental  expenses  consequent 
upon  their  coming  and  conduct  in 
camp,  surpass  all  idea  and  destroy 
every  kind  of  regularity  and  economy 
which  you  could  establish  among  fixed 
and  settled  troops,  and  will,  in  my 
opinion  prove,  if  the  scheme  is  adhered 
to,  the  ruin  of  our  cause." 

During  the  war  various  reorganiza- 
tions took  place;  the  conditions   were 
somewhat  improved  through  the  grad- 
ual acquirement  of  a  small  nucleus  of 
104 


THE  REVOLUTION 

trained  officers ;  but  the  old  vicious  con- 
ditions concerning  the  method  of 
raising  men,  short  terms  of  enlistments, 
rather  than  enlistments  for  the  war, 
bounties,  desertions,  continued.  Boun- 
ties grew  from  small  sums  to  sums 
which,  in  those  days,  were  small  for- 
tunes and  the  foundation  was  laid  for 
a  procedure  which  was  most  vicious 
and  tended  to  corrupt  the  patriotism 
of  the  nation:  namely,  the  bounty 
system,  or  the  buying  of  men  to  dis- 
charge their  military  obligations  to  the 
nation. 

Washington's  opinion  of  our  military 
policy  is  found  in  a  letter  to  the 
president  of  Congress,  August  20, 
1780: 

14  Had  we  formed  a  permanent  army 
in  the  beginning,  which,  by  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  same  men  in  service, 
105 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

had  been  capable  of  discipline,  we 
never  should  have  had  to  retreat  with 
a  handful  of  men  across  the  Delaware 
in  1776,  trembling  for  the  fate  of 
America,  which  nothing  but  the  infatu- 
ation of  the  enemy  could  have  saved; 
we  should  not  have  remained  all  the 
succeeding  winter  at  their  mercy,  with 
sometimes  scarcely  a  sufficient  body 
of  men  to  mount  the  ordinary  guards, 
liable  at  every  moment  to  be  dissipated, 
if  they  had  only  thought  proper  to 
march  against  us;  we  should  not  have 
been  under  the  necessity  of  fighting 
Brandywine,  with  an  unequal  number 
of  raw  troops,  and  afterwards  of  seeing 
Philadelphia  fall  a  prey  to  a  victorious 
army;  we  should  not  have  been  at 
Valley  Forge  with  less  than  half  the 
force  of  the  enemy,  destitute  of  every- 
thing, in  a  situation  neither  to  resist 
106 


THE  REVOLUTION 

nor  to  retire;  we  should  not  have  seen 
New  York  left  with  a  handful  of  men, 
yet  an  overmatch  for  the  main  army 
of  these  States,  while  the  principal  part 
of  their  force  was  detached  for  the 
reduction  of  two  of  them;  we  should 
not  have  found  ourselves  this  spring  so 
weak  as  to  be  insulted  by  5,000  men, 
unable  to  protect  our  baggage  and 
magazines,  their  security  depending  on 
a  good  countenance  and  a  want  of 
enterprise  in  the  enemy;  we  should  not 
have  been  the  greatest  part  of  the  war 
inferior  to  the  enemy,  indebted  for  our 
safety  to  their  inactivity,  enduring 
frequently  the  mortification  of  seeing 
inviting  opportunities  to  ruin  them 
pass  unimproved  for  want  of  a  force 
which  the  country  was  completely  able 
to  afford,  and  of  seeing  the  country 
ravaged,  our  towns  burnt,  the  inhabi- 
107 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

tants     plundered,     abused,     murdered, 
with  impunity  from  the  same  cause. 

"  Nor  have  the  ill  effects  been  con- 
fined to  the  military  line.  A  great 
part  of  the  embarrassments  in  the  civil 
departments  flow  from  the  same  source. 
The  derangement  of  our  finances  is 
essentially  to  be  ascribed  to  it.  The 
expenses  of  the  war  and  the  paper 
emissions  have  been  greatly  multiplied 
by  it.  We  have  had  a  great  part  of 
the  time  two  sets  of  men  to  feed  and 
pay  —  the  discharged  men  going  home 
and  the  levies  coming  in.  This  was 
more  remarkably  the  case  in  1775  and 
1776.  The  difficulty  and  cost  of 
engaging  men  have  increased  at  every 
successive  attempt,  till  among  the 
present  lines  we  find  there  are  some 
who  have  received  $150  in  specie  for 
five  months'  service,  while  our  officers 
108 


THE  REVOLUTION 

are  reduced  to  the  disagreeable  neces- 
sity of  performing  the  duties  of  drill 
sergeants  to  them,  with  this  mortifying 
reflection  annexed  to  the  business,  that 
by  the  time  they  have  taught  these 
men  the  rudiments  of  a  soldier's  duty 
their  services  will  have  expired  and 
the  work  recommenced  with  a  new  set. 
The  consumption  of  provisions,  arms, 
accouterments,  and  stores  of  every  kind 
has  been  doubled  in  spite  of  every  pre- 
caution I  could  use,  not  only  from 
the  cause  just  mentioned,  but  from 
the  carelessness  and  licentiousness  inci- 
dent to  militia  and  irregular  troops. 
Our  discipline  also  has  been  much  hurt, 
if  not  ruined,  by  such  constant  changes. 
The  frequent  calls  upon  the  militia 
have  interrupted  the  cultivation  of  the 
land,  and  of  course  have  lessened  the 
quantity  of  its  produce,  occasioned  a 
109 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

scarcity,  and  enhanced  the  prices.  In 
an  army  so  unstable  as  ours  order  and 
economy  have  been  impracticable.  No 
person  who  has  been  a  close  observer  of 
the  progress  of  our  affairs  can  doubt 
that  our  currency  has  depreciated  with- 
out comparison  more  rapidly  from  the 
system  of  short  enlistments  than  it 
would  have  done  otherwise. 

"  There  is  every  reason  to  believe 
that  the  war  has  been  protracted  on 
this  account.  Our  opposition  being 
less,  the  successes  of  the  enemy  have 
been  greater.  The  fluctuation  of  the 
army  kept  alive  their  hopes,  and  at 
every  period  of  the  dissolution  of  a 
considerable  part  of  it  they  have 
flattered  themselves  with  some  decisive 
advantages.  Had  we  kept  a  perma- 
nent army  on  foot  the  enemy  could 
have  had  nothing  to  hope  for,  and 
110 


THE  REVOLUTION 

would  in  all  probability  have  listened 
to  terms  long  since." 

There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
the  Washington  opinions,  as  expressed, 
underwent  any  essential  change.  War 
drew  its  weary  length  along,  with  con- 
stantly changing  personnel  and  small 
and  ineffective  commands.  The  year 
of  1781  was  marked  by  a  mutiny  of 
troops  of  the  Pennsylvania  line.  Our 
regular  officers  had  become  skilled  and 
able  and  were  making  the  best  pos- 
sible use  of  the  inferior  troops  fur- 
nished them.  Following  the  junction 
of  the  French  and  American  troops 
came  the  operations  against  Yorktown 
and  the  capture  of  Cornwallis.  This 
was  the  last  battle  of  the  Revolution. 
The  United  States  had  employed  dur- 
ing the  war  395,858  troops.  Their 
forces  were  strongest  in  1776.  The 
111 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

British  forces  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  numbered  20,121,  while  at  the 
end  they  amounted  to  42,075.  The 
military  events  which  had  a  strong 
bearing  upon  the  expulsion  of  the 
British  were,  first,  the  capture  of 
Burgoyne,  and,  secondly,  that  of  Corn- 
wallis,  an  event  which  was  made  pos- 
sible only  by  the  strong  cooperation 
of  the  French  forces  on  sea  and  land. 
The  prosecution  of  the  war  by  the 
British  had  not  been  at  any  time 
especially  vigorous. 

The  lack  of  centralized  power  was 
felt  throughout  the  Revolution,  and 
we  have  the  curious  picture  of  an  alli- 
ance of  states  engaged  in  war  viewing 
with  suspicion  a  standing  army,  and 
yet  on  two  occasions  forced  to  give  to 
the  commander  of  these  forces  dicta- 
torial power.  Embarrassing  complica- 
112 


THE  REVOLUTION 

tions  occurred  from  the  tendency  to 
the  exercise  of  power  by  the  states. 
They  assumed  at  critical  moments  a 
quasi-independent  attitude,  as  illus- 
trated by  the  action  of  Governor 
Thomas  Jefferson  in  detaining  the 
Virginia  militia  for  home  defense 
when  it  was  urgently  required  by 
General  Greene;  and  by  the  action  of 
the  people  of  Boston  in  fitting  out 
(without  consulting  the  commander- 
in-chief)  an  independent  military 
expedition  for  operation  against  the 
British  in  Maine. 

In  April,  1812,  the  governor  of 
Massachusetts  denied  the  right  of  Con- 
gress or  the  president  to  determine 
when  conditions  justified  the  calling  out 
of  the  militia,  and  claimed  that  this 
right  is  vested  in  the  commanders-in- 
chief  of  militia  of  the  various  states — 
113 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

in  other  words,  in  the  governors.  At 
the  same  time  Connecticut  made  sub- 
stantially the  same  claim. 

A  little  later  in  the  same  year, 
Vermont  declared  that  the  military 
strength  and  resources  of  the  state 
must  be  reserved  for  its  own  defense 
and  protection  exclusively,  and  in  the 
following  year  the  same  state  refused 
to  permit  the  militia  to  go  to  General 
Macomb's  support.  In  fact,  the  whole 
structure  was  loosely  jointed  and  could 
not  have  resisted  a  strong  and  well- 
organized  attack. 

Taking  it  as  a  whole,  however,  and 
considering  the  lack  of  centralized 
power,  ignorance  of  the  legislative  and 
executive  body  in  all  matters  military, 
the  depreciation  of  currency,  and  that 
consciousness  which  must  have  existed 
among  the  troops  of  a  lack  of  strong 
114 


THE  REVOLUTION 

government,  there  was  less  trouble 
than  might  have  been  expected. 
Mutiny  —  although  causes  for  it  in 
the  way  of  shortage  of  pay  and 
clothing  often  existed  —  seldom  oc- 
curred. The  record  of  the  Continental 
troops,  one  might  say  "  the  regular 
troops,"  was  remarkably  good.  We 
had  the  material  for  both  officers  and 
men,  but  we  lacked  a  strong  govern- 
ment, organization  and  system.  In 
other  words,  there  was  a  weak  military 
policy  and  no  appreciation  of  the  mil- 
itary needs  of  the  country,  if  the  war 
was  to  have  been  conducted  vigor- 
ously and  with  the  minimum  loss  of 
life  and  expenditure  of  treasure. 

During   the    revolutionary    war    the 

states  formed  a  very  loose  confederacy, 

lacking     most     of     the     elements     of 

strength  which  come  from  national  re- 

115 


V 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

sources  properly  mobilized  and  directed 
by  a  central  authority.  The  Conti- 
nental Congress  exercised  only  a  lim- 
ited measure  of  control  and  toward 
the  end  of  the  war  it  was,  to  a  large 
extent,  advisory.  Congress  lacked  the 
power  to  utilize  and  make  available 
the  country's  military  resources.  The 
result  was  that  at  no  time  during  the 
revolution  was  the  full  strength  of  the 
new-born  nation  brought  to  bear,  and 
not  only  was  there  lack  of  a  strong 
coordinating  authority,  but  the  whole 
military  system  was  fatally  defective. 
It  represented  the  folly  of  depending 
upon  troops  enlisted  for  short  periods, 
untrained,  poorly  organized,  with  a 
constantly  changing  enlisted  personnel. 
The  unnecessary  sacrifice  of  life  and 
expenditure  of  treasure  incident  to  this 
system  and  adherence  to  it,  has  fol- 
116 


THE  REVOLUTION 

lowed  through  all  our  wars,  as  the  table 
on  the  following  page  indicates. 

As  a  result  of  this  pernicious  system 
of  frequent  and  short  enlistments,  fol- 
lowed naturally  a  pension  system 
involving  tremendous  expense,  only  a 
small  portion  of  which  would  have  been 
necessary  had  we  had  a  sound  military 
policy. 

The  policy  of  short  enlistments,  of 
enrolling  men  hastily,  not  only  cost  us 
unnecessarily  in  life  and  treasure,  but 
at  times  exercised  a  dangerous  influence 
upon  military  operations.  Arnold  was 
forced  to  deliver  an  assault  upon 
Quebec  because  of  the  approaching 
expiration  of  the  enlistments  of  a  large 
portion  of  his  troops.  Montgomery 
was  killed,  Arnold  wounded,  and  a 
large  part  of  the  force  killed,  wounded, 
or  taken  prisoners. 

117 


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(118) 


THE  REVOLUTION 

Washington  repeatedly  refers  to  the 
loss  of  troops  and  constant  change  of 
personnel  incident  to  this  system  of 
short  enlistments. 

Briefly,  these  are  the  lessons  of  the 
war:  That  a  confederation  of  states, 
without  a  strong  central  government 
under  the  direction  of  citizens  without 
experience  in  military  matters  and 
under  conditions  which  permit  each 
state  to  raise,  arm  and  equip  troops,  is 
an  exceedingly  weak  form  of  govern- 
ment for  the  prosecution  of  war;  that 
the  war  resources  of  a  nation  can  only 
be  employed  to  the  greatest  advantage 
when  used  as  a  national  force  under 
national  control  and  direction;  that 
undisciplined  and  raw  levies  cannot 
meet  disciplined  troops  with  any  hope 
of  success;  that  voluntary  enlistments 
based  on  patriotism  and  the  bounty 
119 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

cannot  be  relied  upon  to  supply  men 
for  the  army  during  a  prolonged  war, 
but  that  men  should  be  enlisted  for 
the  period  of  the  war;  and,  finally, 
that  we  should  turn  to  the  policy  of 
general  military  training  with  a  fixed 
period  of  obligation  for  all  able-bodied 
men. 

It  is  only  by  such  a  system  that 
we  shall  be  able  quickly,  smoothly  and 
effectually  to  mobilize  our  forces  for 
war.  Great  changes  have  occurred 
in  the  organization,  equipment  and 
preparedness  of  our  possible  antagon- 
ists, and  whatever  system  we  have 
must  be  one  which  permits  prompt 
mobilization  of  trained  men.  It  must 
be  one  which  enables  us  to  know  with 
certainty  and  exactness  what  our 
resources  in  men  are,  just  when  they 
will  be  available,  and  what  their  quali- 
120 


THE  REVOLUTION 

fications  are.  This  is  not  possible 
under  either  a  volunteer  system  or 
under  a  system  of  draft,  initiated  after 
war  has  commenced. 


121 


chapter  v 
Seventy  Years  of  Inefficiency 

"It  is  better  to  be  ready  for  war 
and  not  have  it  than  to  have  war  and 
not  be  ready   for  it." — L.  W. 

The  close  of  the  Revolutionary  War 
found  the  young  nation  confronted 
with  many  grave  questions,  among 
them  the  question  of  a  proper  military 
establishment.  This  was  an  object  of 
special  solicitation  on  the  part  of 
Washington,  and  he  recommended  in 
strong  language  the  thorough  train- 
ing of  the  militia,  their  proper  arming 
and  equipment.  By  militia  he  meant 
the  militia  which  includes  all  men  from 
eighteen  to  forty-five  years  of  age. 
The  Continental  Army  was  disbanded, 
122 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

excepting  one  battery  of  artillery 
known  as  the  Alexander  Hamilton  Bat- 
tery, a  battery  which  still  exists  in  our 
service.  Although  the  finances  of  the 
nation  were  exhausted,  an  attempt 
was  made  to  establish  a  small  regular 
establishment,  a  mixed  regiment  of 
infantry  and  artillery,  ridiculously 
inadequate,  of  course.  Later  that 
regiment  was  expanded  a  little  into 
a  Legionary  Corps  consisting  of  some 
2,040  noncommissioned  officers  and 
privates. 

Feeble,  half-hearted  measures  in  the 
direction  of  an  organization  of  a 
small  military  force  followed  during 
the  next  few  years.  In  1789  the  War 
Department  was  organized.  In  1790 
there  was  another  reorganization  of 
the  army.  This  organization  fixed  the 
standard  at  1,216  noncommissioned 
123 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

officers  and  privates  —  not  a  formid- 
able force.  Various  Indian  campaigns 
indicated  the  necessity  of  a  stronger 
military  establishment,  and  in  1791 
there  was  a  further  reorganization 
which  resulted  in  the  addition  of 
another  regiment.  Two  general  offi- 
cers were  authorized. 

St.  Clair's  defeat  emphasized  the 
necessity  of  a  still  further  increase  in 
military  establishment,  as  well  as  the 
inadvisability  of  depending  upon  un- 
trained militia.  This  reorganization 
resulted  in  the  filling  up  of  the  then 
existing  military  establishment  to  full 
strength  and  the  addition  of  three 
regiments  of  infantry  and  certain 
minor  additions  in  field  and  staff  offi- 
cers. About  this  time  the  legionary 
idea,  which  originated  with  Baron  von 
Steuben,  was  applied  to  the  organiza- 
124 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

tion  of  the  regular  army,  and  was  pro- 
posed for  the  militia.  The  Legion 
was  really  a  small,  complete  army  in 
itself,  a  complete  fighting  unit,  com- 
posed of  the  different  arms.  General 
Knox,  then  secretary  of  war,  strongly 
approved  the  idea  for  the  army,  and 
recommended  its  extension  to  include 
all  physically  and  mentally  fit  men 
from  eighteen  to  sixty  years  of  age, 
with  the  idea  of  building  up  a  trained 
citizen  soldiery. 

The  legionary  organization  for  the 
regular  establishment  was  adopted, 
although  unfortunately  the  general 
plan  proposed  by  General  Knox,  to 
divide  and  classify  the  entire  male 
population  between  eighteen  and  sixty, 
was  not  adopted.  In  1795-7  there 
was  further  reorganization,  made 
necessary  by  increasing  calls  for  troops 
125 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

in  connection  with  Indian  disturbances 
and  the  Whiskey  Rebellion  in  Penn- 
sylvania in  August,  1794.  In  1798 
the  president  was  authorized  to  organ- 
ize a  provisional  army  in  case  of  the 
existence  of  war  or  an  invasion  of  our 
territory,  or  imminent  danger.  This 
Provincial  Army  was  to  consist  of 
10,000  noncommissioned  officers  and 
men,  to  be  enlisted  for  a  period  of 
three  years.  The  force  was  to  be  offi- 
cered by  the  president.  Washington 
was  appointed  commander-in-chief, 
with  the  rank  of  lieutenant-general. 
This  army  was  never  called  into 
being.  Further  reorganization  in  1802 
resulted  in  a  further  reduction  in  the 
strength  of  the  army.  In  1805  a  real 
step  forward  was  taken  through  the 
establishment  of  the  Military  Acad- 
emy at  West  Point.  Alexander 
126 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

Hamilton  was  the  moving  force 
behind  the  establishment  of  this  splen- 
did institution.  Washington  strongly 
approved,  and  three  days  before  his 
death  he  wrote  as  follows  to  Hamilton: 

M  The  establishment  of  an  institu- 
tion of  this  kind  on  a  respectable  and 
extensive  basis  has  ever  been  consid- 
ered by  me  an  object  of  primary 
importance  to  this  country,  and  while 
I  was  in  the  chair  of  government  I 
omitted  no  proper  opportunity  of 
recommending  it  in  my  public  speeches 
and  otherwise  to  the  attention  of  the 
Legislature." 

McHenry,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
urged  the  establishment  of  the  Acad- 
emy in  the  following  words: 

"  It  cannot  be  forgotten  that  in  our 
Revolutionary  War  it  was  not  till 
after  several  years'  practice  in  arms, 
127 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

and  the  extension  of  the  periods  for 
which  our  soldiers  were  at  first 
enlisted,  that  we  found  them  at  all 
qualified  to  meet  on  the  field  of  battle 
those  to  whom  they  were  opposed. 
The  occasional  brilliant  and  justly 
celebrated  acts  of  some  of  our  militia 
during  that  eventful  period  detract 
nothing  from  this  dear-bought  truth. 
"  The  great  man  who  conducted  the 
war  of  our  Revolution  was  continually 
compelled  to  conform  his  conduct  to 
the  circumstances  growing  out  of  the 
experimental  lessons  just  mentioned. 
What  was  the  secret  of  his  conduct? 
Must  it  be  told?  It  may,  and  without 
exciting  a  blush  or  an  uneasy  sensa- 
tion in  any  of  his  surviving  companies 
in  arms.  He  had  an  army  of  men,  but 
he  had  few  officers  or  soldiers  in  that 
army." 

128 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

The  Academy  provided  for  a  force 
of  only  twenty  officers  and  cadets,  and 
its  purpose  was  to  provide  a  corps  of 
engineers.  Since  the  day  of  its  foun- 
dation it  has  been  the  strong  prop 
of  our  military  establishment. 

There  were  further  sporadic  changes 
in  the  composition  of  the  army,  and 
in  1808  it  was  increased  by  some  five 
regiments  of  infantry,  a  regiment  of 
riflemen,  a  regiment  of  light  artillery, 
and  one  regiment  of  light  dragoons, 
enlisted  for  a  period  of  five  years. 
This  was  the  result,  principally,  of  the 
increasing  probability  of  war  with 
Great  Britain.  In  March,  1812,  an 
attempt  was  made  to  organize  a  Quar- 
termaster's Department,  Commissary 
Department,  Ordnance  Department, 
and  during  this  year  an  increase  was 
authorized  in  the  number  of  cadets  at 
129 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

the  Military  Academy.  Under  this 
act,  the  maximum  number  of  cadets 
was  fixed  at  250. 

On  June  18,  1812,  war  was  declared 
against  Great  Britain.  Our  regular 
army  had  been  greatly  increased 
immediately  preceding  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  and  now  consisted  of 
some  36,700  men  on  paper.  This 
number  was  rapidly  increased,  from 
time  to  time,  by  calling  in  volunteers 
for  militia.  We  had  apparently 
learned  very  little  from  the  lessons 
of  the  Revolution.  The  war,  taken 
as  a  whole,  was  a  series  of  disasters 
and  reverses  on  land,  many  of  them 
highly  discreditable  in  character.  Our 
record  on  sea  was  much  better,  and 
we  gained  many  notable  successes. 
The  men  of  the  fleet  and  on  the  indi- 
vidual ships  of  war  were  better  trained 
130 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

and  better  disciplined  than  those  of 
the  land  forces.  The  gallant  action  at 
Lundy's  Lane,  where  there  was  a 
strong  nucleus  of  regulars,  and  minor 
successes  on  the  Thames,  formed  the 
bulk  of  our  creditable  actions  on  land 
during  the  period  of  the  war.  It 
should  be  remembered,  in  commenting 
upon  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  army 
and  navy,  that  Congress  has  never 
delegated  to  the  states  the  power  to 
raise  and  maintain  a  navy.  In  1813 
there  was  a  further  increase  in  the 
strength  of  the  regular  army  by 
twenty  regiments,  enlisted  for  a  year, 
and  some  increases  in  the  staff.  There 
was  still  a  general  failure  to  appre- 
ciate the  necessity  of  providing  an 
adequate,  well  -  organized  military 
establishment.  We  put  some  527,000 
men  into  the  war.  The  British  reg- 
131 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

ular  force  in  this  country  at  no  time 
exceeded  16,800. 

Generally  speaking,  our  campaigns 
against  Canada  were  hopelessly  in- 
effective. In  1814  Commodore  Mc- 
Donough's  brilliant  victory  on  Lake 
Champlain  terminated  an  advance 
which,  had  it  not  been  for  the  naval 
successes,  might  have  reached  New 
York  and  cut  off  New  England  from 
the  rest  of  the  country.  During  this 
war,  as  in  the  Revolution,  the  power 
of  a  state  government  to  interfere  with 
military  operations  was  illustrated  by 
the  action  of  the  governor  of  Vermont 
in  refusing  to  send  militia  when  Gen- 
eral Macomb  called  for  aid.  This  war 
was  signalized  by  the  abandonment  of 
our  capital  to  a  force  about  sixty  per 
cent  that  of  the  defenders.  It  is  true 
that  most  of  the  defenders  were  with- 
132 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

out  training  or  discipline.  Only  about 
1,500  of  the  British  force  of  3,500  were 
engaged.  Our  troops  abandoned  the 
capital  with  a  loss  of  eight  killed  and 
eleven  wounded. 

The  battle  of  New  Orleans  was  one 
of  the  most  remarkable  victories  re- 
corded in  our  military  history.  It  was 
fought  two  weeks  after  peace  had  been 
signed  at  Ghent.  Our  success  was  not 
without  the  element  of  good  fortune. 
The  British  attack  was  a  frontal  attack 
without  cover,  in  the  face  of  men 
highly  trained  in  the  use  of  the  rifle. 
While  our  troops  are  entitled  to  a  high 
degree  of  credit,  the  reports  do  not 
bring  out  the  fact,  however,  that  our 
success  was  largely  influenced  by  the 
delay  of  Colonel  Thornton's  highly 
successful  attack  on  the  Americans  on 
the  west  bank.  Had  his  assault  been 
133 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

delivered  a  little  earlier,  the  American 
line  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  would 
have  been  untenable.  While  the  battle 
had  no  influence  in  determining  peace, 
it  served  as  somewhat  of  a  consolation 
for  a  long  series  of  disasters  on  land. 

The  navy's  record  in  the  war  was 
excellent.  It  did  all  that  a  small  force 
could  have  done.  It  aided  in  the 
victory  of  the  Thames,  saved  the  army 
from  destruction  at  Plattsburg,  and  at 
Norfolk,  Bladensburg,  Baltimore  and 
New  Orleans  rendered  splendid  serv- 
ice; but  at  the  end  of  the  war  Great 
Britain  controlled  the  sea. 

The  entire  War  of  1812  was  but 
another  illustration  of  the  unwisdom  of 
our  general  policy.  No  well-thought- 
out  organization  in  time  of  peace  —  no 
sound  policy  in  the  way  of  preparation 
— failure  to  do  in  time  of  peace  those 
134 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

things  which  cannot  be  done  in  time  of 
war.  Taking  the  war  as  a  whole,  it  was 
disastrous  and  highly  discreditable  to  us 
on  land.  The  blunders  were  those  of 
the  Revolution  in  even  a  more  aggra- 
vated form  and  with  less  excuse,  because 
under  the  Constitution  the  government 
did  have  the  authority  to  bring  into 
play  the  entire  financial  and  military 
resources  of  the  nation.  As  Upton 
states:  "Five  thousand  men  (Brit- 
ish) for  the  period  of  two  years 
brought  war  and  devastation  into  our 
territory  and  successfully  withstood 
the  misapplied  power  of  seven  millions 
of  people." 

Shortly  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
war,  the  army  was  again  reduced  and 
we  returned  with  more  or  less  prompt- 
ness to  the  old  haphazard  policy.  In 
1821  another  plan  of  reorganization 
135 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

was  presented.  This  plan  contem- 
plated the  reduction  of  the  army  to 
6,000  enlisted  men  and  its  maintenance 
as  a  group  of  skeletonized  organiza- 
tions. It  is  interesting  to  note,  in  this 
connection,  that  Mr.  Calhoun,  in  pre- 
senting his  plan,  made  the  following 
statements : 

"  To  give  such  an  organization,  the 
leading  principles  in  its  formation 
ought  to  be,  that  at  the  commence- 
ment of  hostilities  there  should  be 
nothing  either  to  new  model  or  to 
create.  The  only  difference,  conse- 
quently, between  the  peace  and  the 
war  formation  of  the  army  ought  to 
be  in  the  increased  magnitude  of  the 
latter,  and  the  only  change  in  passing 
from  the  former  to  the  latter  should 
consist  in  giving  to  it  the  augmenta- 
tion which  will  then  be  necessary." 
136 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

"  It  is  thus,  and  thus  only,  the  dan- 
gerous transition  from  peace  to  war 
may  be  made  without  confusion  or 
disorder,  and  the  weakness  and  danger 
which  otherwise  would  be  inevitable,  be 
avoided.  Two  consequences  result  from 
this  principle:  First,  the  organization 
of  the  staff  in  a  peace  establishment 
ought  to  be  such  that  every  branch 
of  it  should  be  completely  formed, 
with  such  extension  as  the  number  of 
troops  and  posts  occupied  may  render 
necessary;  and,  secondly,  that  the 
organization  of  the  line  ought  as  far 
as  practicable,  to  be  such  that  in  pass- 
ing from  the  peace  to  the  war  forma- 
tion, the  force  may  be  sufficiently 
augmented  without  adding  new  regi- 
ments or  battalions,  thus  raising  the 
army,  on  the  basis  of  the  peace  estab- 
lishment, instead  of  creating  a  new 
137 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

army  to  be  added  to  the  old,  as  at  the 
commencement  of  the  late  war." 

Fortunate,  indeed,  would  we  have 
been  had  this  policy  been  adopted, 
provided  we  had  a  reserve  of  trained 
men  to  bring  the  organization  to  war 
strength.  But  it  was  not.  At  that 
time  the  possibility  of  sudden  invasion 
was  remote.  Most  of  our  people  were 
familiar  with  the  use  of  the  rifle. 
There  was  no  possibility  of  such  con- 
centration against  us  as  during  recent 
years.  The  proposed  organization 
related  wholly  to  the  regular  army, 
and  did  not  provide  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  that  great  bulk  of  our  force 
which  must  always  come  from  the 
people  themselves,  who,  within  certain 
age  limitations,  must  be  trained,  organ- 
ized and  equipped  in  time  of  peace 
if  they  are  to  be  effective  in  war. 
138 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

Following  the  War  of  1812  came  a 
series  of  Indian  wars,  some  of  them 
of  considerable  magnitude.  The  Sem- 
inole War,  the  Black  Hawk  War, 
the  Florida  War,  were  conducted  with 
various  modifications  of  the  military 
establishment,  but,  generally  speaking, 
the  old  policy  was  followed.  Raw 
troops  were  raised  to  meet  each 
emergency,  with  resulting  tremendous 
expenditures  of  money,  great  loss  of 
life  and  a  high  degree  of  inefficiency. 
On  the  heels  of  the  Florida  War 
came  the  Creek  campaign.  Rela- 
tively large  numbers  of  troops  were 
engaged  in  these  campaigns.  In  the 
Creek  campaign,  for  instance,  nearly 
12,000  troops  were  employed.  In  the 
three  wars  —  the  Florida  War,  the 
Creek,  and  the  Cherokee  War  —  we 
called  into  service  the  militia  to  the 
139 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

number  of  48,152.  To  these  should  be 
added  12,539  regulars,  making  our  total 
force  60,691  engaged  in  these  little 
campaigns.  In  1837  there  was  a  slight 
increase  in  the  regular  army,  and  some 
increase  in  the  staff  corps,  but  there 
was  no  legislation  looking  to  the  train- 
ing, disciplining  and  equipping  under 
federal  direction  of  the  great  body 
of  our  men  known  as  the  militia. 

In  1842,  immediately  after  the  ces- 
sation of  hostilities  incident  to  the 
Florida  campaign,  the  army  was 
reduced  from  12,500  to  8,500.  The 
lessons  taught  by  these  Indian  wars 
were  the  lessons  of  the  Revolution  and 
the  War  of  1812,  namely,  that  organi- 
zation and  preparation  for  war  must 
be  made  in  time  of  peace,  and  that 
undisciplined  and  untrained  troops, 
poorly  organized,  are  the  most  expen- 
140 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

sive  weapons  a  nation  can  employ  in 
war.  There  was  needless  sacrifice  of 
life,  undue  prolongation  of  the  war, 
tremendous  and  unnecessary  expense. 
Or,  as  Upton  sums  it  up,  the  lessons 
taught  by  this  war  are: 

"First:  That  its  expense  was 
tripled,  if  not  quadrupled,  by  that 
feature  of  the  law  of  1821  which  gave 
the  president,  in  times  of  emergency, 
no  discretion  to  increase  the  enlisted 
men  of  the  army. 

"  Second:  That,  as  in  every  previ- 
ous war,  after  successfully  employing 
for  short  periods  of  service,  militia 
and  volunteers,  and  exhausting  their 
enthusiasm,  Congress  found  it  more 
humane  and  economical  to  continue 
hostilities  with  regular  troops,  enlisted 
for  the  period  of  five  years. 

"  Third:  That  for  want  of  a  well- 
141 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

defined  peace  organization,  a  nation 
of  17,000,000  of  people  contended  for 
seven  years  with  1,200  warriors,  and 
finally  closed  the  struggle  without 
accomplishing  the  forcible  emigration 
of  the  Indians,  which  was  the  original 
and  sole  cause  of  the  war. 

"  Without  dwelling  on  the  needless 
sacrifice  of  life,  these  hard  lessons 
would  have  been  cheaply  learned, 
could  Congress,  at  the  end  of  the  con- 
flict, have  appreciated  the  value  of 
expansive  organization.  By  with- 
holding from  the  president  authority 
to  add  a  few  enlisted  men  to  the  army, 
it  committed  the  same  great  error  as 
in  1821.  We  shall  see  that  this  error 
more  than  doubled  the  cost  and  length 
of  another  war,  which  despite  the  mis- 
takes of  military  legislation,  was  soon 
to  add  to  the  luster  of  our  arms." 
142 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

The  Mexican  War  furnished  the 
next  opportunity  to  illustrate  what 
the  United  States  had  learned  from 
the  conduct  of  previous  wars.  A 
close  study  of  this  campaign  discloses 
the  fact  that  so  far  as  the  methods 
and  system  are  concerned,  little  or 
nothing  had  been  learned;  and 
although  the  government  had  ample 
warning  of  the  probabilities  of  war, 
little  or  no  preparation  had  been  made 
for  it.  We  were  opposed  by  an  enemy 
inferior  both  in  organization  and 
resources;  we  had  a  small  but  good 
nucleus  of  regular  troops.  The  war 
was  sufficiently  remote  from  centres  of 
influence  to  give  our  officers  a  better 
opportunity  than  usual  to  train  and 
discipline  the  new  levies  which  were 
sent  them.  Moreover,  we  were  singu- 
larly fortunate  in  having  as  com- 
143 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

manders  and  subordinates  an  unusu- 
ally able  group  of  officers,  many  of 
whom  became  the  great  commanders 
of  the  Civil  War.  The  foregoing  and 
other  circumstances  resulted  in  the 
conduct  of  the  war  being  effective, 
one  might  almost  say,  brilliant. 

Palo  Alto,  Resaca  de  la  Palma, 
Monterey,  Buena  Vista,  on  one  line 
of  operations,  and  Vera  Cruz,  Cerro 
Gordo,  Contreras,  Churubusco  and  El 
Molino  del  Rey,  on  the  other,  tell  the 
story  of  the  war.  It  was,  taken  as 
a  whole,  our  most  successful  and  best 
conducted  war ;  but  in  remembering  this 
success,  we  must  not  forget  that  the 
system  employed  was  as  defective  as 
in  previous  wars,  and  that  the  success 
that  we  had  was  not  due  to  the  sys- 
tem, but  was  attained  in  spite  of  it. 

The  regular  army  had  been  reduced 
144 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

to  an  insignificant  force  in  numbers  — 
a  mere  nucleus  —  and  large  numbers 
of  volunteers  had  to  be  called,  result- 
ing in  huge  increase  in  annual  expend- 
itures during  the  war.  There  was  one 
hopeful  change,  however,  and  that 
was  the  reduction  in  the  proportion 
of  militia  used.  This  was  not  due  to 
the  experience  of  the  past,  but  princi- 
pally because  the  militia  was  not  avail- 
able for  service  outside  the  United 
States.  In  the  War  of  1812  the  force 
of  volunteers  serving  for  twelve  or 
more  months  was  only  twelve  per  cent 
of  the  total  number  of  troops  em- 
ployed. In  the  Mexican  War  it  was 
approximately  eighty-eight  per  cent. 
In  the  War  of  1812  a  large  force  of 
militia  and  untrained  volunteers  was 
practically  baffled  by  a  force  of  5,000 
of  the  enemy's  regulars.  In  the 
145 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

Mexican  War  a  force  of  well-disci- 
plined volunteers  with  a  nucleus  of 
regulars  overthrew  an  army  several 
times  their  number.  In  other  words, 
in  the  Mexican  War  we  had  a  good 
nucleus  of  regular  troops  and  we  had 
time  to  develop  our  volunteers  into 
trained  and  reasonably  well-disciplined 
soldiers,  and  we  used  small  numbers 
of  militia.  What  we  did  was  not  due 
so  much  to  any  idea  of  abandoning 
the  old  system  with  its  free  use  of 
militia,  as  it  was  to  the  fact  that  we 
had  to  conduct  a  war  where  the  militia 
could  not  be  used  because  of  the  con- 
stitutional limitation  upon  its  employ- 
ment outside  the  United  States. 

In    this    war    the    system    of    short 

enlistments  jeopardized  the  success  of 

military  operations.     Many  of  Scott's 

troops  were  enlisted  under  conditions 

146 


YEARS  OF  INEFFICIENCY 

which  gave  them  the  option  of  con- 
tinuing in  service  or  taking  their  dis- 
charge at  the  end  of  the  year.  On 
reaching  Pueblo,  he  discovered  that 
seven  of  his  eleven  regiments  had 
decided  to  terminate  their  services  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  year.  Conse- 
quently he  was  stripped  of  a  large 
portion  of  his  effective  troops;  had  the 
Mexican  forces  been  capable  of  further 
activities  disaster  would  certainly  have 
resulted. 

We  employed  in  the  Mexican  War 
approximately  104,000  troops  of  all 
arms,  of  whom  only  12,000  were  mili- 
tia —  twelve  per  cent  of  militia  against 
approximately  eighty-eight  per  cent  in 
the  War  of  1812. 

At  the  close  of  the  Mexican  War 
the  army  was  reduced  from  30,890  to 
10,320.  There  were  some  minor  modi- 
147 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

fications  in  the  organization  of  our 
regiments,  but,  generally  speaking, 
little  change  was  effected  by  the 
Mexican  War.  Discretion  was  given 
to  the  president  to  increase  the 
strength  of  organizations  in  case  of 
emergency,  and  incident  to  the  trou- 
bles in  Utah  and  along  the  Texas  bor- 
der, the  president  was  authorized  to 
accept  into  service  of  the  United 
States  a  regiment  of  Texas  volunteers 
and  to  raise  two  regiments  of  mounted 
infantry  if  required.  There  was  no 
very  important  change  in  policy  with 
reference  to  making  arrangements  for 
possible  war.  In  other  words,  little 
had  been  learned  from  the  preceding 
wars,  or  if  learned,  had  not  been  put 
into  practical  application. 


148 


chapter  vi 

The   Price   of   Unpreparedness   in 
the  Sixties 

"To  lead  an  uninstructed  people 
into  war,  is  to  throw  them  away." — 
Confucius,  Jf.79  B.  C. 

According  to  Upton,  at  the  end  of 
1860,  with  a  population  of  31,000,000, 
we  had  in  our  regular  army   16,367. 

That  army  wTas  scattered  along  the 
western  frontier  and  over  the  vast 
areas  west  of  the  Mississippi,  along 
the  Atlantic  seacoast  and  the  northern 
border,  and,  roughly,  provided  two 
soldiers  per  mile  for  guarding  the 
frontier;  for  the  area  west  of  the 
Mississippi,  one  soldier  for  every  120 
square  miles;  and  for  the  northwest- 
149 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

ern,  or  the  remaining  portions  of  the 
Union,  one  soldier  for  every  1,300 
square  miles.  There  was  almost  no 
well-organized,  equipped  and  trained 
militia. 

This  was  the  general  condition  when 
South  Carolina  passed  the  ordinance 
of  secession.  That  nothing  had  been 
learned  from  previous  wars  and  that 
no  plan  of  operations  had  been 
thought  out  or  adequate  stores  pre- 
pared for  sudden  emergency,  was  indi- 
cated by  the  confusion  and  difficulties 
which  followed  the  attempt  to  organize 
an  army.  The  enlisted  personnel  of 
the  regular  army  was  scattered  over 
the  entire  area  of  the  country.  Prac- 
tically all  of  the  enlisted  men  remained 
staunch  in  their  adherence  to  the  cause 
of  the  national  government,  but  con- 
fusion and  disorganization  resulted  in 
150 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

those  commands  which  were  outside 
the  Union  lines  and  filtered  back  piece- 
meal. The  great  majority  of  the  offi- 
cers retained  their  commissions  in  the 
national  service,  but  many  of  great 
ability  tendered  their  resignations  and 
reported  for  duty  with  the  forces  of 
their  states.  The  conduct  of  the  gov- 
ernors throughout  the  country  largely 
followed  party  lines.  In  the  south 
there  was  a  general  refusal  to  furnish 
militia  for  the  purpose  of  the  national 
government.  Along  the  border  states 
there  was  a  general  opposition  to  fur- 
nishing any  of  these  troops  for 
national  service.  In  Delaware  a  new 
situation  arose,  as  illustrated  by  the 
proclamation  of  the  government  of 
that  state  in  response  to  the  call  for 
one  regiment  of  militia: 

"  Therefore,     I,     William     Burton, 
151 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

governor  of  the  said  State  of  Dela- 
ware, recommend  the  formation  of 
volunteer  companies  for  the  protection 
of  the  lives  and  property  of  the  people 
of  this  state  against  violence  of  any 
sort  to  which  they  may  be  exposed. 
For  these  purposes  such  companies, 
when  formed,  will  be  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  state  authorities,  though 
not  subject  to  be  ordered  by  the 
executive  into  the  United  States  serv- 
ice, the  law  not  vesting  in  him  such 
authority.  They  will,  however,  have 
the  option  of  offering  their  services  to 
the  general  government  for  the  defense 
of  its  capital  and  the  support  of  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  country." 
As  a  general  rule,  the  governors  of 
the  states  which  refused  militia,  acted 
on  their  own  initiative,  and  did  not 
refer  the  matter  to  the  state  legisla- 
152 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

ture.  Six  states  to  which  an  appeal 
was  made  for  the  service  of  militia 
and  refused  by  the  governors,  after- 
wards furnished  252,000  men  to  the 
Union  cause.  This  illustrates  how 
completely,  under  the  militia  system, 
a  governor  can  paralyze  the  military 
resources  of  his  own  state,  the  people 
of  which  in  large  part  may  be  desirous 
of  meeting  the  national  demand. 

The  story  of  the  militia  as  a  whole 
illustrates  the  utter  folly  of  depend- 
ing upon  any  system  which  leaves  the 
control  of  any  portion  of  the  military 
establishment  upon  which  the  nation 
must  depend  in  war,  in  the  hands  of 
the  governor  of  a  state,  or  of  anyone 
else  other  than  the  federal  authority. 
The  entire  military  force  upon  which 
the  nation  is  to  depend  in  war  must 
be  under  the  control  of  the  federal 
153 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

government  absolutely  and  completely, 
and  be  trained,  disciplined  and  organ- 
ized by  it,  if  war  is  to  be  waged  effi- 
ciently. In  the  turmoil  and  confusion 
of  the  moment,  President  Lincoln  was 
compelled,  as  a  matter  of  national 
safety,  to  assume  dictatorial  power.  It 
was  indeed  fortunate  for  the  nation 
that  we  had  at  that  time  a  man  as 
president  who  was  willing  to  assume 
this  responsibility. 

In  order  to  meet  the  emergency  in 
part,  at  least,  President  Lincoln,  by 
proclamation,  increased  the  strength 
of  the  regular  army  approximately 
23,000  men,  and  the  navy  18,000  men. 
This  action  was  subsequently  con- 
firmed by  Congress.  In  addition  to 
the  natural  inevitable  results  of  an 
entire  lack  of  military  policy  was  the 
condition  of  rebellion,  which  had  dis- 
154 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

rupted  to  a  certain  extent  the  small 
standing  army  and  rendered  unavail- 
able the  military  resources  of  the 
nation  in  the  way  of  supplies.  Many 
or  the  northern  arsenals  had  been 
largely  stripped  of  supplies.  There 
was  a  condition  of  veritable  military 
chaos.  Fortunately  for  the  safety  of 
the  country  and  the  outcome  of  the 
war,  the  South  was  unprepared  and 
had  available  no  well  organized 
force  to  take  advantage  promptly 
of  the  helplessness  of  the  national 
government. 

An  attempt  was  made  by  the  fed- 
eral authorities  to  organize  a  force  of 
regulars  and  volunteers  on  sound 
lines.  The  regiments  were  to  be  of 
three  battalions,  two  at  the  front  and 
one  as  a  depot  battalion.  It  was  also 
proposed  to  treat  volunteers  as  a 
155 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

purely  federal  force,  the  officers  to  be 
commissioned  by  the  president.  The 
commission,  composed  of  regular  offi- 
cers whose  report  embodied  these  sug- 
gestions, acted  on  sound  lines,  but 
their  views  and  recommendations  were 
rejected,  and  the  volunteers  were,  to 
a  certain  extent,  state  troops;  to  the 
governors  was  left  the  appointing  of 
officers.  This,  coupled  with  the  em- 
ployment of  untrained,  poorly  organ- 
ized and  officered  militia,  was  another 
of  the  serious  blunders  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  war. 

If  the  proposition  of  the  board  of 
regular  officers  had  been  approved, 
we  should  have  entered  the  war  on 
a  comparatively  sound  basis  and 
undoubtedly  terminated  it  in  much 
less  time  than  was  eventually  neces- 
sary, and  with  much  less  loss  of  life 
156 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

and  expenditure  of  money;  but  under 
the  policy  adopted,  governors  of  states 
soon  showed  a  distinct  tendency  to 
create  new  regiments  instead  of  filling 
up  their  old  ones.  The  new  regiments 
gave  an  opportunity  to  appoint  new 
officers  —  in  other  words,  local  politics 
was  exerting  a  strong  influence  in  the 
building  up  of  the  military  establish- 
ment. Had  the  appointment  of  offi- 
cers rested  with  the  president  and  the 
policy  been  adopted  of  keeping  the 
old  regiments  full,  we  should  have 
very  soon  had  a  highly  effective  and 
efficient  force.  The  handful  of  regular 
officers  and  men  was  the  nucleus 
around  which  the  whole  volunteer  mil- 
itary establishment  rallied. 

No  attempt  will  be  made  to  follow 
in  detail  the  conduct  of  the  war.    All 
that  it  is  desired  to  point  out  is  that 
157 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

the  militia  feature  of  the  system  was 
a  failure  and  that  the  volunteer  sys- 
tem, as  such,  failed  both  in  the  North- 
ern and  Southern  army.  The  spirit 
of  the  volunteers  was  splendid,  but 
the  system  was  unsound  and  could  not 
be  depended  upon.  It  failed  as  it  had 
always  failed  and  will  always  fail. 
The  Confederacy  was  forced  to  resort 
to  the  draft  in  April,  1862;  the 
national  government  published  its 
first  draft  order  in  August,  1862,  and 
resorted  to  the  general  draft  the  fol- 
lowing year.  Desertion  was  rampant. 
Such  great  numbers  deserted  that  effi- 
ciency was  greatly  impaired.  Great 
numbers  of  officers  were  dismissed,  and 
still  greater  numbers  were  got  rid  of 
as  unfit  for  the  service. 

The  bounty  —  that  evil  child  of  the 
Revolution  —  soon    came    into    being 
158 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

and  was  in  this,  as  in  other  wars,  one 
of  the  strongest  influences  in  debauch- 
ing the  patriotism  of  our  people  and 
lowering  the  standards  of  the  indi- 
vidual appreciation  of  the  obligation 
for  the  national  service.  With  it  went 
a  still  greater  evil,  namely,  the  pur- 
chase of  substitutes.  It  is  difficult  to 
conceive  anything  more  at  variance 
with  the  principles  of  representative 
government  and  individual  obligation 
for  national  service  in  war,  than  the 
practice  of  buying  substitutes,  a  prac- 
tice which  made  it  possible  for  the 
rich  to  avoid  service  and  escape  the 
dangers  and  hardships  of  a  campaign 
by  paying  other  men  to  render  their 
service  for  them.  The  effect  of  both 
the  bounty  and  the  purchase  of  substi- 
tutes was  seen  directly  in  the  lowering 
of  the  general  sentiment  of  individual 
159 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

obligation  for  service,  and  in  the  vastly 
increased  number  of  desertions. 

In  fact,  those  two  procedures,  the 
bounty  and  the  purchase  of  substitutes, 
have  done  more  than  anything  else  to 
degrade  and  debauch  that  sense  of 
individual  obligation  in  time  of  war, 
which  should  animate  a  people.  They 
have  struck  at  the  very  foundation 
on  which  the  republic  rests:  an 
appreciation  and  acceptance  of  the 
principle  that  with  manhood  suffrage 
goes  manhood   obligation   for  service. 

At  the  end  of  two  years  the  armies 
on  both  sides  began  to  reach  a  state 
of  real  efficiency,  but  it  had  been 
gained  at  a  great  and  unnecessary 
cost  in  life  and  treasure.  Each  side 
was  laboring  under  somewhat  the  same 
difficulties,  although  the  South,  as  far 
as  the  conduct  of  the  war  was  con- 
160 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

cerned,  was  far  better  organized,  in 
that  it  waged  war  more  as  a  nation 
than  the  North,  which  greatly  weak- 
ened itself  in  the  conduct  of  the  war 
through  surrendering  to  the  governors 
of  the  states  too  much  of  the  federal 
power  in  matters  pertaining  to  the 
raising  and  officering  of  troops.  The 
Confederacy  really  conducted  the  war 
as  a  nation;  the  Union  as  a  confed- 
eracy. By  so  doing,  the  Confederacy 
added  at  least  fifty  per  cent  to  its  effi- 
ciency. New  regiments  were  not  cre- 
ated to  the  extent  that  they  were  in 
the  North.  The  government  was  suffi- 
ciently centralized  to  conduct  the  war 
with  a  much  greater  degree  of  effici- 
ency than  was  the  Union  government. 
Volunteering,  as  could  have  been 
expected,  and  doubtless  was  expected 
by  all  who  had  any  knowledge  of  our 
161 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

military  history,  diminished  after  the 
first  excitement  was  over,  and  the 
draft  was  in  general  application,  both 
in  the   North  and  the   South. 

At  the  end  of  the  Civil  War  we 
were  for  the  first  and  only  time  in  our 
history  prepared  for  war  with  a  first- 
class  power.  We  had  an  admirable 
navy  and  army,  experienced,  well 
organized,  well  equipped.  Our  condi- 
tion of  preparedness  was  recognized 
by  foreign  governments,  as  indicated 
by  the  prompt  evacuation  of  Mexico 
by  Napoleon  upon  the  request  of  this 
government. 

Once  the  Mexican  difficulty  was 
settled,  the  strength  of  the  regular 
army  was  gradually  reduced.  The 
strength  fluctuated  from  year  to  year. 
In  1898  it  amounted  to  28,747.  At 
the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  until  the 
162 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

outbreak  of  the  war  with  Spain,  the 
army  was  principally  engaged  in 
Indian  operations  in  the  West,  work 
which  was  largely  of  a  police  char- 
acter. Men  were  kept  in  the  service 
as  long  as  practical;  knowledge  of  the 
language,  of  the  country  and  the 
habits  of  the  Indian,  made  the  re-en- 
listed man  valuable.  It  was  really  a 
military  police  force  and  not  an  army 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word.  The 
organizations  were  skeletonized  and 
kept  at  reduced  strength. 

This  period  was,  from  the  stand- 
point of  military  progress,  a  period 
of  dry  rot,  interrupted  occasionally  by 
sporadic  activities  incident  to  Indian 
outbreaks.  The  organizations  were 
full  of  old  soldiers.  The  work  of  the 
army  was  valuable  in  the  highest  sense 
as  an  aid  in  the  development  of  the 
163 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

Great  West,  and  this  portion  of  its 
work  is  one  of  the  most  interesting 
from  the  standpoint  of  local  history; 
but  it  was  not  a  period  marked  by  mili- 
tary progress  or  development.  Pro- 
motion was  slow;  officers  reached  com- 
mand grade  when  they  were  too  old 
to  exercise  it.  The  militia  was,  gener- 
ally speaking,  inefficient  and  of  little 
or  no  military  value.  Our  regular 
army  equipment  was  years  behind  that 
of  the  great  military  powers  of 
Europe;  we  showed  all  the  effects  of 
our  peaceful  slumber,  so  far  as  mili- 
tary development  went.  Interest  in 
military  matters  was  reduced  to  a 
minimum;  people  were  principally 
concerned  in  the  development  of  the 
natural  resources  of  the  country, 
opening  up  lines  of  communication, 
building  railroads,  turning  natural 
164 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 

wealth  into  money.  For  a  long  time 
after  the  war  we  had  available  for 
service  from  a  million  and  a  half  to 
two  million  men  who  had  served 
through  the  Civil  war,  and  many  thou- 
sands of  able  officers;  in  other  words, 
we  had  an  unorganized  though  trained 
reserve. 

In  the  thirty-three  years  which  had 
elapsed  between  the  Civil  War  and 
the  war  with  Spain,  which  now  began 
to  loom  up,  nearly  all  this  personnel 
had  ceased  to  be  valuable  through  age, 
physical  disability  and  many  other  less 
important  causes,  such  as  change  in 
arms  and  equipment.  When  the  war 
with  Spain  began,  it  was  at  once 
apparent  that  nothing  of  importance 
whatever  had  been  taken  to  heart  from 
the  lessons  of  the  Civil  War,  and  that 
we  were  wholly  unprepared  from 
165 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

every  standpoint.  We  were  without 
reserves  of  men,  officers  or  material. 
We  were  using  an  obsolete  rifle,  anti- 
quated artillery,  black  powder.  In 
fact,  we  were  a  military  "  Rip  Van 
Winkle."  Fortunately,  our  navy  was 
stronger  than  the  navy  of  our  enemy, 
and  our  coasts  were  free  from  moles- 
tation. 

Our  condition  at  that  time  was  one 
of  disorganization  and  unprepared- 
ness.  On  every  side  was  lack  of  well- 
thought-out  preparation.  A  clumsy, 
bureaucratic  system  of  administration 
crumbled  under  the  first  pressure  which 
was  put  upon  it;  the  sanitary  adminis- 
tration of  our  camps  showed  in  many 
instances  lack  of  elementary  knowledge 
and  reasonable  prudence,  and  an  entire 
want  of  discipline.  There  were  some 
marked  exceptions,  but  generally 
166 


IN  THE  SIXTIES 


speaking,  sanitary  incompetency,  to- 
gether with  administrative  failure, 
served  to  give  us  a  death  list  from 
diseases  many  times  greater  than  that 
from  bullets. 


167 


chapter  vii 
The  Value  of  Preparedness 

"The  safety  of  the  United  States, 
under  divine  protection,  ought  to  rest 
on  the  basis  of  systematic  and  solid 
arrangements  exposed  as  little  as  pos- 
sible to  the  hazards  of  fortuitous  cir- 
cumstances. "  —  George  Washington, 
Third  Annual  Address. 

The  safety  of  our  country  and  its 
institutions,  the  opportunity  to  enjoy 
life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness under  the  American  flag,  will 
be  jeopardized  unless  there  is  well- 
thought-out,  well-organized  prepared- 
ness—  a  preparedness  based  upon  the 
principle  that  with  equality  in  the 
opportunities  and  privileges  of  citizen- 
ship goes  hand  in  hand  equality  of 
168 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

obligation  for  service  to  the  nation  in 
peace  or  war. 

Citizenship  means  a  great  deal  or 
it  means  nothing.  To  the  savage  with- 
out a  country  it  is  a  meaningless  word. 

To  the  Roman  it  meant  everything. 
Our  nation  must  be  prepared  if  our 
government  is  to  give  us  that  type  of 
citizenship  which  carries  with  it  the 
privilege  and  the  honors  which  the  word 
implies  when  applied  to  the  citizens  of 
a  great  country,  a  citizenship  of  the 
type  implied  in  the  words  of  the  cen- 
turion to  those  who  were  about  to 
scourge  Saint  Paul  without  trial, 
"  Take  heed  what  thou  doest  for  this 
man  is  a  Roman." 

While  just  and  tolerant  we  must  be 

prepared  and  strong  enough  on  land 

and  sea   so   that  those   contemplating 

injury  to  one  of  our  citizens  may  hear 

169 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

the  warning  voice,  "  Take  heed  what 
thou  doest  for  this  man  is  an 
American." 

The  people  whom  preparedness  most 
concerns,  both  from  their  number  and 
in  the  unfortunate  result  of  the  absence 
of  preparedness,  are  the  wives  and  the 
families  of  the  men  who  in  war  consti- 
tute the  rank  and  file  of  our  armies. 
The  great  mass  of  our  population,  they 
feel  more  severely  than  any  other  class 
the  results  of  a  disastrous  war  —  the 
loss  of  men,  the  loss  of  protectors  and 
supporters.  We  desire  for  them  a 
better  destiny. 

Avoidance  of  war  will  be  rendered 
far  more  probable  and  peace  far  more 
secure  by  such  well-ordered  measures 
in  the  way  of  preparedness  as  will  pro- 
tect us  against  unjust  aggression,  and 
by  such  sound  training  and  education 
170 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

of  our  children  as  will  fill  them  with 
a  sense  of  justice  and  fair  dealing. 

Whether  or  not  the  time  will  come 
when  war  will  be  controlled  by  a  league 
of  nations,  and  a  discussion  of  diffi- 
culties insisted  upon  before  a  resort  to 
force,  is  a  question  which  time  alone 
can  answer.  We  hope  it  may  be  so. 
In  the  meantime,  work  for  this  as  we 
may  and  as  we  should,  we  must  not 
forget  the  situation  which  confronts  us, 
the  conditions  which  surround  us. 

As  we  look  back  over  the  long  and 
needlessly  costly  wars  of  the  past,  we 
realize  how  much  was  due  to  the  lack 
of  preparedness. 

The  practical  and  vital  questions 
that  now  concern  us  are:  Have  we 
learned  anything  from  these  hideously 
costly  and  wasteful  wars?  Are  we 
prepared  to  take  steps  necessary  to 
171 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

establish  a  rational  degree  of  prepar- 
edness, which  will  not  only  serve  as  an 
insurance  for  peace  but  will,  if  we  are 
forced  into  war,  make  it  short  and 
limit  the  expenditure  of  life  to  the 
minimum.  Or  are  we  going  on  to 
our  next  war  without  organization  and 
without  preparation,  depending  upon 
the  unexpected,  some  happy  chance, 
some  dreamed-of  invention,  which  will 
make  good  our  lack  of  preparation, 
or  tend  to  insure  our  protection?  Men 
work  their  own  miracles  in  matters  of 
defense. 

The  only  war  we  have  to  fear  is 
war  with  a  highly  organized  and  thor- 
oughly prepared  power  of  the  first 
class.  Nothing  will  protect  us  against 
defeat  or  destruction  in  such  a  war, 
except  the  most  thorough  organization 
and  careful  preparation  made  in  time 
172 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

of  peace.  We  must  remember  the 
world-old  slogan,  than  which  truer 
words  were  never  uttered,  "  In  time  of 
peace  prepare  for  war."  We  might 
vary  it  by  saying,  "  In  time  of  peace 
make  such  preparation  against  war  as 
will  make  it  improbable,"  but  however 
we  state  it,  it  means  preparation  — 
careful,  thorough  and  well  thought  out. 
In  considering  this  great  question, 
it  must  constantly  be  borne  in  mind 
that  we  have  never  yet  in  all  our  his- 
tory engaged  single-handed  in  war  with 
a  first-class  power  prepared  for  war. 
This  experience  is  undoubtedly  before 
us  unless  our  history  is  to  be  different 
from  that  of  all  other  peoples,  an 
assumption  which  is  wholly  unwar- 
ranted. We  may  see  no  concrete  dan- 
ger at  the  present,  but  in  these  times, 
although  at  peace,  we  are  like  a  ship 
173 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

in  the  cyclone  area  with  messages  con- 
stantly coming  in  over  the  wireless, 
bearing  tales  of  storm  and  disaster  all 
about  us.  We  are  poor  sailors  and 
unworthy  of  the  trust  and  responsi- 
bility placed  upon  us  if  we  do  not 
take  heed  of  the  warnings. 

Our  wars  have  been  hideously  waste- 
ful of  life  because  we  have  sent  the 
youth  of  our  country  into  war 
untrained  and  undisciplined  —  even 
worse,  we  have  sent  them  unprepared 
either  to  take  care  of  themselves  or 
to  render  efficient  service  as  soldiers. 
We  have  required  of  them  the  sacri- 
fice but  we  have  not  given  them  the 
opportunity  to  make  it  reasonably 
effective.  We  have  sent  them  un- 
trained, willing,  but  unprepared;  we 
have  sent  them  under  officers  ignorant 
of  their  elementary  duties.  We  have 
174 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

thrown  away  their  lives  with  reckless, 
brutal  prodigality.  Fortunately  for 
our  interests  and  national  life,  our 
enemies  have  either  been  inferior  in 
strength  and  resources,  or,  like  our- 
selves, have  been  unprepared  and  have 
had  to  learn  the  art  of  war  while 
engaged  in  war. 

This  would  be  impossible  in  case  of 
war  with  a  strong,  well-organized 
nation,  a  nation  whose  effort  is 
founded  upon  well-thought-out  prep- 
aration —  a  nation  which  has  not  left 
all  the  burden  of  war  for  the  moment 
of  war,  but  has  prepared  in  advance, 
her  organization,  including  reserves  of 
men,  her  equipment  and  adequate  sup- 
plies to  make  good  the  consumption 
and  losses  of  war. 

A  policy  which  permits  a  people  to 
drift  on  willing  but  unprepared,  in 
175 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

spite  of  all  the  lessons  of  the  past, 
ignorantly  proposing  to  place  the  bur- 
dens of  war  wholly  upon  the  period 
of  war,  is  a  policy  which  spells 
destruction  for  this  or  any  other 
people  foolish  enough  to  adopt  and 
follow  it.  It  is  a  policy  which  must 
meet  the  strong  condemnation  of  every 
patriotic  man  who  has  an  interest 
either  in  the  lives  of  his  people  or  the 
welfare  of  his  country.  No  soldier 
worthy  of  the  name,  either  from  the 
standpoint  of  information  or  that  of 
patriotic  impulse,  could  for  a  moment 
advocate  such  a  policy  unless  bowing 
to  political  opportunism  rather  than 
seeking  the  welfare  and  safety  of  his 
country.  The  experience  and  lessons 
of  the  past  are  especially  valuable  if 
we  will  but  heed  them,  for  the  lessons 
taught  by  mistakes  are  ofttimes,  to 
176 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

honest,  open-minded  men,  as  valuable 
as  success. 

Our  system  has  been  most  undem- 
ocratic. We  have  induced  our  people 
by  bounty,  by  gifts  of  land  and  other 
means,  to  discharge  their  plain  mili- 
tary obligations.  We  have  encour- 
aged a  system  which  has  enabled  the 
rich  to  escape  the  blood  tax  —  the 
service  in  war  —  through  their  ability 
to  buy  others  to  take  their  places  in 
the  ranks.  I  refer  to  the  unspeakably 
contemptible,  unpatriotic  and,  for  the 
future,  I  hope,  impossible  practice  of 
buying  substitutes.  Further  resort  to 
these  vicious  practices  should  not  be 
permitted. 

Every    good    American    honors    the 

real  volunteer  spirit,  but  it  is  difficult 

to   understand   how   any   man   who   is 

familiar  with  our  country's  history  can 

177 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

advocate  the  continuance  of  the  volun- 
teer system,  with  its  uncertainties, 
unpreparedness  and  lack  of  equality 
of  service.  We  have  been  warned 
repeatedly  by  the  experience  of  others 
of  the  folly  of  depending  upon  the 
volunteer  system.  The  lack  of  train- 
ing, the  uncertainty  in  the  way  of 
returns,  the  cost,  the  confusion,  have 
all  served  to  demonstrate  the  danger 
of  the  procedure;  the  danger  to  us  has 
been  greatly  increased  by  the  thorough- 
ness of  modern  organization  and  the 
rapidity  with  which  armies  can  be 
transported  over  land  or  sea  to  deliver 
attacks  in  force. 

Washington's  letters  are  full  of 
advice  against  trusting  to  uncertain 
returns  and  insisting  upon  organiza- 
tion and  preparation.  The  best  and 
bravest  have  always  rushed  to  the 
178 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

colors  first.  They  are  willing  but 
unprepared,  and  prove  an  almost 
unavailing  sacrifice.  After  the  excite- 
ment wears  off,  men  no  longer  come, 
as  was  seen  during  the  Revolution  and 
during  the  Civil  War.  Then  comes 
the  use  of  the  bounty,  a  most  vicious 
and  demoralizing  practice,  and  then 
the  draft,  and  this  always  in  the  crisis 
of  a  struggle.  What  system  could  be 
more  dangerous  in  these  days  of 
organized  preparedness  ? 

Service  to  the  nation  and  for  the 
nation  in  war  is  a  service  which  every 
man,  rich  and  poor,  must  give,  if 
required,  subject  only  to  the  limita- 
tions of  age  and  health.  When  this 
vital  principle  is  generally  recognized 
and  the  rich  and  the  poor  stand 
shoulder  to  shoulder  in  the  nation's 
service,  there  will  be  much  less  of 
179 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

class  distinction  and  much  more  soli- 
darity and  a  better  national  spirit. 
Individuals  with  more  intelligence 
than  courage  admit  the  general  propo- 
sition that  manhood  suffrage  goes 
hand  in  hand  with  manhood  service, 
and  still  state  that  the  country  is  not 
yet  ready  for  it.  If  it  is  not  ready 
it  is  because  they  and  others  of  their 
kind  lack  the  courage  to  state  and 
urge  their  convictions.  If  there  was 
ever  a  time  in  the  history  of  this 
country  when  it  is  apparent  that  this 
great  principle  should  be  urged  as  the 
only  just  and  equitable  one  —  the 
only  one  on  which  we  can  safely  rely 
—  it  is  to-day,  with  the  lessons  of  the 
greatest  of  all  wars  before  our  eyes. 
That  struggle  shows  conclusively,  as 
have  our  past  wars,  that  a  volunteer 
system  cannot  be  depended  upon  and 
180 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

that  dependence  upon  such  a  system 
means  hastily-raised  and  untrained 
armies,  officered  by  willing  but  unin- 
structed  officers.  It  means  campaigns 
accompanied  by  losses  unnecessarily 
great  and  attended  by  results  far  short 
of  what  could  have  been  obtained. 

We  must  continue  our  efforts  for 
World  Peace,  encourage  arbitration, 
do  all  we  can  to  extend  its  applica- 
tion, but  while  doing  this  we  must  not 
forget  the  fact  —  if  we  do  we  shall 
aid  in  accomplishing  the  destruction 
of  our  own  nation  —  that  the  era  of 
World  Peace  has  not  yet  arrived,  and 
that  arbitration  is  not  yet  of  general 
application.  We  must  not  only  be 
just,  tolerant  and  upright  in  all  our 
dealings  with  other  people,  but  we 
must  also  be  ready  to  meet  the  strength 
of  evil  with  the  force  of  right. 
181 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

Our  people  must  be  organized  and 
prepared  in  order  that  they  may  be 
able  to  uphold  the  institutions  they 
believe  in,  defend  the  right,  and  if 
need  be,  aid  the  oppressed. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  we  cannot 
depend  upon  our  own  fair  dealing 
and  sense  of  justice  to  protect  us,  but 
nevertheless  it  is  a  fact  that  we  cannot. 
In  seeking  the  ideal  we  must  not  for- 
get the  actual;  we  must  not  let  our 
hopes  for  the  future  regulate  entirely 
our  conduct  at  the  present.  A  people 
may  dream  of  peace  and  work  for  it, 
but  they  should  not  lose  sight  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  not  yet  among  us.  We 
are  struggling  for  the  elimination  of 
dreaded  diseases,  but,  realizing  that  we 
have  not  thus  far  been  successful,  we 
take  every  possible  precaution  against 
them.  So  it  is  with  war. 
182 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

It  is  a  pathetic  sight  to  see  a  great 
people,  despite  all  the  teachings  of 
history,  follow  counsels  which  must 
lead  not  only  to  unnecessary  sacrifice 
of  life,  but  even  perhaps  to  the  loss 
of  national  freedom.  It  is  the  duty 
of  all  who  have  gathered  anything 
from  the  history  of  the  past,  to  bring 
before  the  people  frankly  the  lessons 
taught  by  the  past  results  of  lack  of 
organization  and  preparation. 

The  professional  pacifist,  the  advo- 
cate of  unpreparedness  and  nonresist- 
ance,  is  the  most  dangerous  of  our 
citizens.  He  is  generally  eminently 
respectable.  He  is  like  the  well-dressed 
and  well-groomed  typhoid  carrier,  as 
he  goes  about,  poisoning  the  very  life 
of  the  people.  He  advocates  a  policy 
which  if  adopted  will  surely  end  in 
great  and  unnecessary  loss  of  life,  if 
183 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

not  in  the  final  loss  of  our  national 
liberty. 

Assuming  that  our  cause  is  just,  non- 
resistance  and  unpreparedness  mean 
the  establishment  of  a  condition  which 
prevents  our  effectively  defending  the 
right.  It  assures  the  subordination 
of  good  to  evil.  It  is  the  most 
brutal  of  all  policies,  as  well  as  the 
most  cowardly  and  sinister;  brutal 
in  that  it  insures  the  unnecessary 
loss  of  thousands  upon  thousands 
of  our  people  in  a  struggle  that  is 
fruitless  because  it  is  unprepared  and 
unorganized.  It  is  the  more  cowardly 
and  sinister  in  that  it  is  an  admission 
that  there  is  nothing  worth  fighting 
for  —  that  there  are  no  great  prin- 
ciples which  are  worth  the  sacrifice  of 
life.  It  is  a  policy  which  marks  the 
decadence  of  a  people,  and  if  followed' 
184 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

by  the  bulk   of  a  nation  means  that 
its  end  is  at  hand. 

Preparedness  is  based  upon  organi- 
zation. National  preparedness  means 
far  more  than  the  mere  organization 
of  the  army  and  navy.  It  means,  first 
of  all,  the  moral  organization  of  the 
people,  an  organization  which  creates 
in  the  heart  of  every  citizen  a  sense 
of  his  obligation  for  service  to  the 
nation  in  time  of  war  or  other  diffi- 
culty. This  is  the  greatest  part  of 
organization,  and  if  once  accomplished 
all  the  rest  follows  easily  and  natur- 
ally. The  organization  of  the  indus- 
trial resources  of  the  country  would 
place  the  government  in  possession  of 
full  knowledge  concerning  the  capa- 
city of  each  industrial  plant  —  just 
what  it  can  do,  how  much,  and  when 
—  and  at  the  same  time  would  place 
185 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

in  the  possession  of  the  various  indus- 
trial organizations  an  exact  knowl- 
edge of  what  was  expected  of  them 
and  would  see  to  it  that  they  are 
properly  equipped  to  discharge  their 
obligations  promptly  when  called 
upon.  An  organization  which  takes 
into  consideration  transportation,  com- 
munications and  supply;  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  sanitary  service,  and  of  the 
various  special  groups  of  highly- 
trained  men;  an  organization  of  the 
financial  system  of  the  country  so  that 
it  may  have  the  elasticity  and  expan- 
sibility to  meet  the  demands  of  war; 
the  organization  of  the  economical 
resources  of  the  country;  the  careful 
study  of  ways  and  means  to  make 
good  shortages;  organization  of  our 
chemical  resources;  provision  as  far  as 
possible  of  substitutes  for  things  which 
186 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

are  not  found  within  our  own  limits,  so 
that  we  may  be  supplied  in  case  of  loss 
of  sea  power  —  all  these  things  come 
under  organization  and  require  much 
time  for  their  consideration.  This 
cannot  be  accomplished  in  the  haste 
and  confusion  of  war. 

A  wise  nation,  realizing  that  its 
safety  depends  upon  preparation,  and 
that  preparation  depends  upon  organi- 
zation, gives  careful  heed  to  all  these 
questions.  It  is  a  vital  part  of 
national   policy. 

The  fighting  forces  of  the  nation, 
the  land  and  sea  forces,  might  be  com- 
pared to  the  edge  of  an  extremely 
heavy  knife.  The  mass  of  steel  behind 
the  edge  represents  trained  reserves 
of  men,  reserves  of  munitions,  organi- 
zation, transportation,  communication, 
sanitary  units,  special  service  groups 
187 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

—  in  brief,  all  that  great  mass  of 
organization  which  measures  the  might 
of  the  nation,  which  serves  to  renew 
the  cutting  edge  and  to  give  it  the 
rigidity  and  weight  necessary  to  force 
it  home.  It  is  the  type  of  organiza- 
tion which  makes  it  possible  to  apply 
promptly  the  might  of  the  nation,  and 
to  maintain  it  for  the  maximum  period 
of  time;  it  is  organization  which  leaves 
nothing  to  chance.  It  is  a  recognition 
of  the  fact  that  efficiency  can  be 
secured  only  through  preparation, 
and  that  preparation  rests  upon 
organization. 

This  sort  of  preparation  makes 
for  national  unity,  consequently  for 
national  strength.  It  involves  having 
all  the  men  of  a  certain  age  doing 
something  in  common  for  the  nation 
at  the  same  time.  It  makes  for 
188 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

national  solidarity;  it  tends  to  do  away 
with  class  distinctions.  It  tends  to 
build  up  a  truer  national  spirit,  to 
fuse  the  various  elements  into  a  homo- 
geneous mass  which,  with  us,  would 
be  one  of  real  Americanism.  It  tends 
to  the  establishment  of  a  condition 
which  will  obliterate  the  sharp  distinc- 
tions between  the  rich  and  the  poor, 
the  distinctions  of  race  and  creed,  and 
to  make  us  one  homogeneous  mass 
fused  by  common  patriotic  impulses. 
A  people  not  only  willing  but  organ- 
ized and  trained  for  peace  and,  if 
need  be,  for  war. 

If  we  have  faith  in  our  institutions 
and  confidence  in  ourselves,  and  believe 
our  purpose  in  the  world  is  a  worthy 
one,  this  is  a  condition  which  we  should 
strive  to  attain.  Its  attainment  will 
result  in  better  citizens,  better  men 
189 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

physically,  men  better  morally  and 
more  efficient  from  the  economic  stand- 
point, men  more  tolerant  and  more 
observant  of  the  rights  of  others.  They 
will  be  better  physically  because  of 
the  training  which  will  have  placed 
their  bodies  more  fully  under  the  con- 
trol of  their  will,  will  have  built  up 
their  muscles,  corrected  their  physical 
defects,  taught  them  how  to  protect 
themselves  in  camp  and  field  and  to 
ward  off  disease  and  infection.  They 
will  be  better  citizens  morally  because 
of  the  discipline  they  have  had.  They 
will  be  more  observant  of  the  law 
and  the  constituted  authorities;  more 
observant  of  the  rights  of  others; 
more  efficient  economically  because  of 
their  habits  of  discipline,  regularity 
and  promptness.  They  will  appreciate 
that  with  the  rights  and  opportunities 
190 


VALUE  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

of  citizenship  go  its  obligations.  They 
will  be  all-around  better  citizens,  and 
collectively  we  shall  be  a  better  nation. 
An  approximate  idea  of  the  unneces- 
sary cost  of  our  military  establishment 
resulting  from  an  unsound  military 
policy,  is  indicated  by  the  statement  on 
the  following  page,  taken  from  Huide- 
koper's  statement  to  the  Military 
Affairs  Committee  of  the  Senate. 


191 


*0     T? 

CO    r-i 

o  oi 

o     *    ^ 

co  O* 
CO  co^ 

vT  of 

00 


m- 


T3 
P 

o 
O 


O   ^    Q   00  N  O 

05    -*<   CO   CO   05 

b- 

00 

iO   h   X    CO   )C   >C 

05  o  t^  q  co 

°? 

q 

oo*  rH  co  od  t-1  oo 

d  6  ^*  i-4  i-H 

»T5 

!>*■ 

CO    rH    T^   o   o   o* 

rH    O    >C    00    O 

»o 

CO 

O©    h(^1>05 

*T5   CO   O*   CO   CO 

05 

co^  ^ 

r-i    »-H    GO    O    05    O 

05   i-i   CO   O*    CO 

CO 

jtT  -m 

t-h  »0  I>  O  b»  t- 

^   O?    CO   CO    05 

^ 

t-  g 

Tf(    N00    »C    O    »C 

1^  CO    00    CO    00 

05 

^    p 

O    05    CO    00    00    CO 

00    H    H     H     © 

o 

^  cXi 

05    CO    rl    00    CO    CO 

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CO 

05      ^ 

■*H  ^ 

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CO 

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Ph  KH  KH  P-, 


i-H  co  »o 

.    rH    i-l  CO 

^  oo  oo  oo 
Pill 

g     1-H     O*  J^ 

n,  O  H  h 

"  t^  oo  oo 


CO  W  05   O   >ft  05 

-^  ^  ^   CO   CO  CO 

oo  oo  oo  oo  oo  oo 

i— I  r-1  r-!  i^-i  rl  r- 1 

I  I  I    I    I  I 

CO  CO  CO  O  rH  CO 

CO  ^  "*  V5  CO  CO 

00  00  00  00  00  00 


t^  05  W  iTi 

05  05  O  i— • 

00  00  05  05 

r-i  i—l  i— l  i— ( 

l  I  I  l 

O  oo  O  S* 

t-  05  O  O 

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(192) 


chapter  viii 
What  We  Should  Do 

"Oh,  ye  Athenians,  yet  is  there 
time!  And  there  is  one  manner  in 
which  you  can  recover  your  greatness, 
or,  dying,  fall  worthy  of  your  past — 
go  yourself,  every  man  of  you,  and 
stand  in  the  ranks;  and  either  a  vic- 
tory beyond  all  victories  in  its  glory 
awaits  you,  or,  falling,  you  shall  fall 
greatly  and  worthy  of  your  past." — 
Demosthenes  to  the  Athenians. 

Our  past  military  policy,  so  far  as 
it  concerns  the  land  forces,  has  been 
thoroughly  unsound  and  in  violation 
of  basic  military  principles.  We  have 
succeeded  not  because  of  it,  but  in 
spite  of  it.  It  has  been  unnecessarily 
and  brutally  costly  in  human  life  and 
recklessly  extravagant  in  the  expendi- 
193 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

ture  of  treasure.  It  has  tended  greatly 
to  prolong  our  wars  and  consequently 
has  delayed  national  development. 

Because  we  have  succeeded  in  spite 
of  an  unsound  system,  those  who  do 
not  look  beneath  the  surface  fail  to 
recognize  the  numerous  shortcomings 
of  that  system,  or  appreciate  how  dan- 
gerous is  our  further  dependence 
upon  it. 

The  time  has  come  to  put  our  house 
in  order  through  the  establishment  of 
a  sound  and  dependable  system,  and 
to  make  such  wise  and  prudent  prepa- 
ration as  will  enable  us  to  defend  suc- 
cessfully our  country  and  our  rights. 

No  such  system  can  be  established 
which  does  not  rest  upon  equality  of 
service  for  all  who  are  physically  fit 
and  of  proper  age.  Manhood  suffrage 
means  manhood  obligation  for  service 
194 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

in  peace  or  war.  This  is  the  basic 
principle  upon  which  truly  representa- 
tive government,  or  free  democracy, 
rests  and  must  rest  if  it  is  successfully 
to  withstand  the  shock  of  modern  war. 

The  acceptance  of  this  fundamental 
principle  will  require  to  a  certain 
extent  the  moral  organization  of  the 
people,  the  building  up  of  that  sense 
of  individual  obligation  for  service  to 
the  nation  which  is  the  basis  of  true 
patriotism,  the  teaching  of  our  people 
to  think  in  terms  of  the  nation  rather 
than  in  those  of  a  locality  or  of  per- 
sonal interest. 

This  organization  must  also  be 
accompanied  by  the  organization,  clas- 
sification and  training  of  our  men  and 
the  detailed  and  careful  organization 
of  the  material  resources  of  the  coun- 
try with  the  view  to  making  them 
195 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

promptly  available  in  case  of  need  and 
to  remedying  any  defects. 

In  the  organization  of  our  land 
forces  we  must  no  longer  place 
reliance  upon  plans  based  upon  the 
development  of  volunteers  or  the  use 
of  the  militia.  The  volunteer  system 
is  not  dependable  because  of  the  uncer- 
tainty as  to  returns,  and  in  any  case 
because  of  lack  of  time  for  training 
and  organization. 

Modern  wars  are  often  initiated 
without  a  formal  declaration  of  war 
or  by  a  declaration  which  is  coincident 
with  the  first  act  of  war. 

Dependence  upon  militia  under  state 
control  or  partially  under  state  con- 
trol, spells  certain  disaster,  not  because 
of  the  quality  of  the  men  or  officers, 
but  because  of  the  system  under  which 
they  work. 

196 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

We  must  also  have  a  first-class 
navy,  well  balanced  and  thoroughly 
equipped  with  all  necessary  appliances 
afloat  and  ashore.  It  is  the  first  line 
of  defense. 

We  need  a  highly  efficient  regular 
army,  adequate  to  the  peace  needs  of 
the  nation.  By  this  is  meant  a 
regular  force,  fully  equipped,  thor- 
oughly trained  and  properly  organ- 
ized, with  adequate  reserves  of  men 
and  material,  and  a  force  sufficient  to 
garrison  our  over-sea  possessions, 
including  the  Philippines  and  the 
Hawaiian  Islands.  These  latter  are 
the  key  to  the  Pacific  and  one  of  the 
main  defenses  of  our  Pacific  coast  and 
the  Panama  Canal,  and  whoever  holds 
them  dominates  the  trade  routes  of 
the  greater  portion  of  the  Pacific  and, 
to  a  large  extent,  that  ocean.  The 
197 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

army  must  be  sufficient  also  to  provide 
an  adequate  garrison  for  the  Panama 
Canal,  which  is  an  implement  of  com- 
merce and  an  instrument  of  war  so 
valuable  that  we  must  not  under  any 
conditions  allow  it  to  lie  outside  our 
secure  grasp. 

The  regular  force  must  also  be  ade- 
quate to  provide  sufficient  troops  for 
our  coast  defenses  and  such  garrisons 
as  may  be  required  in  Porto  Rico  and 
Alaska.  The  regular  force  must  also 
be  sufficient  to  provide  the  necessary 
mobile  force  in  the  United  States;  by 
this  is  meant  a  force  of  cavalry, 
infantry,  field  artillery,  engineers  and 
auxiliary  troops  sufficient  to  provide 
an  expeditionary  force  such  as  we  sent 
to  Cuba  in  1898,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  provide  a  force  sufficient  to 
meet  possible  conditions  of  internal 
198 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

disorder.  It  must  also  furnish  train- 
ing units  for  the  National  Guard,  or 
whatever  force  the  federal  government 
may  eventually  establish  in  place  of  it, 
and  provide  sufficient  officers  for  duty 
under  the  detail  system  in  the  various 
departments,  instructors  at  the  various 
colleges  and  schools  where  military 
instruction  is  or  may  be  established, 
attaches  abroad  and  officers  on  special 
missions. 

The  main  reliance  in  a  war  with  a 
first-class  power  will  ultimately  be  the 
great  force  of  citizen  soldiers  forming 
a  purely  federal  force,  thoroughly 
organized  and  equipped  with  reserves 
of  men  and  material.  This  force  must 
be  trained  under  some  system  which 
will  permit  the  instruction  to  be  given 
in  part  during  the  school  period  or  age, 
thereby  greatly  reducing  the  time 
199 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

required  for  the  final  intensive  period 
of  training,  which  should  be  under 
regular  officers  and  in  conjunction 
with  regular  troops.  In  brief,  the 
system  must  be  one  which  utilizes  as 
far  as  possible  the  means  and  oppor- 
tunities now  available,  and  interferes 
as  little  as  possible  with  the  educa- 
tional or  industrial  careers  of  those 
affected.  A  system  moulded  on  the 
general  lines  of  the  Australian  or 
Swiss1  will  accomplish  this.  Some 
modifications  will  be  required  to  meet 
our  conditions. 

Each  year  about  one  million  men 
reach  the  military  age  of  18;  of  this 
number  not  more  than  fifty  per  cent 
are  fit  for  military  service,  this  being 
about  the  average  in  other  countries. 
Far  less  than  fifty  per  cent  come  up 

1  See  Appendix  for  complete  description. 
200 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

to  the  standards  required  for  the  regu- 
lar army,  but  the  minor  defects  reject- 
ing them  for  the  regular  army  would 
not  reject  them  for  general  military 
service.  Assuming  that  some  system 
on  the  general  lines  of  the  Australian 
or  Swiss  must  be  eventually  adopted 
in  this  country,  it  would  seem  that 
about  500,000  men  would  be  available 
each  year  for  military  training.  If  the 
boys  were  prepared  by  the  state  author- 
ities, through  training  in  schools  and 
colleges,  and  in  state  training  areas  — 
when  the  boys  were  not  in  school  —  to 
the  extent  that  they  are  in  Switzerland 
or  Australia,  it  would  be  possible,  when 
they  come  up  for  federal  training,  to 
finish  their  military  training  —  so  far 
as  preparing  them  for  the  duties  of 
enlisted  men  is  concerned  —  within  a 
period  of  approximately  three  months. 
201 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

We  should  be  able  to  limit  the  period 
of  first  line  obligation  to  the  period 
from  eighteen  to  twenty-five,  inclusive, 
or  seven  years,  or  we  could  make  the 
period  of  obligatory  service  begin  two 
years  later  and  extend  it  to  twenty- 
seven.  This  procedure  would  give  in 
the  first  line  approximately  three  and 
one-half  millions  of  men  at  the  age  of 
best  physical  condition  and  of  minimum 
dependent  and  business  responsibility. 
From  the  men  of  certain  years  (classes) 
of  this  period,  organizations  of  federal 
forces  should  be  built  up  to  the  extent 
of  at  least  twenty-five  divisions.  They 
would  be  organized  and  equipped 
exactly  like  the  regular  army  and 
would  be  held  ready  for  immediate 
service  as  our  present  militia  would  be 
were  it  under  federal  control. 

Men   of  these   organizations   would 
202 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

not  live  in  uniform  but  would  go  about 
their  regular  occupations  as  do  the 
members  of  the  militia  to-day,  but  they 
would  be  equipped,  organized  and 
ready  for  immediate  service.  If  emer- 
gency required  it,  additional  organiza- 
tions could  be  promptly  raised  from  the 
men  who  were  within  the  obligatory 
period. 

There  should  be  no  pay  in  peace 
time  except  when  the  men  were  on 
duty  and  then  it  should  be  merely 
nominal.  The  duty  should  be  recog- 
nized as  a  part  of  the  man's  citizenship 
obligation  to  the  nation.  The  organiza- 
tions to  be  made  up  of  men  within 
the  period  of  obligatory  service,  could 
be  filled  either  by  the  men  who  indi- 
cated their  desire  for  such  training  or 
by  drawing  them  by  lot.  This  is  a 
matter  of  detail.  The  regular  army 
203 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

as  organized  would  be  made  up  as 
to-day ;  it  would  be  a  professional  army. 
The  men  who  came  into  it  would  be 
men  who  had  received  in  youth  this 
citizenship  training.  They  would  come 
into  the  regular  army  because  they 
wanted  to  be  professional  soldiers. 
The  regular  army  would  be  to  a  certain 
extent  the  training  nucleus  for  the 
citizen  soldier  organizations  and  would 
be  the  force  garrisoning  our  over-sea 
possessions.  It  would  be  much  easier 
to  maintain  our  regular  army  in  a 
highly  efficient  condition,  as  general 
military  training  would  have  produced 
a  respect  for  the  uniform  and  an  appre- 
ciation of  the  importance  of  a  soldier's 
duty. 

The  reserve  corps  of  officers  would 
be    composed    of    men    who    had    had 
longer  and  more  advanced  training,  and 
204 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

could  be  recruited  and  maintained  as 
indicated  below,  through  further  train- 
ing of  men  from  the  military  schools 
and  colleges  and  those  from  the  officers' 
training  corps  units  of  the  nonmilitary 
universities  and  colleges.  There  would 
also  be  those  from  the  military  training 
camps  and  other  sources,  such  as  men 
who  have  served  in  the  army  and  have 
the  proper  qualifications.  This  would 
give  a  military  establishment  in  which 
every  man  would  be  physically  fit  to 
play  his  part  and  would  have  finished 
his  obligation  in  what  was  practically 
his  early  manhood,  with  little  proba- 
bility of  being  called  upon  again  unless 
the  demands  of  war  were  so  great  as 
to  require  more  men  than  those  of  the 
total  first  line,  eighteen  to  twenty-five 
years,  inclusive.  Then  they  would  be 
called  by  years  as  the  occasion  required, 
205 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

and  would  be  available  for  service  up 
to  their  forty-fifth  year.  It  would  give 
us  a  condition  of  real  national  pre- 
paredness, a  much  higher  type  of 
citizenship,  a  lower  criminal  rate  and 
an  enormously  improved  economic 
efficiency.  Pending  the  establishment 
of  such  a  system,  every  effort 
should  be  made  to  transfer  the  state 
militia  to  federal  control.  By  this  is 
meant  its  complete  removal  from  state 
control  and  its  establishment  as  a 
purely  federal  force,  having  no  more 
relation  to  the  states  than  the  regular 
army  has  at  present.  This  force  under 
federal  control  will  make  a  very  valu- 
able nucleus  for  the  building  up  of  a 
federal  force  of  citizen  soldiers.  Offi- 
cers and  men  should  be  transferred 
with  their  present  grades  and  ratings. 
The  states  have  full  authority  to 
206 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

maintain  a  military  force  of  their 
own  and  under  their  exclusive  control, 
if  they  desire  to  do  so.  Pennsylvania 
has  established  a  state  constabulary 
and  in  doing  so  has  taken  a  long  step 
in  the  right  direction.  Pennsylvania 
has  not  had  to  call  upon  her  militia 
for  strike  or  riot  duty  for  a  good 
many  years. 

As  has  been  recommended  by  the 
General  Staff,  there  should  be  built 
up  with  the  least  possible  delay  a 
corps  of  at  least  50,000  reserve  offi- 
cers, on  lines  and  through  means 
recommended  by  the  General  Staff, 
and  by  means  of  a  further  develop- 
ment of  the  United  States  Military 
Training  Camps  for  college  students 
and  older  men,  which  have  been  in 
operation  for  a  number  of  years. 
These  plans  include  the  coordination 
207 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

of  the  instruction  at  the  various 
military  colleges  and  schools  and 
the  establishment  of  well-thought-out 
plans  for  the  nonmilitary  colleges  at 
which  it  may  be  decided  to  establish 
officers'  training  corps  units  on  lines 
now    under    consideration. 

This  number  of  officers,  fifty  thou- 
sand, may  seem  excessive  to  some,  but 
when  it  is  remembered  that  there  were 
one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  thou- 
sand officers  in  the  Northern  army 
during  the  Civil  War,  and  over  sixty 
thousand  in  the  Southern,  fifty  thou- 
sand will  not  appear  to  be  excessive. 
Fifty  thousand  officers  will  be  barely 
sufficient  properly  to  officer  a  million 
and  a  half  citizen  soldiers.  We  had 
in  service,  North  and  South,  during 
the  Civil  War,  over  four  million  men, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  war  we  had 
208 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

approximately  one  and  a  quarter  mil- 
lion under  arms. 

Under  legislative  provision  enacted 
during  the  Civil  War,  commonly 
known  as  the  Morrill  Act,  Congress 
established  mechanical  and  agricultural 
colleges  in  each  state,  among  other 
things  prescribing  military  instruction 
and  providing  for  this  purpose  officers 
of  the  regular  army.  There  are 
nearly  thirty  thousand  students  at 
these  institutions  who  receive  during 
their  course  military  instruction  for 
periods  of  from  one  to  two  years. 
In  some  cases  the  instruction  is  excel- 
lent; in  others  it  is  very  poor. 

There  are  in  addition  a  large  num- 
ber of  military  colleges  and  schools; 
at  these  there  are  some  ten  thousand 
students,  so  that  there  are  approxi- 
mately forty  thousand  young  men 
209 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

receiving  military  instruction,  nearly 
all  of  them  under  officers  of  the  army. 
This  means  a  graduating  class  of 
about  eight  thousand,  of  whom  not 
more  than  forty-five  hundred  would  be 
fit  to  undergo  military  training. 

These  men  should  be  assembled  in 
United  States  Military  Training 
Camps  for  periods  of  five  weeks  each 
for  two  consecutive  years,  in  order 
that  they  may  receive  that  practical 
and  thorough  instruction  which  in  the 
majority  of  instances  is  not  possible 
during  their  college  course.  With 
these  should  be  assembled  the  men  who 
have  taken  the  officers'  training  course 
at  the  various  nonmilitary  universi- 
ties. This  course,  as  outlined  by  the 
General  Staff,  will  be  thorough  and 
conducted,  so  far  as  the  purely  mili- 
tary courses  and  duties  are  concerned, 
210 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

under  the  immediate  control  of  officers 
of  the  army. 

From  all  these  sources  we  have 
practically  an  inexhaustible  supply  of 
material  from  which  excellent  reserve 
officers  can  be  made.  From  the  men 
assembled  in  camp  each  year,  fifteen 
hundred  should  be  selected  and  com- 
missioned, subject  only  to  a  physical 
examination,  as  they  are  all  men  of 
college  type,  for  one  year  as  second 
lieutenants  in  the  line  and  in  the  vari- 
ous staff  corps  and  departments  of 
the  regular  army.  They  should  receive 
the  pay  and  allowance  of  second  lieu- 
tenants, or  such  pay  and  allowance  as 
may  be  deemed  to  be  appropriate. 

The  men  who  receive  this  training 

would  furnish  very  good  material  for 

reserve  officers  of  the  grade  of  captain 

and  major,  whereas  as  a  rule  the  men 

211 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

jvho  have  not  had  this  training  would 
qualify  only  in  the  grade  of  lieutenant. 

From  this  group  of  men  could  well 
be  selected,  subject  to  the  prescribed 
mental  and  physical  examination,  the 
greater  portion  of  the  candidates  from 
civil  life  for  appointment  in  the  army. 
We  have  the  material  and  the  machin- 
ery for  turning  out  an  excellent  corps 
of  reserve  officers.  All  that  is  needed 
is   to   take   hold   of   it   and    shape   it. 

The  prompt  building  up  of  a  reserve 
corps  of  officers  is  one  of  the  most 
vitally  important  steps  to  be  taken.  It 
is  absolutely  essential.  It  takes  much 
time  and  care  to  train  officers.  Not 
only  should  students  of  the  various 
colleges,  universities  and  schools  where 
military  training  is  given,  be  made 
use  of  to  the  fullest  extent,  but  the 
military  training  camps  which  have 
212 


WHAT  WE  SHOULD  DO 

been  conducted  so  successfully  during 
the  past  few  years  should  be  greatly 
extended  and  made  a  part  of  the  gen- 
eral plan  of  providing  officers  for  the 
officers'  reserve  corps.  It  will  be  nec- 
essary to  place  the  instruction  at  these 
camps  on  a  different  bask  and  to  com- 
bine certain  theoretical  work  with  the 
practical  work  of  the  camp.  This  is  a 
matter  of  detail  which  can  be  readily 
arranged.  The  results  attained  at 
these  camps  fully  justify  their  being 
given  the  most  serious  attention  and 
being  made  a  part  of  the  general  plan 
for  the  training  of  officers. 


213 


chapter  ix 
Constructive  Work  of  the  Army 

"All  civic  virtues,  all  the  heroism 
and  self-sacrifice  of  patriotism,  spring 
ultimately  from  the  habit  men  acquire 
of  regarding  their  nation  as  a  great 
organic  whole,  identifying  themselves 
with  its  fortunes  in  the  past  as  in  the 
present,  and  looking  forward  anxiously 
to  its  future  destinies. " — LecJee. 

Our  people  as  a  whole  do  not  under- 
stand what  a  tremendous  factor  our 
little  army  has  been  in  the  building 
up  of  the  nation  and  the  development 
of  its  resources  from  the  earliest  days. 
They  too  often  think  of  it  only  as  an 
instrument  of  destruction.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  it  has  been  one  of  the  great 
influences  in  opening  up  and  building 
214 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY 

up  the  country  and  maintaining  public 
order.  Of  recent  years  it  has  played 
a  very  great  role  as  an  administrative 
force,  and  in  areas  under  its  control 
great  advances  have  been  made  and 
lasting   benefits   to   humanity   secured. 

Before  and  after  the  Civil  War  the 
army  was  the  main  instrument  in  the 
maintenance  of  order,  the  safeguard- 
ing of  life  and  in  the  opening  up  and 
protection  of  lines  of  communication 
incident  to  the  development  of  the 
West.  This  period  of  the  army's 
activity  was  full  of  fascinating  inter- 
est; it  was  attended  by  much  hard 
and  dangerous  work.  Even  to  this 
day  the  strongest  hold  the  army  has 
upon  the  affections  of  our  western 
people  is  the  result  of  the  work  of 
this  period. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish 
215 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

War  the  army  entered  upon  a  new 
field  of  activity.  The  war  with  Spain 
was  not  a  great  war.  Fighting  was 
limited  to  a  few  hotly-contested  actions 
in  Cuba  and  to  some  of  lesser  impor- 
tance in  Porto  Rico.  Immediately 
upon  the  cessation  of  hostilities  the 
army  was  confronted  with  the  neces- 
sity of  taking  over  the  civil  adminis- 
tration of  the  conquered  territory. 
This  administration  was  conducted 
under  the  broad  authority  of  military 
law,  but  the  agency  employed  was  the 
law  of  the  land.  It  was  military  for 
the  time  being,  in  that  its  source  of 
authority  was  the  power  of  the  mili- 
tary occupant.  Some  deviations  in 
form  of  procedure,  due  to  emergency 
measures,  were  required,  but,  generally 
speaking,  the  municipal  law  governed 
in  the  town  and  city,  and  the  general 
216 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY 

law  of  the  land  in  the  administration 
of  justice  and  the  control  of  admin- 
istrative procedure.  The  basic  policy 
was  to  avoid  changes  in  the  substan- 
tive body  of  the  law,  and  to  limit,  as 
far  as  possible,  modifications  to  pro- 
cedure, with  a  view  to  its  betterment 
and  simplification,  and  also  to  giving 
the  accused  a  larger  measure  of 
protection. 

The  administrative  work  in  Cuba 
not  only  involved  the  everyday  con- 
duct of  public  business,  but  an 
immense  amount  of  constructive  work 
incident  to  the  establishment  of  a 
school  system,  construction  of  great 
public  works,  and  of  the  general  laws 
governing  charitable  institutions,  as 
well  as  an  enormous  amount  of  sani- 
tary organization,  an  electoral  law  and 
constructive  and  administrative  work 
217 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

to  bring  about  the  many  changes  nec- 
essary to  convert  a  war-wrecked, 
demoralized  and  exhausted  colony, 
fever-stricken  and  overrun  by  disease, 
into  a  self-governing  republic. 

This  great  work  of  the  army 
involved  not  only  the  maintenance  of 
public  order  and  the  safeguarding  of 
life  and  property,  but,  what  was  more 
far-reaching,  the  building  up  of  a 
sound  system  of  sanitation,  a  system 
which,  when  once  in  operation,  greatly 
reduced  the  death  rate.  Malaria,  in 
its  various  forms,  had  been  one  of 
the  great  causes  of  death  in  Cuba. 
Measures  were  taken  which  very 
greatly  reduced  its  ravages  among  the 
native  population  and  almost  elimi- 
nated it  from  the  army.  Smallpox 
had  been  a  devastating  scourge.  This 
was  done  away  with  entirely  by  vacci- 
218 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY 

nation  and  the  establishment  of  proper 
regulations.  Yellow  fever,  one  of  the 
most  dreaded  of  all  tropical  diseases, 
was  brought  under  thorough  control, 
the  means  of  transmission  discovered 
and  the  method  of  control  worked  out. 
This  discovery  freed  Cuba  of  the  dread 
disease  which  has  swept  away  count- 
less thousands  of  its  population  and 
decimated  the  Spanish  garrisons  and 
the  Spanish  population  for  genera- 
tions. It  is  a  discovery  of  vast  impor- 
tance for  all  time  to  all  living  in  the 
American  tropical  and  semi-tropical 
countries.  Its  accomplishment  was  the 
work  of  medical  officers  of  the  army 
under  the  direction  of  Major  Walter 
Reed.  The  general  sanitary  work  in 
the  Island  was  under  the  control  of 
an  army  medical  officer  who  was 
directly  under  the  military  governor. 
219 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

Cuban  physicians  of  great  ability  co- 
operated loyally  in  the  great  work  of 
the  sanitary  rehabilitation  and  ren- 
dered invaluable  service.  The  discov- 
eries made  in  Cuba  and  the  methods 
established  for  the  control  of  yellow 
fever  were  adopted  by  other  countries 
and  the  benefits  secured  are  now  com- 
mon to  all  countries  formerly  ravaged 
by  this  disease.  The  saving  of  life 
and  money  in  our  own  country  inci- 
dent to  doing  away  with  yellow  fever 
and  the  quarantine  that  paralyzed  the 
movement  of  business  in  the  entire 
South,  has  been  many,  many  times 
the  cost  of  the  war. 

In  Porto  Rico  similar  work  was 
done  with  reference  to  malaria  and 
smallpox.  The  same  methods  were 
applied  as  were  employed  in  Cuba 
to  control  yellow  fever.  The  great 
220 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY 

problem  of  tropical  anemia  was  taken 
up  and  solved.  A  very  great  portion 
of  the  credit  for  this  work  is  due  to 
the  army,  principally  to  Major  Bailey 
K.  Ashford,  army  surgeon,  who  took 
up  the  work  in  Porto  Rico  and  found 
that  there  was  a  real  cause  for  what 
we  looked  upon  as  tropical  shiftlessness 
and  laziness.  The  cause  was  the  hook- 
worm. Most  energetic  and  successful 
measures  were  taken  to  combat  it. 
Recent  opinion  is  to  the  effect  that  the 
re-energization  of  the  working  class  in 
Porto  Rico  incident  to  doing  away 
with  tropical  anemia  or  hookworm  dis- 
ease, amounts  to  about  60  per  cent 
increased  efficiency.  The  benefits  of 
this  discovery  are  being  applied  to 
many  tropical  and  semi-tropical  coun- 
tries, including  our  own  South.  It 
means  the  re-energization  of  a  great 
221 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

mass  of  the  people.  The  life-saving 
value  is  tremendous.  Each  year  in 
Porto  Rico  the  reduction  in  the  death 
rate  incident  to  the  control  of  tropical 
anemia,  exceeds  the  total  loss  by  death 
and  wounds  in  the  Spanish- American 
War.  Important  constructive  and 
administrative  work  was  also  accom- 
plished, during  the  period  of  military 
control,  much  of  it  directly  under  the 
military  governors  who  were  first 
appointed. 

Similar  work,  administrative,  con- 
structive and  sanitary,  was  accom- 
plished in  the  Philippines.  There  for 
a  long  time  the  government  was  under 
exclusive  military  control.  Much  val- 
uable and  far-reaching  sanitary  work 
was  done  in  those  islands  by  medical 
officers  of  the  army.  This  work  has 
been  taken  up  and  continued  by  the 
222 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY 

medical  forces  of  the  civil  government 
and  pushed  to  a  degree  of  success  hard 
to  appreciate  by  those  who  have  not 
seen  what  has  been  done.  It  has  been 
a  great  work,  resulting  in  the  saving 
of  thousands  and  thousands  of  lives. 
The  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal 
was  largely  army  work.  It  was  built 
very  largely  on  a  sanitary  foundation. 
Splendid  and  effective  as  has  been  the 
work  of  the  army  engineers,  the  fright- 
ful death  toll  would  have  prevented  the 
accomplishment  of  the  undertaking 
had  it  not  been  for  Reed's  discovery 
concerning  yellow  fever  and  the  splen- 
did application  of  the  system  of  pre- 
vention by  Surgeon- General  William 
C.  Gorgas,  who  made  it  possible  to 
conduct  the  gigantic  work  of  construc- 
tion under  conditions — so  far  as  health 
was  concerned — equal  to  those  existing 
223 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

in  almost  any  portion  of  the  conti- 
nental United  States.  These  great 
sanitary  works  in  lands  under  our  con- 
trol or  taken  over  by  us,  alone  have 
saved  many  times  the  number  of  lives 
lost  in  the  war.  The  benefits  of  these 
discoveries  will  be  for  all  time. 

More  recently  other  measures  of  the 
greatest  value  in  saving  human  life 
have  been  taken  by  the  military  authori- 
ties of  the  government  in  the  use  of 
the  anti-typhoid  serum  in  the  army;  so 
effective  has  the  serum  been  that 
although  there  are  more  than  100,000 
men  scattered  all  over  the  world  from 
Tientsin,  China,  to  Panama,  and  from 
Porto  Rico  to  Alaska,  in  the  army  we 
did  not  have  a  single  death  from 
typhoid  in  1915. 

The  universal  application  of  this 
preventive  measure  in  the  army  has 
224 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY 

demonstrated  thoroughly  that  typhoid 
fever  can  be  completely  controlled;  that 
it  is  a  preventable  disease.  Its  univer- 
sal application  to  the  military  estab- 
lishment was  first  made  in  the  United 
States.  England  first  began  the  use 
of  it,  but  did  not  make  it  general. 

The  army  has  done  tremendous  serv- 
ice for  the  country  in  the  handling  of 
the  grave  and  alarming  conditions 
arising  from  the  great  Mississippi  flood 
of  recent  years.  So  quietly  was  this 
work  done  that  few  people  appreciate 
it;  thousands  and  thousands  of  people 
have  been  saved  from  watery  graves 
or  from  starvation. 

Such  has  been  some  of  the  con- 
structive and  life-saving  work  of  the 
army.  A  force  designed  to  protect 
our  lives  and  liberties  in  time  of  war, 
in  time  of  peace  it  has  always  been 
225 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

one  of  the  great  factors  in  the  develop- 
ment of  our  own  country  and  of  lands 
under  our  control. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  again  and 
again  in  the  foregoing  pages,  the  train- 
ing which  men  get  in  the  army,  the 
knowledge  of  sanitation,  the  respect 
for  law  and  authority,  and  the  habits 
of  discipline,  are  of  unestimable  value 
in  building  up  a  sane  and  sound  people. 
What  the  army  has  meant  to  our  peo- 
ple, how  far-reaching  its  work  has  been, 
is  understood  by  few.  It  may  at  times 
fail,  and  in  great  emergency  must  fail 
unless  backed  and  supported  by  an 
organized  and  devoted  people,  a  people 
who  appreciate  that  no  amount  of  will- 
ingness can  take  the  place  of  prepared- 
ness and  training. 

Behind  the  regular  army  must 
always  stand  the  great  reserve  army 
226 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY 

consisting  of  the  able-bodied  men  of 
the  nation,  so  trained  as  to  be  promptly 
available  for  military  service  if  needed, 
but  following  their  normal  occupations 
in  time  of  peace. 

Any  policy  which  fails  to  recognize 
the  principle  of  equal  obligation  and 
equal  service  is  but  a  makeshift  and  a 
stop-gap.  The  volunteer  system  is 
unworthy  of  serious  consideration; 
not  trustworthy  because  it  would  cer- 
tainly break  down  under  the  sudden 
shock  and  strain  of  modern  war;  dan- 
gerous because  it  serves  to  lull  people 
into  a  false  sense  of  security. 


227 


APPENDIX 

THE  AUSTRALIAN  SYSTEM  OF 
DEFENSE. 

Prior  to  1870  the  main  defense  of  Australia 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  British  troops  quar- 
tered in  the  leading  cities ;  the  primary  purpose 
of  these  troops  was  to  serve  as  a  convict  guard. 
Whenever  war  appeared  to  be  imminent  volun- 
teer corps  were  organized. 

All  British  troops  were  withdrawn  in  1870, 
and  small  detachments  of  permanent  forces 
were  formed  as  a  nucleus  around  which  it  was 
proposed  to  shape  a  citizen  soldiery.  In  1883- 
1884  a  partially  paid  volunteer  militia  was 
organized.  There  was  established  at  this  time 
a  system  of  military  instruction  in  the  schools 
for  boys.  This  cadet  system  had  attained  con- 
siderable development,  but  had  not  reached  the 
class  of  boys  who  fail  for  any  reason  to  attend 
these  schools,  and  was  purely  of  a  volunteer 
nature.  In  1903  the  volunteer  system  was  ex- 
tended by  providing  for  the  military  training 
of  the  youth  not  attending  school,  and  who  were 

228 


APPENDIX 

authorized  to  form  a  part  of  the  land  defense 
of  the  country.  This  system  for  both  the  gen- 
eral forces  and  the  cadet  forces  proved  unsat- 
isfactory, so  that  in  1909  a  statute  was  passed 
making  both  the  cadet  system  and  the  adult 
system  compulsory.  This  act  of  1909  did  not 
become  effective  until  June  30,  1911,  on  which 
date  the  volunteer  system  ceased,  and  on  the 
following  day  the  compulsory  provisions  of  this 
act  became  effective.  They  divided  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  the  Commonwealth  into 
"permanent"  and  "citizen"  forces — the  former 
bound  to  service  for  a  term,  the  latter  not  so 
bound.  Until  1911  they  were  divided  into 
militia  who  were  paid  and  volunteers  who  were 
not  ordinarily  paid  for  their  services,  with  a 
reserve  who  had  done  active  service. 

Until  July  1 ,  1911,  when  compulsory  training 
went  into  effect  under  the  Act  of  1909,  enlist- 
ment in  time  of  peace  was  voluntary.  All  male 
inhabitants  between  18  and  60  were  liable  to 
service  in  time  of  war  within  the  territorial 
limits  of  Australia  only,  and,  in  addition,  cadet 
corps,  in  which  were  enrolled  schoolboys  under 
12  years  of  age  and  youths  between  14  and  19 
not  attending  school,  were  established.  These 
corps  were  not  liable  for  active  service. 

The  Act  of  1909  was  the  direct  outcome  of 

229 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

the  feeling  shared  by  all  classes  in  the  com- 
munity that  the  defense  of  Australia  was  inse- 
cure under  a  voluntary  system;  section  125  of 
this  Act  provides: 

All    male    inhabitants    of    Australia 
(excepting  those  who  are  exempted  by 
this   Act),   who    have    resided    therein 
for   six   months   and   are   British   sub- 
jects, shall  be  liable  to  be  trained  as 
follows:     (a)  From  12  to  14  years  of 
age  in  the  junior  cadets;  (b)  From  14 
to  18  years  of  age  in  the  senior  cadets; 
(c)  From  18  to  26  years  of  age  in  the 
citizen  forces ;  provided  that,  except  in 
time  of  imminent  danger  or  war,  the 
last  year  of  service  in  the  citizen  forces 
shall  be  limited  to  one  registration  or 
one  muster  parade. 
The  Acts  of   1910-1913  merely  extended  or 
curtailed   certain   minor   provisions   of  the  Act 
of  1909.     To-day  the  system  is  substantially  as 
follows : 

On  July  1st  of  his  12th  year  every  Australian 
boy  who  has  been  officially  declared  physically, 
mentally  and  morally  fit,  starts  his  training  as 
a  junior  cadet.  He  is  furnished  with  a  hat, 
shirt,  breeches,  puttees  and  shoes,  and  is  given 
a   minimum   of   90   hours'   elementary   military 

230 


APPENDIX 

training  for  each  of  two  years.  In  his  14th 
year  he  becomes  a  senior  cadet — his  funda- 
mental military  training  for  four  years,  with 
an  annual  minimum  of  four  4-hour  drills, 
twelve  2-hour  drills  and  twenty- four  1-hour 
drills  in  marching,  discipline,  the  handling  of 
arms,  physical  drill,  guard  duty  and  minor  tac- 
tics. A  cadet  rifle  and  belt  are  added  to  his 
"junior"  uniform,  and  10  per  cent  of  the  best 
shots  are  given  target  practice  with  the  service 
rifle.  In  his  nineteenth  year  the  youth  becomes 
a  member  of  the  "citizen  forces."  He  receives 
two  woolen  shirts,  two  pairs  of  breeches,  over- 
coat, hat,  sleeping  cap,  two  pairs  of  leggings, 
two  pairs  of  shoes,  a  kit  bag,  rifle  and  bayonet. 
In  the  "citizen  forces"  the  minimum  annual 
instruction  must  reach  an  equivalent  of  sixteen 
whole  days'  drill,  not  less  than  eight  of  which 
must  be  in  camps  of  continuous  training. 

From  the  senior  cadets  the  youth  is  assigned 
to  that  arm  of  the  "citizen  forces"  to  which  he 
seems  best  fitted  and  in  which  he  is  most  inter- 
ested, and  is  given  infantry  and  cavalry  drill, 
or  staff  corps  training  until  he  is  25  years  of 
age.  In  his  26th  year  he  is  required  to  attend 
one  muster  parade  only,  and  is  then  discharged 
from  "active"  service.  He  remains,  however, 
subject  to  recall  to  the  colors  in  time  of  war 

231 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

until  he  becomes  60  years  of  age.  If  he  is 
declared  proficient  at  the  end  of  each  year's 
training  by  a  board  of  officers  convened  to  pass 
judgment,  he  has  received  twelve  years  of  sys- 
tematic progressive  military  training.  To  win 
his  discharge  he  must  hold  twelve  annual  cer- 
tificates of  proficiency — a  failure  to  pass  the 
efficiency  board  means  a  repetition  of  that  year 
of  training.  Promotions  in  the  "citizens"  forces 
are  absolutely  by  merit,  the  principle  adopted 
being  that  "the  best  soldiers  must  lead,  what- 
ever their  civil  avocation  or  birth."  The  pop- 
ulation of  Australia  of  military  age  is  about 
500,000.  Exemptions  and  rejections  average 
about  10  per  cent  for  senior  cadets  and  33  1-3 
per  cent  for  "citizen  forces."  The  number 
under  training  when  the  system  is  in  full  sway 
will  give  100,000  senior  cadets  and  120,000 
"citizen"  soldiers.  The  available  trained  force 
of  Australia  will  in  the  course  of  a  few  years 
approximate   300,000  men. 

Under  the  Defense  Acts  the  following  classes 
of  exemptions  exist:  Persons  physically,  men- 
tally or  morally  unfit,  members  and  officers  of 
parliament,  judges,  police,  prison  employees, 
ministers  of  religion,  lighthouse  keepers,  and 
physicians  and  nurses  of  public  hospitals.  The 
governor  general  may  by  proclamation  vary  or 

232 


APPENDIX 

extend  these  exemptions,  or  he  may  exempt 
specified  areas.  Persons  whose  religion  or 
belief  prohibits  them  from  bearing  arms  may 
be  exempted  from  service  in  the  combatant 
branches,  but  are  liable  for  service  in  the  sup- 
ply departments;  and  in  every  case  the  burden 
of  proof  rests  upon  the  person  claiming  exemp- 
tion. The  parent  or  guardian  who  fails  to  reg- 
ister a  son  or  ward  of  service  age,  or  the 
employer  who  interferes  in  any  way  with  the 
miltary  service  of  his  employees,  although  he 
is  not  required  to  pay  an  employee  for  time 
absent  on  military  duty,  is  liable  to  a  heavy 
fine,  and  the  boy  or  man  who  is  absent  from  a 
formation  may  be  fined  or  imprisoned. 
/^Should  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  pass 
the  proposed  act  to  partially  pay  our  organized 
militia,  our  system  of  defense  will  be  practically 
that  which  was  long  ago  abandoned  by  Austra- 
lia as  "insecure."  The  effect  of  the  present  sys- 
tem is  the  constant  maintenance  of  an  adequate, 
trained  force,  which  is  under  the  direct  control 
of  the  commonwealth  in  time  of  emergency. 

The  government  maintains  "area  officers" 
who  look  after  registration  and  enrollment  of 
the  available  recruits  in  their  districts,  and  it 
supplies  its  forces  with  a  simple,  inexpensive 
uniform,  but  no  pay. 

233 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

The  young  men  of  Australia  give  a  small 
amount  of  their  time  to  the  service  of  their 
country,  and  in  return  receive  the  best  kind  of 
mental  and  physical  training  at  the  most  recep- 
tive period  of  their  lives.  The  expense  to  the 
government  is  small,  the  benefits  derived  by  it 
and  the  individuals  it  accepts  for  training  are 
__  many  and  important. 

The  foregoing  is  a  brief  synopsis  of  the 
Australian  system.  It  will  be  noted  that  to 
apply  this  system  in  this  country,  where  prac- 
tically the  entire  matter  of  education  is  in  the 
hands  of  forty-eight  state  governments  instead 
of  being  in  the  hands  of  the  general  government, 
will  require  considerable  modification  for  its 
practical  application.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
practically  the  greater  portion  of  the  inherent 
difficulties  attending  the  securing  of  efficiency  in 
the  militia  will  have  to  be  overcome  in  the 
establishment  of  an  efficient  system  of  military 
training  of  any  kind  that  is  undertaken  by  our 
government.  It  is  not  believed  that  these  diffi- 
culties will  be  insurmountable  if  the  people  of 
the  country  can  be  made  to  realize  the  inherent 
defects  in  our  present  system,  and  our  actual 
inability  to  organize  even  a  protective  defensive 
force  in  this  country.  By  this  effective  organi- 
zation is  understood,  of  course,  an  organization 

234 


APPENDIX 

that  can  be  completed  in  time  to  be  of  use 
under  modern  conditions.  The  following  ideas 
are  deemed  to  be  essential  to  efficiency  in  any 
system  of  defense  that  may  be  adopted,  viz: 

1.  Absolute    and    unqualified    control   by    the 

central  or  responsible  power. 

2.  A  nation-wide  appreciation  of  the  needs  of 

the  country  in  the  form  of  national  de- 
fense. 

S.  The  actual  training  and  organization  of  a 
sufficient  number  of  regular  troops  to 
act  as  an  expeditionary  force  or  as  a 
retaining  force  until  the  citizen  soldiers, 
whether  cadets  or  militia,  can  be  mob- 
ilized. 

4.  That  this  citizen  force,  composed  as  it 
must  be  of  militia  and  students,  shall  be 
not  only  trained,  but  organized  into 
fixed  defensive  units,  at  all  times, 
whether  in  peace  or  war,  under  the  con- 
trol and  subject  to  the  direct  call  of 
the  President  as  Commander  in  Chief 
of  the  Land  and  Naval  Forces. 


235 


THE  SWISS  SYSTEM  OF  DEFENSE. 

"Nothing  is  more  powerful,  happier, 
or  more  praiseworthy  than  a  State 
which  possesses  a  very  great  number 
of  trained  soldiers.  The  independence 
of  the  Swiss  Confederation  rests  not 
upon  assurances  or  promises  of  em- 
perors or  kings,  it  rests  on  a  founda- 
tion of  iron — that  of  our  swords." 

The  Swiss  have  always  recognized  the  neces- 
sity of  universal  military  service,  and  as  early 
as  1291  it  appears  that  all  who  did  not  serve — 
even  widows  and  nuns  —  were  subject  to  a 
special  tax.  From  a  military  policy  based 
upon  hurried  levies  when  war  appeared  to  be 
imminent,  and  which  were  as  broken  reeds  in 
action,  the  Swiss  in  1874  passed  laws  which 
form  the  basis  of  the  present  system.  The 
laws  of  1874  have  from  time  to  time  been 
modified  in  many  minor  respects. 

Today  every  Swiss  schoolboy,  from  the  time 
he  enters  school  until  he  is  graduated,  is  given 
a  systematic  course  of  athletic  training  to  fit 
him  for  his  later  military  service.     This  train- 

236 


APPENDIX 

ing,  which  is  progressive  and  prescribed  by  the 
federal  government,  although  directly  super- 
vised by  the  canton  authorities,  is  followed  in 
every  public  and  private  school  and  institution 
for  boys  in  Switzerland.  The  minimum  time 
devoted  to  this  instruction  is  two  hours  a  week 
for  the  younger  classes,  and  three  hours  a  week 
for  the  older. 

Upon  leaving  school  the  young  man  may  vol- 
unteer for  a  course  in  preliminary  training. 
He  receives  from  50  to  80  hours  a  year  in 
athletics,  marching,  care  and  use  of  the  service 
rifle  and  target  practice  to  include  300  metres. 
This  course  is  purely  voluntary,  and  is  largely 
gone  into  by  those  who  hope  to  win  a  commis- 
sion in  the  Swiss  forces. 

In  his  20th  year,  if  examination  finds  him 
morally,  mentally  and  physically  fit,  he  must 
be  enrolled  as  a  member  of  the  recruit  class 
of  the  local  battalion  of  the  "Elite,"  or  First 
Line.  He  is  furnished  with  a  simple  service 
uniform  and  receives  pay  at  the  rate  of  16  cents 
per  day.  In  his  recruit  year  the  Swiss  receives 
from  60  to  90  days  of  military  training,  depend- 
ing upon  the  branch  of  the  army  he  enters,  by 
instructor-officers  of  the  permanent  establish- 
ment. Every  year  after  the  recruit  year,  he, 
as  a  soldier  of  the  First  Line,  returns  to  the 

237 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

colors  for  at  least  11  days  of  "review"  instruc- 
tion. He  retains  his  uniform,  rifle  and  equip- 
ment in  his  immediate  possession,  and  since  all 
other  impedimenta  is  kept  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  local  organization,  the  details  of  mobili- 
zation  are  greatly  simplified. 

Upon  reaching  the  age  of  32  the  First  Line 
soldier  is  transferred  to  the  Landwehr,  or  Sec- 
ond Line,  and  at  48  to  the  Landsturm  or  Third 
Line.  The  Landwehr  is  a  feeder  for  the  Elite, 
and  is  itself  fed  from  the  Landsturm. 

Officers  are  made  through  merit,  are  given 
special  courses,  and  retained  in  "active"  serv- 
ice for  longer  periods.  The  law  permits  no 
soldier  to  decline  promotion  with  its  added 
responsibilities  in  either  the  commissioned  or 
noncommissioned  grades. 

The  government  encourages  the  formation  of 
rifle  clubs  and  competitions  among  them  in  every 
possible  way,  and  officers  of  the  Second  and 
Third  Lines  make  it  a  practice  to  assemble  often 
for  tactical  discussions  and  war  games. 

Every  soldier  is  insured  against  sickness, 
accident  or  death  by  the  government  while 
under  instruction  or  while  engaged  in  any  mili- 
tary duty. 

Certain  classes  are  exempted  from  active  serv- 
ice in  time  of  peace,  as  members  of  the  Federal 

238 


APPENDIX 

Council,  ministers  of  religion  (except  the  nec- 
essary chaplains),  prison  wardens,  frontier 
guards,  police,  personnel  of  public  hospitals, 
and  railroad  and  steamship  employees,  but  are 
liable  for  service  in  time  of  war  in  their  pro- 
fessional capacities.  The  morally  and  physi- 
cally unfit  are  not  permitted  to  serve,  but  are 
required  to  pay  a  special  income  tax  in  lieu  of 
service. 

In  one  sense  it  may  be  said  that  Switzerland 
has  no  standing  army,  as  its  permanent  estab- 
lishment consists  of  a  general  staff  and  a  small 
number  of  territorial  recruiting  supply  and 
instructor  officers;  yet  with  a  population  of 
4,000,000  in  the  year  1912  it  had  a  fully  organ- 
ized and  equipped,  well  trained  and  disciplined 
force  of  490,430  men  instantly  available.  The 
military  expenses  of  the  Government  for  that 
year  were  $8,229,941,  or  $16.77  per  man. 

While  the  obligatory  military  service  of  the 
boys  is  extremely  short  in  contrast  with  that  of 
the  great  European  powers,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  boy  has  been  receiving  military 
instructions  for  a  number  of  years,  that  he  has 
been  acquiring  a  good  body  and  familiarity 
with  the  rifle  and  a  high  moral  sense  of  his 
obligation  to  his  country,  so  that  when  he  comes 
to  the  colors  he  has  already  absorbed  a  large 

239 


OUR  MILITARY  HISTORY 

proportion  of  the  training  which  the  recruit  has 
to  receive  after  joining  the  colors  in  other 
armies. 

Physical  training  forms  an  essential  part  of 
this  preliminary  work,  and  the  training  is  uni- 
form throughout  the  country,  as  it  could  be  here, 
it  all  being  based  upon  the  calisthenic  meth- 
ods prescribed  by  the  army  regulations.  Prac- 
tically all  of  this  instruction  is  given  by  the 
male  teachers  of  the  public  schools.  Rifle  shoot- 
ing is  encouraged  throughout  the  country,  as  it 
should  be  here. 


240 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


>r>57im 


REC'D  LD 


2    1957. 


JAN  2  s  iqfift 


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af 


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DEC  »  8 1958 


17M«y'65VAf ! 


REC 


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'65  -9  P'K 


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DEGl8'67-dPM 


LD  21-100m-6,'56 

<B9li^««PPEPT» 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


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/  O  o 


YB  476S0 


336840 


1 


A 


7/ . 


JNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LlSfcARY 


